United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Northern Division
Patricia T. Morris Magistrate Judge
ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS, ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION, DENYING MOTION TO VACATE SENTENCE, DENYING
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME AS MOOT, DENYING CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY, AND DENYING PERMISSION TO APPEAL IN FORMA
L. LUDINGTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
January 30, 2017, Petitioner Michael Casey Jackson was
sentenced to 165 months of incarceration after pleading
guilty to one count of unlawful imprisonment. ECF No. 31. On
January 10, 2018, Jackson filed a motion to vacate his
sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. ECF No. 32. That
motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Patricia T. Morris.
ECF No. 35. On March 14, 2018, Judge Morris issued a report
recommending that the motion to vacate be denied. ECF No. 39.
On April 2, 2018, Jackson filed a motion for an extension of
time to respond to the Government's response brief. ECF
No. 40. The next day, before his motion for an extension of
time was ruled upon, Jackson filed objections to the report
and recommendation. For the following reasons, Jackson's
objections will be overruled, the report and recommendation
will be adopted, his motion to vacate will be denied, and his
motion for an extension will be denied as moot.
does not object to Judge Morris's procedural or factual
summary of his case. For that reason, Judge Morris's
summary will be adopted and reproduced here:
On June 24, 2016, Petitioner Michael Casey Jackson
(“Petitioner” or “Jackson”) pleaded
guilty to unlawful imprisonment in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§13, 1152; M.C.L. 750.349b pursuant to a Rule 11 plea
agreement. (Doc. 19.) A judgment filed on January 30, 2017,
sentenced Petitioner to 165 months incarceration and three
years of supervised release. (Doc. 31 at ¶ 118-19.)
Petitioner did not file an appeal.
Rep. & Rec. at 1, ECF No. 39.
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, a party may object to
and seek review of a magistrate judge's report and
recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
Objections must be stated with specificity. Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 151 (1985) (citation omitted). If
objections are made, “[t]he district judge must
determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's
disposition that has been properly objected to.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). De novo review requires at least a
review of the evidence before the magistrate judge; the Court
may not act solely on the basis of a magistrate judge's
report and recommendation. See Hill v. Duriron Co.,
656 F.2d 1208, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981). After reviewing the
evidence, the Court is free to accept, reject, or modify the
findings or recommendations of the magistrate judge. See
Lardie v. Birkett, 221 F.Supp.2d 806, 807 (E.D. Mich.
those objections that are specific are entitled to a de novo
review under the statute. Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d
636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). “The parties have the duty to
pinpoint those portions of the magistrate's report that
the district court must specially consider.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
A general objection, or one that merely restates the
arguments previously presented, does not sufficiently
identify alleged errors on the part of the magistrate judge.
See VanDiver v. Martin, 304 F.Supp.2d 934, 937 (E.D.
Mich. 2004). An “objection” that does nothing
more than disagree with a magistrate judge's
determination, “without explaining the source of the
error, ” is not considered a valid objection.
Howard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 932
F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). Without specific objections,
“[t]he functions of the district court are effectively
duplicated as both the magistrate and the district court
perform identical tasks. This duplication of time and effort
wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs
contrary to the purposes of the Magistrate's Act.”
has raised three objections to the Magistrate Judge's
report and recommendation. Each of the objections closely
track with arguments he made in his motion to vacate and
which Judge Morris rejected. First, Jackson argues that his
federal court conviction should be overturned because the
Court lacked jurisdiction. He argues that the address where
the offense occurred “is still Public/Private Property
because the utilities are all City/County, including all
taxes paid for by the owner.” Objs. at 2. For that
reason, Jackson believes that the address is outside the
bounds of “Indian Country.” Second, Jackson
argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate and raise this jurisdictional issue. Third,
Jackson requests an evidentiary hearing.
the address where the offense occurred is within Indian
Country, Jackson's objections have no merit. In response
to Jackson's argument that the address was outside Indian
Country because it is owned by an individual non-Indian,
Judge Morris reasoned:
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1151, Indian Country is defined as
“(a) all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent...” Therefore, even if the land has been
patented by the United States to a person such that neither
the United States nor the tribe owns the parcel of land, as
long as the land is located within reservations boundaries,
it meets the definition of Indian Country and jurisdiction in