from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee at Winchester. No.
4:12-cr-00027-1-Harry S. Mattice, Jr., District Judge.
Jennifer Niles Coffin, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN
TENNESSEE, INC., Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant.
L. Bay, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Chattanooga,
Tennessee, for Appellee.
Before: SILER, BATCHELDER, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.
Following his guilty plea on a drug offense, William Shane
Reid was sentenced to 145 months' imprisonment. Reid
later moved the district court to reduce his sentence based
upon retroactive amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines. The
district court denied his motion. Because we lack
jurisdiction, we DISMISS Reid's appeal.
2012, Reid pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846
and 841(b)(1)(B). The district court calculated Reid's
guidelines range as 151 to 188 months and in 2013 sentenced
him within that range to 170 months' imprisonment.
Reid's sentence was later reduced to 145 months, a 4%
downward departure from the bottom of the guidelines range,
following the United States' motion under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 35(b).
782 to the Sentencing Guidelines went into effect in 2014.
Among other things, the amendment reduced by two levels the
base offense levels set forth in USSG § 2D1.1(c), the
guidelines section under which Reid was sentenced. USSG app.
C, amend. 782 (Nov. 1, 2014). The Sentencing Commission made
Amendment 782 retroactive. Id. app. C, amend. 788
(Nov. 1, 2014). The parties agree that Reid's amended
guidelines range is 130 to 162 months. Additionally, because
Reid was previously granted a 4% downward departure under
Rule 35(b), he is eligible for a comparable reduction to 125
months from his amended guidelines range. Id. §
filed a motion in 2016 under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to
reduce his sentence. Aside from the guideline amendments,
Reid emphasized his post-sentencing rehabilitative conduct.
The United States agreed that Reid was eligible for a
sentence reduction and took no position on his motion. The
government pointed out, however, that Reid had incurred two
disciplinary sanctions while incarcerated, for possessing
"drugs/alcohol" and tobacco, respectively. The
district court denied Reid's motion, stating that
"Defendant's disciplinary infractions while
incarcerated indicate that he has not gained respect for the
law. These infractions are all-the-more troubling given that
Defendant was on federal supervised release when he committed
the instant offense." This appeal followed.
review the district court's denial of Reid's §
3582(c)(2) motion on the merits for an abuse of discretion.
United States v. Curry, 606 F.3d 323, 327 (6th Cir.
2010) (citing United States v. Carter, 500 F.3d 486,
490 (6th Cir. 2007)). However, as in every case, we are first
obligated to examine whether we possess jurisdiction to
entertain Reid's appeal.
defendants enjoy no constitutional right to appeal their
convictions; accordingly, in order to appeal one must come
within the terms of some applicable statute." United
States v. Bowers, 615 F.3d 715, 718 (6th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656
(1977)) (cleaned up). In Bowers, we held that our
jurisdiction to entertain a defendant's appeal of the
district court's denial of a § 3582(c)(2)
sentence-reduction motion derives from 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
Id. at 722. That statute grants us jurisdiction when
a sentence "(1) was imposed in violation of law; (2) was
imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
sentencing guidelines; or (3) is greater than the sentence
specified in the applicable guideline range . . .; or (4) was
imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing
guideline and is plainly unreasonable." 18 U.S.C. §
3742(a). Our jurisdiction under § 3742 is "tightly
circumscribed, " Bowers, 615 F.3d at 719, and