United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
S. CARMODY U.S. Magistrate Judge
matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 51). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that
Defendants' motion be granted and this
about August 4, 2005, Plaintiff executed a note pursuant to
which he borrowed eighty-five thousand dollars ($85, 000.00)
in return for which he granted Defendant Fifth Third a
mortgage on the subject property. (ECF No. 6-1 at 33-43).
Plaintiff subsequently defaulted on his loan obligations and
on or about December 3, 2014, Plaintiff paid five thousand
seven hundred eighty-eight dollars and seventy-one cents ($5,
788.71) to satisfy his arrearage amount and reinstate his
mortgage. (ECF No. 6-1 at PageID.26-31). Plaintiff was
expressly informed that payment of this amount would make his
loan “good through 12/3/2014, ” but that
“this will leave the account due 1/1/2015.” (ECF
No. 6-1 at PageID.26).
about February 26, 2015, Plaintiff was informed that he was
again in default on his loan obligations. (ECF No. 51-3 at
PageID.211). Plaintiff was expressly instructed that
“failure to pay the past due amount” would
“result in acceleration of your loan and the
foreclosure of the property.” (ECF No. 51-3 at
PageID.211). Foreclosure proceedings were subsequently
initiated and the subject property was sold at auction on
July 30, 2015, to Defendant Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation. (ECF No. 10-2 at PageID.59-64). Plaintiff did
not redeem the property prior to the expiration of the
statutory redemption period. See Mich. Comp. Laws
April 14, 2016, Defendant Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation obtained in state court a judgment awarding it
possession of the subject property and further providing that
it could apply for an order of eviction if Plaintiff did not
vacate the property by April 25, 2016. (ECF No. 6-1 at
PageID.24). Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed the matter,
(ECF No. 10-4 at PageID.66; ECF No. 10-5 at PageID.67), and
Defendant Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ultimately
obtained an Order of Eviction on April 21, 2017. (ECF No.
51-4 at PageID.213). Plaintiff initiated the present action
on July 21, 2017, against Defendants Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation and Fifth Third Mortgage-MI, LLC,
alleging: (1) breach of contract; (2) quiet title; and (3)
slander of title. (ECF No. 1). On February 6, 2018,
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, to which
Plaintiff has failed to respond.
judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party moving for summary
judgment can satisfy its burden by demonstrating “that
the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for
discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of
his or her case.” Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398
F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir. 2005). Once the moving party
demonstrates that “there is an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party's case, ” the
non-moving party “must identify specific facts that can
be established by admissible evidence, which demonstrate a
genuine issue for trial.” Amini v. Oberlin
College, 440 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2006).
the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, the party opposing the summary
judgment motion “must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Amini, 440 F.3d at 357. The existence
of a mere “scintilla of evidence” in support of
the non-moving party's position is insufficient.
Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730, 734-35 (6th Cir.
2005). The non-moving party “may not rest upon [his]
mere allegations, ” but must instead present
“significant probative evidence” establishing
that “there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Pack v. Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 813-14 (6th Cir.
the non-moving party cannot defeat a properly supported
motion for summary judgment by “simply arguing that it
relies solely or in part upon credibility
determinations.” Fogerty v. MGM Group Holdings
Corp., Inc., 379 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2004). Rather,
the non-moving party “must be able to point to some
facts which may or will entitle him to judgment, or refute
the proof of the moving party in some material portion, and.
. .may not merely recite the incantation, 'Credibility,
' and have a trial on the hope that a jury may disbelieve
factually uncontested proof.” Id. at 353-54.
In sum, summary judgment is appropriate “against a
party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.” Daniels, 396 F.3d at 735.
moving party without the burden of proof need only show that
the opponent cannot sustain his burden at trial, a moving
party with the burden of proof faces a “substantially
higher hurdle.” Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552,
561 (6th Cir. 2002). Where the moving party has the burden,
“his showing must be sufficient for the court to hold
that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for
the moving party.” Calderone v. United States,
799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986). The party with the burden
of proof “must show the record contains evidence
satisfying the burden of persuasion and that the evidence is
so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to
disbelieve it.” Arnett, 281 F.3d at 561.
Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the party with the
burden of persuasion “is inappropriate when the
evidence is susceptible of different interpretations or
inferences by the trier of fact.” Hunt v.
Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999).
basis of Plaintiff's complaint is his allegation that
Defendants unlawfully foreclosed on the subject property and
then unlawfully evicted therefrom. These matters have already
been litigated in state court, however. As a result,
Plaintiff's claims are barred by the
state courts, which are courts of general jurisdiction, the
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. A
significant limitation upon the jurisdiction of the federal
district courts is that such courts are precluded from
reviewing judgments of the state courts. As the Supreme Court
has long recognized, the jurisdiction of the federal district
courts is “strictly original” and, therefore,
only the United States Supreme Court can “entertain a
proceeding to reverse or modify” a judgment entered by
a state court. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); see also, Durham v.
Haslam, 2013 WL 2665786 at ...