United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
GORDON
J. QUIST UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This is
a civil rights action brought by state prisoner Antonio
Stapleton under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Stapleton alleges that
Defendants conspired to plant marijuana among his personal
property in retaliation for his implicating another inmate
for possessing a cell phone. Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss and for summary judgment (ECF No. 38) and a
supplement. (ECF No. 41.) Stapleton responded. (ECF No. 42.)
Defendants replied. (ECF No. 49.) Magistrate Judge Timothy
Greeley issued a Report and Recommendation (R & R),
recommending that the Court grant in part and deny in part
Defendants' motion. (ECF No. 52.) Stapleton objected.
(ECF No. 54.)
Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), a party “may
serve and file specific written objections” to the R
& R, and the Court is to consider any proper objection.
Local Rule 72.3(b) likewise requires that written objections
“shall specifically identify the portions” of the
R & R to which a party objects. Under 28 U.S.C. §
636(b), upon receiving objections to a report and
recommendation, the district judge “shall make a de
novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made.” After conducting a de novo review
of the R & R, Stapleton's Objections, and the
pertinent portions of the record, the Court concludes that
the R & R should be adopted.
Stapleton
agreed to dismiss Defendants Place and LaRock, Count III for
retaliation under the First Amendment, Count VII for racial
discrimination, and Count V for malicious prosecution under
state law. Beyond that, the R & R recommended dismissing
Count I for an Eighth Amendment violation and Count II for a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due
process clause. Stapleton raised two objections. First, that
the R & R erred in recommending that his substantive due
process claim be dismissed. Second, that the R & R erred
in a factual finding regarding Stapleton's time spent in
segregation for the marijuana violation. Stapleton did not
object to the R & R's recommendation regarding Count
I. Accordingly, the R & R will be adopted as to Count I.
See, e.g., Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of
Teachers Local 231, Am. Fed'n of Teachers, AFL-CIO,
829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that
“making some objections but failing to raise others
will not preserve all the objections a party may
have”).
The R
& R recommended dismissing Stapleton's substantive
due process claim because it was better suited to be
litigated under his Fourth Amendment claim. The R & R
relied upon Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273,
114 S.Ct. 807, 813 (1994), which held that “[w]here a
particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of
constitutional protection against a particular sort of
government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized
notion of ‘substantive due process, ' must be the
guide for analyzing these claims.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct.1865, 1871 (1989));
see also Heike v. Guevara, 519 F. App'x 911, 923
(6th Cir. 2013); Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444
F.3d 725, 749 (6th Cir. 2006).
Stapleton
argues that under Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273
(3d Cir. 2014), his substantive due process claim can survive
alongside his Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim.
Decisions from other circuits are not binding. See,
e.g., Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351,
381 n.9 (6th Cir. 2009). Halsey also explicitly
distinguished between the Fourth Amendment's protections
before trial and substantive due process protections through
and after trial. 750 F.3d at 291-92. Stapleton never reached
trial as the prosecution dropped the criminal charge before
trial began. Also, the R & R adequately discussed how the
Fourth Amendment is the “explicit textual source of
constitutional protection against” Stapleton's loss
of liberty, i.e., being placed in segregation and
facing a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, the Court will
adopt the R & R and will dismiss Stapleton's
substantive due process claim and allow him to proceed on his
Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim.
Stapleton
also objected to a footnote in the R & R which stated,
“It appears that Plaintiff was housed in segregation
due to the marijuana and cigarette misconducts for less than
6 months.” (ECF No. 52 at PageID.656 n.3.) If that
statement was meant to be a finding of fact, Stapleton
objects to it given a “host of disputed factual
issues.” (ECF No. 54 at PageID.668-69.) From the
context and language used in the R & R, it is clear that
the statement at issue was not meant as a definitive finding
of fact. Accordingly, Stapleton's objection is
unnecessary.
Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Magistrate
Judge's Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 52) is
APPROVED AND ADOPTED as the Opinion of this
Court and Plaintiff's Objections (ECF No. 54) are
OVERRULED.
IT
IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for
Dismissal and/or Summary Judgment (ECF No. 38) is
GRANTED dismissing Defendants Place and
LaRock, Plaintiff's retaliation, racial discrimination,
state law malicious prosecution, and substantive due process
claims, and DENIED as to Defendants Durand,
Pelkola, ...