United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS
BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
matter is before the Court on defendant G4S Secure Solutions
USA, Inc.'s motion to dismiss [docket entry 7]. Plaintiff
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has responded and G4S
has replied. Pursuant to LR. 7.1(f), the Court shall decide
this motion without a hearing.
This is
an EEOC enforcement action against G4S, in which the EEOC
alleges that G4S violated the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.
It alleges that in May 2015 G4S removed Christine Ross
(“Ross”) “from her seated security officer
position and placed in her in a foot-patrol position.”
Compl. ¶¶ 13(a)-(e). Ross struggled with this new
position because of her connective tissue disorder and lupus.
Id. Due to her health complications, Ross asked to
return to her seated-security position. Id. Instead
of granting her request, one month later, G4S terminated her.
Id.
Ross
subsequently filed a disability discrimination charge with
the EEOC. Id. ¶ 7. In May 2017, the EEOC issued
G4S a Letter of Determination inviting G4S to participate in
informal conciliation efforts. Id. ¶ 9. The
parties failed to reach a conciliation agreement,
id. ¶ 11, so the EEOC filed suit in this Court
seeking compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive
relief for Ross.
G4S now
moves to dismiss the complaint for three reasons: (1) the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the EEOC did
not attach its Charge of Discrimination to the complaint, (2)
Ross's condition does not constitute a disability within
the meaning of the ADA, and (3) the EEOC did not exhaust its
administrative remedies.[1]
When
deciding a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court must
“construe the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, accept all the factual allegations as true,
and determine whether the plaintiff can prove a set of facts
in support of its claims that would entitle it to
relief.” Shane v. Bunzl Distrib. USA, Inc.,
200 F. App'x 397, 401 (6th Cir. 2006).
Subject
Matter Jurisdiction.
The
Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. §
1331, this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over all
civil actions arising under the laws of the United States,
including EEOC enforcement actions. The EEOC alleges that it
brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) to enforce
the ADA. No authority supports defendant's proposition
that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction only when the
EEOC attaches its Charge of Discrimination to the complaint.
The authority defendant cites on this point is inapplicable
and unpersuasive.
Ross's
Disability Under the ADA.
The
complaint, read in the light most favorable to the EEOC,
sufficiently alleges that Ross was disabled within the
meaning of the ADA. Under the ADA, an individual is disabled
if she suffers from “a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life
activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). A physical
impairment is
any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of
the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal;
special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs;
cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary;
hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine[.]
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998) (quoting
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)). “[M]ajor life
activities include, but are not limited to, caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating,
sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking,
breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking,
communicating, and working, ” and also include
“the operation of a major bodily function [such as] the
immune system.” § 12102(2)(A)-(B).
In the
instant case, the EEOC alleges that “Ross has a mixed
connective tissue disorder and lupus, ” both of which
are muskeoskeltal, neurological, and skin-related. These are
physical impairments under 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i). As
the EEOC alleges that Ross's conditions interfered with
her foot-patrol assignment, the Court can reasonably infer
that they substantially limit her walking, which is a major
life activity under § 12102(2)(A). The EEOC also alleges
that Ross's conditions “affect her immunological
function, ” a major bodily function under §
12102(2)(B). In sum, the EEOC sufficiently alleges
plaintiff's disability under the ADA.
Exhaustion
of ...