United States District Court, E.D. Michigan
LAMOUNT M. SAPP, Plaintiff,
UNTIED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants.
ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING CASE
Horable Nancy G. Edmunds, Judge
Lamount M. Sapp, a federal inmate incarcerated at the Federal
Correctional Institution in Glenville, West Virginia, has
filed a pro se complaint pursuant to the Federal
Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The Court granted
Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis, and he
is proceeding without prepayment of the filing fee in this
action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After careful
consideration of the complaint, the court summarily dismisses
complaint does not contain allegations regarding the district
in which Plaintiff was convicted or the nature of the
charges. He does allege, however, that he has been in federal
custody since July 24, 2014, and that he was sentenced to a
term of 24 months. Dkt. 1, 1-2. At the time of filing his
complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he has served more than
twice his sentence. As a result, he asserts that he is being
falsely imprisoned by four named Defendants who refuse to
order his release: United States of America, United States
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons -Designation
and Sentence Computation Center, and the United States
Marshal Service - Eastern District of Michigan. He seeks $2,
000, 000 in damages. For what it is worth, the Bureau of
Prison website indicates that Plaintiffs release date is June
complaints filed by a pro se prisoner are subject to the
screening requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 866 (6th Cir. 2000).
Section 1915(e)(2) requires district courts to screen and to
dismiss complaints that are frivolous, fail to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, or that seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); McGore v. Wigglesworth,
114F.3d601, 604(6thCir. 1997). A complaint is frivolous and
subject to sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(e) if it
lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A plaintiff fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, when,
construing the complaint in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff and accepting all the factual allegations as true,
the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in
support if his claims that would entitle him to relief.
Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197
(6th Cir. 1996); Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 179
(6th Cir. 1996); Wright v. MetroHealth Med. Ctr., 58
F.3d 1130, 1138 (6th Cir. 1995).
alleges that he is being falsely imprisoned by Defendants
because he is being kept in custody beyond the expiration of
his federal sentence. Plaintiffs complaint is barred by the
favorable-termination requirement set forth in Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Under the Heck
doctrine, a prisoner may not file a civil suit for damages or
equitable relief if a ruling on his claims would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, until and unless the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid, or called into
question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Id. at 486-87; Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544
U.S. 74, 81-82(2005).
on the teachings of Heck, the Ninth Circuit held in
Erlin v. United States, 364 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir.
2004), that a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
for negligent miscalculation of a release date did not accrue
until the prisoner obtained a writ of habeas corpus:
Even though the action is for miscalculation of the release
date, we conclude that the cause of action did not accrue
when the Parole Commission made the miscalculation. The
reason is that one more thing had to happen before Erlin had
a claim for the miscalculation. He had to prevail in a habeas
case establishing that he was entitled to release. So long as
he was incarcerated, a judgment for damages for the
miscalculation would necessarily imply that he was wrongfully
imprisoned. Thus, the cause of action could not accrue until
he won a writ of habeas corpus. Erlin filed his claim within
two years of the issuance of the writ, so his action was
Id., 364 F.3d at 1130-1131.
the reasoning of Heck and Erlin dictate
that Plaintiffs wrongful imprisonment claim stemming from the
alleged miscalculation of his release date cannot accrue
until he obtains a ruling on petition for writ of habeas
corpus that his sentence has expired.
conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, the Court determines that Plaintiffs action will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 ...