United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Robert J. Jonker Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
S. CARMODY U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 25), and Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 30). Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends
that these motions be granted and this
following allegations are contained in Plaintiff's
complaint. (ECF No. 1). On July 16, 2015, Plaintiff
“suffered a cut on his left foot.” Plaintiff
reported to Health Care Services where Registered Nurse Randy
Lindstrom “applied a band-aid to Plaintiff's
injury.” Later that day, Plaintiff noticed that his
injury was “discolored” and draining blood and
fluid. Plaintiff's request to return to Health Care
Services was denied on the ground that he had been treated
earlier that day.
the course of the next several weeks, Plaintiff submitted
“numerous” requests for medical treatment all of
which were denied by Nurse Lindstrom on the ground that
Plaintiff's injury was “not serious.”
Plaintiff subsequently requested treatment from Registered
Nurses Hope Peeks and Dianna Earl, both of whom denied
Plaintiff's request, instructing him to instead submit a
formal request for medical treatment. On August 12, 2015, a
prison official observed Plaintiff's injury and
“became alarmed” at the severity of such.
Plaintiff was taken to Health Care Services where he was
given antibiotic medication which “ultimately proved
medically ineffectual.” Soon thereafter, Plaintiff was
transferred to a different correctional facility where he
received appropriate treatment.
initiated this action against Randy Lindstrom, Hope Peeks,
Dianna Earl, Kyle Sperling, and Margaret Ouellette alleging
violations of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants now move for summary
judgment on the ground that Plaintiff has failed to properly
exhaust his administrative remedies.
judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party moving for summary
judgment can satisfy its burden by demonstrating “that
the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for
discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of
his or her case.” Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398
F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir. 2005). Once the moving party
demonstrates that “there is an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party's case, ” the
non-moving party “must identify specific facts that can
be established by admissible evidence, which demonstrate a
genuine issue for trial.” Amini v. Oberlin
College, 440 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2006).
the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, the party opposing the summary
judgment motion “must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” “mini, 440 F.3d at 357. The
existence of a mere Ascintilla of evidence” in support
of the non-moving party's position is insufficient.
Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730, 734-35 (6th Cir.
2005). The non-moving party “may not rest upon [his]
mere allegations, ” but must instead present
“significant probative evidence” establishing
that “there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Pack v. Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 813-14 (6th Cir.
the non-moving party cannot defeat a properly supported
motion for summary judgment by “simply arguing that it
relies solely or in part upon credibility
determinations.” Fogerty v. MGM Group Holdings
Corp., Inc., 379 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2004). Rather,
the non-moving party Amust be able to point to some facts
which may or will entitle him to judgment, or refute the
proof of the moving party in some material portion, and. .
.may not merely recite the incantation, 'Credibility,
' and have a trial on the hope that a jury may disbelieve
factually uncontested proof.” Id. at 353-54.
In sum, summary judgment is appropriate “against a
party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.” Daniels, 396 F.3d at 735.
moving party without the burden of proof need only show that
the opponent cannot sustain his burden at trial, a moving
party with the burden of proof faces a “substantially
higher hurdle.” Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552,
561 (6th Cir. 2002). Where the moving party has the burden,
“his showing must be sufficient for the court to hold
that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for
the moving party.” Calderone v. United States,
799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986). The Sixth Circuit has
emphasized that the party with the burden of proof
“must show the record contains evidence satisfying the
burden of persuasion and that the evidence is so powerful
that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve
it.” Arnett, 281 F.3d at 561. Accordingly,
summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of
persuasion “is inappropriate when the evidence is
susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the
trier of fact.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S.
541, 553 (1999).
Defendants' Motions ...