United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
Gershwin A. Drain United States District Court Judge
before the Court is Plaintiff Charles Cratty's Motion for
Reconsideration. Dkt. No. 43. Plaintiff requests this Court
reverse the Motion for Summary Judgment that it granted
against Plaintiff on February 21, 2018. Dkt. No. 41. For the
reasons discussed below, this Court will deny Plaintiff's
action stems from the alleged illegal acts taken by the
officers of the City of Wyandotte Police Department against
Plaintiff. On February 7, 2017, Plaintiff filed the present
action in this Court. Dkt. No. 2. Plaintiff brought a federal
malicious prosecution claim, state and federal abuse of
process claims, and three state law claims of conspiracy,
conversion, and unjust enrichment. Dkt. No. 2, pg. 2-17 (Pg.
ID 20-35). On October 9, 2017, Defendant filed its Motion for
Summary Judgment. Dkt. No. 20. Plaintiff opposed the Motion
on October 27, 2017. Dkt. No. 28. On January 3, 2018, this
Court extended the discovery deadline to allow Plaintiff to
depose the City of Wyandotte's Mayor, Joseph Peterson.
Dkt. No. 34. This Court also allowed supplemental briefing by
both parties regarding Mayor Peterson's deposition.
Id. On January 10, 2018, Plaintiff deposed Mayor
Peterson. Dkt. No. 38-3. Plaintiff filed his supplemental
brief on February 1, 2018. Dkt. No. 38. Defendant filed its
supplemental brief on February 8, 2018. Dkt. No. 39.
Defendant argued that Plaintiff failed to show a policy or
custom of constitutional rights violations by Defendant.
Id. On February 21, 2018, this Court issued an
Opinion and Order granting Defendant's Motion. Dkt. No.
41. This Court found that Plaintiff failed to bring facts
sufficient to support a genuine dispute on the issue of
municipal liability. Id. On March 7, 2018, Plaintiff
filed the present Motion for Reconsideration. Dkt. No. 43.
this Court's Local Rules, the Court may not grant a
motion for reconsideration that merely presents the same
issues upon which the Court already ruled. E.D. Mich. LR
7.1(h)(3) (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2013). Additionally, the movant
must demonstrate that there is a palpable defect in the
opinion or order under attack and that correcting the defect
will result in a different disposition of the case.
Id.; Indah v. U.S. S.E.C., 661 F.3d 914,
924 (6th Cir. 2011). “A ‘palpable defect' is
a defect which is obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest, or
plain.” Hawkins v. Genesys Health Systems, 704
F.Supp.2d 688, 709 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (quoting Ososki v.
St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 162 F.Supp.2d 714, 718
(E.D. Mich. 2001)).
asserts that this Court failed to apply the appropriate law
for determining municipal liability. Dkt. No. 43, pg. 2 (Pg.
ID 1119). This Court applied the correct law to this case by
applying the test used by the Sixth Circuit in Burgess v.
Fisher. 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff's complaint brought several § 1983 claims
against Defendant, a municipality, better known as
Monellclaims. This Court follows the precedent
set forth by the Sixth Circuit. Sixth Circuit precedent holds
that a Plaintiff who brings § 1983 claims against a
municipality must demonstrate that the alleged federal
violations occurred because of a municipal policy or custom.
Burgess v. Fisher, 735 F.3d at 478. There are four
ways that a plaintiff may demonstrate an illegal policy or
custom: (1) the existence of an illegal official policy or
legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final
decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the
existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision;
or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence
of federal rights violations. Id. Plaintiff failed
to articulate this standard as set forth by the Sixth Circuit
in his briefs. However, Defendant did articulate this
standard in its supplemental brief. Dkt. No. 39, pg. 2 (Pg.
ID 930). Even if neither party had articulated the correct
standard, this Court is still required to apply the correct
standard. As such, Plaintiff's claim that this Court
applied the incorrect standard is without merit.
asserts that this Court committed palpable error by claiming
that documentation of an official illegal policy is required
to prove municipal liability. Dkt. No. 43, pg. 2 (Pg. ID
1119). However, Plaintiff misstates the Court. The Court held
that to show municipal liability under element one of the
Burgess test, Plaintiff was required to show proof
of an official illegal policy or legislative enactment. Dkt.
No. 41, pg. 7 (Pg. ID 1099). The Court then noted that the
record contained no documentation of an official illegal
policy, which could prove that there was in fact an official
illegal policy. Id. The Court did not hold that
Plaintiff was required to show documentation of an official
illegal policy in order to preclude summary judgment.
Therefore, the Court committed no palpable defect in this
next states that this Court failed to apply the testimony of
Lieutenant Reed in its consideration of municipal liability.
Dkt. No. 43, pg. 3 (Pg. ID 1120). Plaintiff then asserts that
Reed's testimony demonstrates that Plaintiff was
illegally targeted in accord with the normal practice of
Defendant's Police Department. Id. However, the
Court considered all of the testimony in the depositions and
the record. The Court came to the conclusion that Reed's
testimony did not create a genuine dispute of municipal
liability. Therefore, Plaintiff's contention that the
Court failed to interpret the facts correctly is without
Plaintiff asserts that this Court committed palpable error by
failing to apply additional law cited by Plaintiffs. Dkt. No.
43, pg. 6 (Pg. ID 1123). Plaintiff asserts that this Court
failed to consider that “although evidence of a
policymaker's specific decision or deliberate
indifference are potential avenues to establish municipal
liability, they are not necessary if a plaintiff can point to
testimony from which a jury can reasonably infer an
unconstitutional municipal custom and practice.”
Mobley v. City of Detroit, 938 F.Supp.2d 669, 685
(E.D. Mich. 2012). This test was articulated in an opinion
issued by the Eastern District of Michigan and quoted from
the Ninth Circuit. See Id. Therefore, this Court was
not required to apply this standard, because neither the
Sixth Circuit nor the Supreme Court articulated it. However,
this Court did consider this argument when it was originally
articulated in Plaintiff's briefs and came to the
conclusion that the test could not be
also asserts that this Court failed to consider that “a
municipality can also be held liable for a single decision by
a policymaker if the official is the one who has the final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the
action ordered.” Arnold v. City of Columbus,
515 Fed.Appx. 524, 538 (6th Cir. 2013). The Court did not
explicitly articulate this test in its Opinion and Order.
However, the Court considered this test and likewise held
that the test could not be satisfied. The analysis and facts
articulated in this Court's February 21, 2018 Opinion and
Order demonstrate this Court's finding that there was no
single decision made by a policymaker that violated
Plaintiff's rights. Therefore, the Court did not commit
palpable error by failing to consider the appropriate legal
7-13 of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration claim that
this Court failed to consider several facts in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 43, pgs. 7-13 (Pg. ID
1124-30). However, this Court considered all of the facts in
the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. As stated above,
this Court only articulated the most relevant facts in its
Opinion and Order. Plaintiff disagrees with this Court's
analysis of those facts. However, this disagreement is not a
sufficient reason to grant a motion for ...