United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
TIFFANY M. ARP, Plaintiff,
CITY OF ROMULUS, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RESTRAIN DEFENDANT FROM
FURTHER HARASSMENT VIA INVESTIGATION, SUBPOENA, AND REQUESTS
FOR INFORMATION (ECF #6)
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
action, Plaintiff Tiffany M. Arp complains that Hussein
Farhat, an officer with the City of Romulus Police
Department, engaged in unlawful investigative tactics that
violated her rights under the federal Constitution, the State
of Michigan Constitution, and Michigan common law.
(See Compl. ECF #1 at Pg. ID 10-24.) Arp asserts
claims against Farhat, the City of Romulus, and the City of
Romulus Police Department.
motion now before the Court, Arp seeks entry of an order
restraining the Defendants from making “requests for
information about Ms. Arp without a proper showing of
probable cause or reasonable grounds to do so….”
(Mot., ECF #6 at Pg. ID 90.) The motion is
Circuit, a district court must apply the following four-part
test when determining whether to grant a preliminary
injunction or a temporary restraining order:
(1) whether the moving party has a strong likelihood of
success on the merits; (2) whether the moving party will
suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether
the issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm
to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be
served by issuance of the injunction.
Nat'l Hockey League Players' Ass'n v.
Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d 712, 717 (6th
who is represented by counsel, does not acknowledge or
attempt to apply this test in her motion and supporting
brief. In fact, the brief filed in support of the motion
provides, in its entirety: “Plaintiff relies on MCR
3.310(A) and (B) and Fed.R.Civ.P 65(a) and (b) as support for
the relief requested herein.” (ECF #6 at Pg. ID. 90.)
first addresses the relevant factors in her reply brief. And
in that brief, she does not cite a single case in support of
her arguments that she has satisfied the final three factors
of the test for injunctive relief. Arp has not carried her
“heavy” burden of showing that she is entitled to
the “extraordinary remedy” of a preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order. Cox v.
Jackson, 579 F.Supp.2d 831, 853 (E.D. Mich. 2008). While
Arp has not made a sufficient showing on any of the factors
in the four-part test, her arguments on the irreparable harm
element of the test fall especially short.
Court has explained, “[t]he threat of irreparable harm
is a sine qua non for granting preliminary injunctive
relief.” Id. Arp has not demonstrated that she
faces such harm absent an injunction or restraining order.
Her irreparable harm argument, in its entirety, is as
[W]hether Defendant can demonstrate irreparable injury is not
difficult. Plaintiff's children were at school and she
had to scramble to find someone to pick them up while trying
not to state she had been arrested. Plaintiff's image,
reputation, and standing in the community is now shattered as
numerous neighbors watched as Defendants handcuffed
Plaintiff, put her in the police car, and drove her off to
jail. The emotional injury alone to Plaintiff of these events
has scarred her for life having been ripped out of her home
and taken to jail as a criminal.
(Reply to Mot., ECF #13 at Pg. ID 181.)
merely a description of Arp's alleged injuries; it is not
an explanation as to how they are irreparable. And Arp has
not attempted to show why money damages would not be an
appropriate remedy for the alleged injuries she describes.
See SEIU Health Care Michigan v. Snyder, 875
F.Supp.2d 710, 723 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (explaining that an
injury is not irreparable where money damages are an adequate
remedy). Moreover, Arp's description of her injuries is
entirely backward-looking. Arp does not attempt to show that
she faces a serious and imminent risk of similar injuries
going forward. She has not demonstrated that she faces a
“threat” of future harm. Cox, 579
F.Supp.2d at 853. Because Arp has failed to show that she
faces a real and imminent threat of irreparable harm, she is
not entitled to a preliminary injunction or a temporary
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's
Motion to Restrain Defendant From Further Harassment Via