United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
ALICE RADEN and BOBBIE MOORE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
MARTHA STEWART LIVING OMNIMEDIA, INC., a Delaware Corporation, and MEREDITH CORPORATION, an Iowa Corporation, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION [ECF NO. 27]
V. PARKER, U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.
lawsuit arises from Plaintiffs Alice Raden and Bobbie Moore
(collectively “Plaintiffs”) class action
complaint alleging that Defendants Martha Stewart Living
Omnimedia, Inc. (“Martha Stewart Living
Omnimedia”) and Meredith Corporation
“Defendants”) violated Michigan's Personal
Privacy Protection Act, M.C.L. § 445.1712
(“PPPA”) and were unjustly enriched by disclosing
sensitive and statutorily protected information to third
parties. In an Opinion and Order entered on July 20, 2017,
this Court granted, in part, Defendants' motion to
dismiss. (ECF No. 23.) In that decision, the Court found that
Plaintiffs did not allege “actual damages” as
required under the amended PPPA and dismissed Count I of the
complaint. The Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss
on Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim. Presently before
the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b) filed on August 7, 2017. (ECF No. 27.)
With the Court's permission, Defendant Martha Stewart
Living filed a response to the motion on August 29, 2017.
(ECF No. 29.)
Rule 7.1 provides the following standard for motions for
Generally, and without restricting the court's
discretion, the court will not grant motions for rehearing or
reconsideration that merely present the same issues ruled
upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable
implication. The movant must not only demonstrate a palpable
defect by which the court and the parties and other persons
entitled to be heard on the motion have been misled but also
show that correcting the defect will result in a different
disposition of the case.
E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3). Palpable defects are those which are
“obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest or
plain.” Mich. Dep't of Treasury v.
Michalec, 181 F.Supp.2d 731, 734 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
“It is an exception to the norm for the Court to grant
a motion for reconsideration.” Maiberger v. City of
Livonia, 724 F.Supp.2d 759, 780 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
“To justify reconsideration under Rule 54(b), plaintiff
must show: 1) an intervening change in the controlling law;
2) that new evidence is available; or 3) to correct a clear
error or prevent manifest injustice.”
Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Govt. v. Hotels.com,
L.P, 590 F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir. 2009). “This
standard vests significant discretion in district courts.
Justice does not require that the district court grant
reconsideration on an issue that would not alter its prior
decision.” Kirk v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No.
1:16-00031, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116961, at *9 (M.D. Tenn.
July 26, 2017) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
motion for reconsideration is not properly used as a vehicle
to re-hash old arguments or to advance positions that could
have been argued earlier but were not.” Smith ex
rel. Smith v. Mount Pleasant Pub. Sch., 298 F.Supp.2d
636, 637 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (citing Sault Ste. Marie Tribe
of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th
Cir.1998)). “A motion for reconsideration
‘addresses only factual and legal matters that the
court may have overlooked. . . .' It is improper on a
motion for reconsideration to ‘ask the court to rethink
what [it] had already thought through-rightly or
wrongly.'” Carter v. Robinson, 211 F.R.D.
549, 550 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (quoting Above the Belt, Inc.
v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D.
Va 1983). Therefore, a motion that merely presents the same
issues already ruled upon by the Court shall not be granted.
See Smith ex rel. Smith, 298 F.Supp.2d at 637.
argue that the Court committed a palpable defect when it
based the applicability of the amended PPPA on the date
Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed. Plaintiffs maintain that
the Court erred in failing to recognize that the
applicability of a statute depends on when the cause of
action accrues not when the complaint was filed.
Court set out in its July 20, 2017 Order and Opinion,
“[t]he reading of the statute makes clear the statute
went into effect on July 31, 2016, ” the same date
Plaintiffs' filed their Complaint. (ECF No. 23 at Pg ID
297.) Furthermore, the Court noted that the statute
explicitly states “[t]his act is ordered to take
immediate effect.” (Id. at Pg ID 298.)
the cases Plaintiffs cite, Plaintiffs' Complaint was
filed on the same date the amendment took
“immediate” effect. The conclusion other courts
have reached concerning the applicability of the amended PPPA
is not contrary to this Court's decision because the
complaints in those cases were pending prior to the amendment
taking effect. Here, as supported by a clear reading of the
statute, the intent was for the amendment to take immediate
effect, which happened to be on the same date Plaintiffs
filed their Complaint. Because Plaintiffs failed to allege
“actual damages” as required under the amended
PPPA, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs' PPPA claims.
short, Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a palpable defect in
this Court's July 20, 2017 decision, much less a defect
the correction of which results in a different disposition of
Plaintiffs' claims. Likewise, Plaintiffs failed to show
any intervening change in the controlling law, the
availability of new evidence, or a clear error or manifest
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion
for partial ...