Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Rajapakse v. Credit Acceptance Corp.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

February 6, 2018

SAMANTHA RAJAPAKSE, Plaintiff
v.
CREDIT ACCEPTANCE CORP, et al, Defendants.

          Matthew F. Leitman United States District Judge

          REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR EX PARTE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (Dkt. 19)

          STEPHANIE DAWKINS DAVIS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

         I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         Plaintiff filed this complaint against Credit Acceptance Corporation (CAC) and a number of individual defendants on September 8, 2017 relating to a car loan. (Dkt. 1). District Judge Matthew F. Leitman referred this matter to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. (Dkt. 8). Plaintiff has not yet served the summons and complaint on any defendants. Plaintiff has, however, filed a number of motions, including several motions for “injunctive relief.” (Dkt. 9, 12, 13, 14, 16-19). One motion, [1] filed on February 4, 2018, purports to be a motion for an ex parte temporary restraining order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b), relating to the apparent repossession of plaintiff's vehicle based on an alleged failure to pay her automobile loan with CAC. (Dkt. 19).

         For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS denying plaintiff's motion for ex parte temporary restraining order.

         II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

         In her motion entitled “Supplement Seeking Injunctive Relief Rule 65. Injunctions and Restraining Orders, ” plaintiff says that her car was repossessed and the company who repossessed it “informed her that there was no amount attached to the claim, ” and that she had 24 hours to seek injunctive relief or she would not be able to obtain the return of her vehicle without paying fees. Additionally, the vehicle would be subject to sale. (Dkt. 19, pp. 1-2). Plaintiff says that CAC was supposed to “delete the warranty” and asserts that she has paid CAC the amount she owes for the vehicle. (Dkt. 19, p. 2). According to plaintiff's motion, the agency that seized the vehicle stated that the company will return the vehicle to plaintiff once an order is granted. Id. Plaintiff further explains that her “insurance was removed from her credit and kept on [the] CAC account, causing her vehicle to be seized.” Id. According to plaintiff, CAC has attempted to use the vehicle as leverage. She states that she paid Credit Acceptance for the vehicle and not the warranty. Plaintiff has been demanding that Credit Acceptance Corporation remove the warranty off the coverage of her vehicle since October, 2014 - shortly after financing the vehicle.

         Although CAC has not been served, plaintiff says she has presented sufficient evidence to support the injunctive relief she is seeking. Plaintiff maintains that she does not owe CAC any money and should not be forced to file bankruptcy protection and damage her credit in seeking equal protection. Nor should she endure additional injury as a result of CAC's retaliation. Plaintiff insists that CAC's repossession of her vehicle based on the fraudulent warranty will cause her to lose her employment and become homeless.

         III. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

         The Court has discretion in deciding a motion for temporary restraining order. See Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, 543 F.3d 357, 361 (6th Cir. 2008). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b), which governs requests for temporary restraining orders, states in part:

         The court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if:

(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and
(B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(1). “Reasonable notice” consists of information received within a reasonable time to permit an opportunity to be heard. Brown v. Countrywide Home Loans, 2009 WL 1798069, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 19, 2009) (citing Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439, (1974) (noting that ex parte ‚Äútemporary restraining orders reflect the fact that our entire jurisprudence runs ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.