United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING PLAINTIFF'S
OBJECTIONS AND DENYING HIS REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION (DKT.
MARK A. GOLDSMITH UNITED STATES DISTRICT
November 28, 2016, plaintiff Richmond Brown Taylor, a state
prisoner at the Handlon Correctional Facility in Ionia,
Michigan,  filed a pro se complaint and request for
appointment of counsel and a psychiatric evaluation. (Dkt. 1)
At the time, Plaintiff was confined at the Woodland Center
Correctional Facility in Whitmore Lake, Michigan. The
defendants in this case were: (i) the Mental Health Services
division of the Michigan Department of Corrections; (ii) Jodi
Deangelo, Warden at the Woodland Center Correctional
Facility; (iii) Heidi Washington, Director of the Michigan
Department of Corrections; and (iv) Rick Snyder, Governor of
alleged in his complaint that, on October 20, 2016, he was
forced to pack his property and go to a mental hospital
without any notice or an opportunity to challenge the
transfer. Plaintiff further alleged that Defendants had
threatened to administer psychotropic medication to him and
that they had prevented him from filing any complaints
against prison officials. Plaintiff sought money damages and
a court order directing Deangelo to stop psychiatrists from
administering psychotropic medication to him. Plaintiff did
not submit the filing fee for his complaint, and he claimed
that he should not be required to do so because he was in
December 19, 2016, the Court entered an order that denied
Plaintiff permission to proceed in forma pauperis
and dismissed his complaint under the “three
strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Section
1915(g) states that,
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a
judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section
if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while
incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action
or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed
on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the
prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
Plaintiff invoked the “imminent danger” exception
to the “three strikes” rule, claiming that mental
health professionals intended to administer psychotropic
medication to him, the Court concluded that Plaintiff had
failed to demonstrate he was in imminent danger of serious
injury. Now before the Court are Plaintiff's objections
to the Court's opinion and order denying him permission
to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissing his
to Local Rule 7.1(h), the Court “will not grant motions
for rehearing or reconsideration that merely present the same
issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by
reasonable implication.” E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3).
Rather, a party seeking reconsideration must demonstrate (i)
a “palpable defect” by which the court and the
parties have been “misled, ” and (ii) “that
correcting the defect will result in a different disposition
of the case.” Id. A “palpable
defect” is an error that is “obvious, clear,
unmistakable, manifest or plain.” United States v.
Cican, 156 F.Supp.2d 661, 668 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
raises a number of objections to the Court's dismissal of
his complaint and failure to allow him to proceed in
forma pauperis. Among other things, he claims that he
was falsely convicted in 1992 and that the Court is
deceitful, unreasonable, and hiding behind federal laws.
Objections, pages 2-4 (Dkt. 5). He further alleges that
twenty-four years of having his civil rights violated have
undermined his confidence in court orders, judgments, and
prior verdicts. Id., page 3.
the point, Plaintiff alleges that his prior cases were
wrongly decided and that there is no evidence he failed to
win any of his prior cases. Id., page 5. In its
previous order, however, the Court listed four of
Plaintiff's prior cases that were dismissed as frivolous
or for failure to state a claim,  and Plaintiff has not
explained how his prior cases were wrongly decided.
Section 1915(g) does not direct courts to review the merits
of a prior dismissal, to ask whether the case would have been
addressed by them in a different manner, or whether
subsequent case law might lead to a different result were the
case to be filed today. Rather, “all that matters for
the purpose of counting strikes is what the earlier court
actually did, not what it ought to have done.”
Thompson v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 492 F.3d 428,
438-39 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Finally, it bears repeating
that IFP motions present no occasion for relitigating final
judgments.”); see also Jones v. Moorjani, No.
13 CIV. 2247, 2013 WL 6569703, at *8 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13,
2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. 13 CIV. 2247,
2014 WL 351628 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2014) (citing
Walker v. Cuomo, No. 9:17-CV-0650, 2017 WL 3475061,
at *3 (N.D. N.Y. Aug. 11, 2017) (unpublished).
also alleges that psychotropic drugs are dangerous and that
the Court does not care whether he lives or dies. But, as the
Court pointed out in its previous order, “forced
administration of medication does not necessarily create an
imminent danger of serious physical injury.”
Holbach v. North Dakata, et al., No. 3:13-cv-38,
2014 WL 295153, at *2 (D. N.D. Jan. 24, 2014)(unpublished).
Plaintiff's conclusory allegations, without any facts,
details, or supporting documentation, fail to demonstrate
that he was in imminent danger of serious injury when he
filed his complaint.
the Court rejects Plaintiff's objections and denies his
request for reconsideration of the Court's previous order
dismissing his complaint and denying ...