United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
S. CARMODY U.S. Magistrate Judge
an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's
claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of
the Social Security Act. The parties have agreed to proceed
in this Court for all further proceedings, including an order
of final judgment.
405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative
record and provides that if the Commissioner's decision
is supported by substantial evidence it shall be conclusive.
The Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled
within the meaning of the Act. For the reasons stated below,
the Court concludes that the Commissioner's decision is
supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the
Commissioner's decision is affirmed.
Court's jurisdiction is confined to a review of the
Commissioner's decision and of the record made in the
administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v.
Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 847 F.2d 301,
303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social
security case is limited to determining whether the
Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her
decision and whether there exists in the record substantial
evidence supporting that decision. See Brainard v.
Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 889 F.2d 679,
681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de novo
review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide
questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745
F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). It is the Commissioner who is
charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for
disability benefits, and her findings are conclusive provided
they are supported by substantial evidence. See 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance. See Cohen v. Sec'y of Dep't of
Health and Human Services, 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir.
1992) (citations omitted). It is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347
(6th Cir. 1993). In determining the substantiality of the
evidence, the Court must consider the evidence on the record
as a whole and take into account whatever in the record
fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v.
Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 735 F.2d 962,
963 (6th Cir. 1984). As has been widely recognized, the
substantial evidence standard presupposes the existence of a
zone within which the decision maker can properly rule either
way, without judicial interference. See Mullen v.
Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation
omitted). This standard affords to the administrative
decision maker considerable latitude, and indicates that a
decision supported by substantial evidence will not be
reversed simply because the evidence would have supported a
contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347;
Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
was 45 years of age on her alleged disability onset date.
(PageID.287). She successfully completed high school and
worked previously as a corrections officer, nurse aide,
machine operator, and security guard. (PageID.87). Plaintiff
applied for benefits on November 5, 2013, alleging that she
had been disabled since October 2, 2011, due to fibromyalgia,
migraines, back pain, neck pain, a “possible”
aneurysm, herniated discs, spinal blood clots, carpel tunnel
syndrome, arthritis, thyroid condition, diabetes, anemia,
vitamin deficiencies, hernia, memory loss, depression, and
anxiety. (PageID.287-99, 340). Plaintiff's application
was denied, after which time she requested a hearing before
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (PageID.145-267).
November 18, 2015, Plaintiff appeared before ALJ JoErin
O'Leary with testimony being offered by Plaintiff and a
vocational expert. (PageID.99-143). In a written decision
dated December 22, 2015, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
was not disabled. (PageID.72-89). The Appeals Council
declined to review the ALJ's determination, rendering it
the Commissioner's final decision in the matter.
(PageID.26-31). Plaintiff subsequently initiated this appeal
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review
of the ALJ's decision.
OF THE ALJ'S DECISION
social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential
process for evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R.
'' 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f). If the
Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in
the review, no further finding is required. See 20
C.F.R. '' 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations
also provide that if a claimant suffers from a nonexertional
impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are
considered in determining her residual functional capacity.
See 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1545, 416.945.
burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely
on Plaintiff's shoulders, and she can satisfy her burden
by demonstrating that her impairments are so severe that she
is unable to perform her previous work, and cannot,
considering her age, education, and work experience, perform
any other substantial gainful employment existing in
significant numbers in the national economy. See 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528.
While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step
five, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four
of the procedure, the point at which her residual functioning
capacity (RFC) is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert,
482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (ALJ
determines RFC at step four, at which point claimant bears
the burden of proof).
determined that Plaintiff suffered from: (1) fibromyalgia;
(2) degenerative disc disease; (3) migraines; (4)
osteoarthritis of the left shoulder; (5) bilateral carpal
tunnel syndrome; (6) hypoglycemia; (7) obesity; (8) anxiety
disorder; (9) affective disorder; and (10) personality
disorder, severe impairments that whether considered alone or
in combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy the
requirements of any impairment identified in the Listing of
Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. (PageID.75-78).
respect to Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the capacity to
perform sedentary work subject to the following limitations:
(1) she can frequently perform fingering activities; (2) she
can occasionally balance, stoop, crouch, and climb
ramps/stairs; (3) she can never kneel, crawl, or climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (4) she can never work around
unprotected heights or dangerous moving mechanical parts; (5)
she cannot operate a motor vehicle commercially; (6) she is
limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks not at a
production rate pace; (7) she is limited to simple