United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Matthew F. Leitman United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
EX PARTE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (Dkt. 19)
STEPHANIE DAWKINS DAVIS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
filed this complaint against Credit Acceptance Corporation
(CAC) and a number of individual defendants on September 8,
2017 relating to a car loan. (Dkt. 1). District Judge Matthew
F. Leitman referred this matter to the undersigned for all
pretrial proceedings. (Dkt. 8). Plaintiff has not yet served
the summons and complaint on any defendants. Plaintiff has,
however, filed a number of motions, including several motions
for “injunctive relief.” (Dkt. 9, 12, 13, 14,
16-19). One motion,  filed on February 4, 2018, purports to be
a motion for an ex parte temporary
restraining order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65(b), relating to the apparent repossession of
plaintiff's vehicle based on an alleged failure to pay
her automobile loan with CAC. (Dkt. 19).
reasons set forth below, the undersigned
RECOMMENDS denying plaintiff's motion
for ex parte temporary restraining order.
motion entitled “Supplement Seeking Injunctive Relief
Rule 65. Injunctions and Restraining Orders, ”
plaintiff says that her car was repossessed and the company
who repossessed it “informed her that there was no
amount attached to the claim, ” and that she had 24
hours to seek injunctive relief or she would not be able to
obtain the return of her vehicle without paying fees.
Additionally, the vehicle would be subject to sale. (Dkt. 19,
pp. 1-2). Plaintiff says that CAC was supposed to
“delete the warranty” and asserts that she has
paid CAC the amount she owes for the vehicle. (Dkt. 19, p.
2). According to plaintiff's motion, the agency that
seized the vehicle stated that the company will return the
vehicle to plaintiff once an order is granted. Id.
Plaintiff further explains that her “insurance was
removed from her credit and kept on [the] CAC account,
causing her vehicle to be seized.” Id.
According to plaintiff, CAC has attempted to use the vehicle
as leverage. She states that she paid Credit Acceptance for
the vehicle and not the warranty. Plaintiff has been
demanding that Credit Acceptance Corporation remove the
warranty off the coverage of her vehicle since October, 2014
- shortly after financing the vehicle.
CAC has not been served, plaintiff says she has presented
sufficient evidence to support the injunctive relief she is
seeking. Plaintiff maintains that she does not owe CAC any
money and should not be forced to file bankruptcy protection
and damage her credit in seeking equal protection. Nor should
she endure additional injury as a result of CAC's
retaliation. Plaintiff insists that CAC's repossession of
her vehicle based on the fraudulent warranty will cause her
to lose her employment and become homeless.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Court has discretion in deciding a motion for temporary
restraining order. See Ohio Republican Party v.
Brunner, 543 F.3d 357, 361 (6th Cir. 2008). Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 65(b), which governs requests for
temporary restraining orders, states in part:
court may issue a temporary restraining order without written
or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if:
(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint
clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can
be heard in opposition; and
(B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any
efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not
Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(1). “Reasonable notice”
consists of information received within a reasonable time to
permit an opportunity to be heard. Brown v. Countrywide
Home Loans, 2009 WL 1798069, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 19,
2009) (citing Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of
Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439, (1974) (noting that ex
parte “temporary restraining orders reflect the
fact that our entire jurisprudence runs ...