United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
PATRICIA T. MORRIS MAG. JUDGE
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF  AND DENYING AS MOOT
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
E. LEVY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
prisoner Victoria Lynn Payne (“plaintiff”) has
filed a pro se civil rights complaint under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court granted plaintiff's
application to proceed in forma pauperis, and
plaintiff is proceeding without prepayment of the filing fee
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After careful
consideration, the Court summarily dismisses the complaint.
is incarcerated at the Huron Valley Women's Correctional
Facility in Ypsilanti, Michigan. Sometime in 2015, the
Michigan State Disbursement Unit, an arm of the Child Support
System for the State of Michigan, deposited $1, 900.00 in
plaintiff's prison account. See Dkt. 1 at 90-91.
The deposits were long-overdue child support payments related
to a 1993 child custody proceeding. Id. The State
then sought reimbursement of the costs associated with
plaintiff's incarceration under Michigan's State
Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act
(SCFRA). See Mich. Comp. Laws §
800.401 et seq. The Kent County Circuit Court
awarded the State 50% of incoming child support payments.
See Dkt. 1 at 91. Plaintiff filed a complaint in the
Michigan Court of Claims, seeking a reversal of the Circuit
Court's decision and monetary damages of $1, 000, 000.
The Michigan Court of Claims denied relief, finding the
claims barred by governmental immunity and res
judicata, and that the complaint failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. at
then filed the pending civil rights complaint. She names
three defendants: former state treasurer, Kevin Clinton,
Attorney General Bill Schuette, and Kent County Circuit Court
Judge Paul J. Sullivan. Plaintiff challenges the Michigan
Court of Claims' decision denying her relief.
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint set
forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” as well as
“a demand for the relief sought.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2), (3). The purpose of this rule is to “give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) and Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2)). While such notice pleading does not require
detailed factual allegations, it does require more than the
bare assertion of legal conclusions. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555. Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned,
the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.'”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.'” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996
(“PLRA”), the Court is required to sua
sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint
before service on a defendant if it determines that the
action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (applying this
standard to government entities, officers, and employees as
defendants). A complaint is frivolous “where it lacks
an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)).
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that (1) she was deprived of a right, privilege, or
immunity secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the
United States; and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person
acting under color of state law. Flagg Bros. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978); Harris v.
Circleville, 583 F.3d 356, 364 (6th Cir. 2009). A
pro se civil rights complaint is to be construed
liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972). Despite this liberal pleading standard, the Court
finds that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
complaint challenges the result of the SCFRA enforcement
proceeding. She claims that the state court erred in finding
that the defendants were immune from suit for considering
child support payments as “assets” subject to
seizure under SCFRA and in finding that her challenge to the
Circuit Court's decision allowing the seizure was barred
by res judicata.
Court lacks jurisdiction over the case. “The Supreme
Court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from
final state-court judgments. See Abbott v. Michigan,
474 F.3d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Lance v.
Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006). The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine bars attempts by a federal plaintiff to receive
appellate review of a state-court decision in a federal
district court. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). A federal court has no
authority to review complaints about injuries caused by a
state-court judgment rendered before the federal proceeding
commenced. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283-84 (2005). “So long as
the plaintiff's injury arises from the state court's
judgment, the doctrine applies.” Abbott v.
Michigan, 474 F.3d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 2007). Even
injuries caused by third-party actions are barred from
federal review under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine if
they “are the products of a state court
judgment.” Robbennolt v. Washington, 626 Fed.
App'x 155, 157 (6th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted).
claims concern the state court SCFRA proceeding and the
defendants' actions in that proceeding. Her injuries are
a result of the SCFRA judgment and the defendants'
actions in relation to seeking reimbursement and enforcing
the state-court ...