United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division
J. QUIST, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court
is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under
federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se
complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations
as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly
incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.
is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at Parnall Correctional Facility (SMT) in
Jackson, Jackson County, Michigan. The events about which he
complains, however, occurred while he was confined at the
Ojibway Correctional Facility (OCF) in Marenisco, Gogebic
County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues an Unknown Party named as
“Julie L. Marquette Branch Manager Honor Credit
alleges that he sent a “limited financial power of
attorney” to the Honor Credit Union and it was returned
to Plaintiff because it had not been drafted by an attorney.
Plaintiff states that he is trying to have his father
appointed as his power of attorney because he suffers from a
brain injury that affects his memory. Plaintiff seeks
equitable relief and damages.
Failure to state a claim
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement, ' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies
to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.
1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself,
the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
contends that he has a claim against Defendant pursuant to
§ 1983, as a result of her refusal to accept his
paperwork to establish his father as his power of attorney.
However, plaintiff has no federal right to force Defendant to
accept his power of attorney paperwork. The purpose of §
1983 is to provide a remedy for the deprivation of federal
rights by a state official's abuse of his position while
acting under color of state law. If there has been no
violation of a federal right, § 1983 is not applicable.
McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417, 419 (6th Cir. 1996),
aff'd, 521 U.S. 399, 117 S.Ct. 2100 (1997);
Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 168 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1018, 115 S.Ct. 581 (1994).
In addition, to prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff
must establish that a person acting under color of state law
deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the
laws of the United States. Searcy v. City of Dayton,
38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994). Defendant in this case is
not a state actor against whom claims can be asserted under
§ 1983. Therefore, because Plaintiff has not alleged the
violation of a federal right by a state actor, his §
1983 action is properly dismissed.
conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, the Court determines that Defendants will be dismissed
for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would
be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court
dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis
for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the
Court will assess the $505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant
to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at
610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in
forma pauperis, e.g., by ...