United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
J. QUIST, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. Promptly after the filing of a petition
for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary
review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly
appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits
annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief
in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing §
2254 Cases; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the
petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen
v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district
court has the duty to “screen out” petitions that
lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes
those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well
as those containing factual allegations that are palpably
incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434,
436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the review required
by Rule 4, the Court concludes that the petition must be
dismissed because it fails to raise a meritorious federal
Scott Smith, is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional
Facility (LRF) in Muskegon County, Michigan. In 2016, he pled
nolo contendere in Allegan County Circuit Court to
one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, Mich.
Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(a). The court subsequently
sentenced him to 5 years and 11 months to 15 years in prison.
applied for leave to appeal his decision to the Michigan
Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court. Those courts
denied leave to appeal on June 7, 2016, and March 7, 2018,
petition raises one ground for relief, as follows:
PETITIONER WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL AS GUARANTEED BY BOTH
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS, WHEN THE TRIAL COURT REFUSED
TO ENTERTAIN THE 180-DAY RULE PRESENTED AT AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING, THE RESULT BEING A VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS[.]
(Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.8.) Petitioner raised this same
ground on appeal. The appellate courts summarily rejected his
action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA).
The AEDPA “prevents federal habeas
‘retrials'” and ensures that state court
convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the
law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002). An
application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in state court unless the adjudication: “(1)
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is “intentionally
difficult to meet.” Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S.
__, 135 S.Ct. 1372');">135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (internal quotation omitted).
AEDPA limits the source of law to cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This Court
may consider only the “clearly established”
holdings, and not the dicta, of the Supreme Court.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000);
Bailey v. Mitchell, 271 F.3d 652, 655 (6th Cir.
2001). In determining whether federal law is clearly
established, the Court may not consider the decisions of
lower federal courts. Lopez v. Smith, 135 S.Ct. 1, 3
(2014); Bailey, 271 F.3d at 655. Moreover,
“clearly established Federal law” does not
include decisions of the Supreme Court announced after the
last adjudication of the merits in state court. Greene v.
Fisher, 565 U.S. 34 (2011). Thus, the inquiry is limited
to an examination of the legal landscape as it would have
appeared to the Michigan state courts in light of Supreme
Court precedent at the time of the state-court adjudication
on the merits. Miller v. Stovall, 742 F.3d 642, 644
(6th Cir. 2014) (citing Greene, 565 U.S. at 38).
federal habeas court may issue the writ under the
“contrary to” clause if the state court applies a
rule different from the governing law set forth in the
Supreme Court's cases, or if it decides a case
differently than the Supreme Court has done on a set of
materially indistinguishable facts. Bell, 535 U.S.
at 694 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06).
“To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is
required to ‘show that the state court's ruling on
the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in
justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement.'” Woods, 135 S.Ct
at 1376 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
103 (2011)). In other words, “[w]here the precise
contours of the right remain unclear, state courts enjoy
broad discretion in their adjudication of a prisoner's
claims.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. __, 134
S.Ct. 1697, 1705 (2014) (internal quotations omitted).
AEDPA requires heightened respect for state factual findings.
Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir.
1998). A determination of a factual issue made by a state
court is presumed to be correct, and the petitioner has the
burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing
evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Lancaster v.
Adams, 324 F.3d 423, 429 (6th Cir. 2003);
Bailey, 271 F.3d at 656. This presumption of
correctness is accorded to findings of state appellate