United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
L. T. TUCKER, JR., #132271, a/k/a KITWANA OMARI MBWANA, Plaintiff,
CORIZON CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE, KRISTINE NYQUIST, and CHUNG OH, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE APPLICATION TO PROCEED
WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE , SUMMARILY DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT , AND DENYING AS MOOT THE MOTION FOR
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
G. EDMUNDS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter has come before the Court on a pro se civil rights
complaint filed by L.T. Tucker, Jr., who is also known as
Kitwana Omari Mbwana. Plaintiff is a state prisoner at the
Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility in Baraga, Michigan. He
alleges that he suffers from type two diabetes, diabetic
peripheral neuropathy, high blood pressure, glaucoma,
digestive intestinal disorder, and hepatitis C. The
defendants are Corizon Correctional Health Care and two of
its employees. The complaint alleges that the defendants have
been deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's diabetes and
hepatitis and that they have retaliated against him for
filing grievances about the problem. Plaintiff has applied
for permission to proceed without prepayment of the filing
fee for his complaint. He also seeks appointment of counsel
to assist him.
federal litigant who is too poor to pay court fees ordinarily
“may commence a civil action without prepaying fees or
paying certain expenses.” Coleman v. Tollefson, 135
S.Ct. 1759, 1761 (2015) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915).
a special “three strikes” provision prevents a
court from affording in forma pauperis status where the
litigant is a prisoner and he or she “has, on 3 or more
prior occasions, while incarcerated . . ., brought an action
or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed
on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”
Id. (quoting § 1915(g)).
exception to this “three strikes” rule applies
when “the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious
physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “The
imminent danger exception is essentially a pleading
requirement subject to the ordinary principles of notice
pleading.” Vandiver v. Vasbinder, 416 Fed.Appx. 560,
562 (6th Cir. 2011).
has filed numerous cases in federal court, and at least three
of his prior lawsuits were dismissed as frivolous or for
failure to state a claim. See Percival, et al. v. Williams,
et al., No. 1:00-cv-849 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 29, 2000); Tucker v.
Hembree, et al., No. 4:94-cv-105 (W.D. Mich. July 15, 1994);
Tucker v. Kinney, et al., No. 4:94-cv-101 (W.D. Mich. June
30, 1994); Tucker v. Chapin, et al., No. 4:94-cv-100 (W.D.
Mich. June 30, 1994). Although three of these cases were
dismissed before § 1915(g) became law as part of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, they count as
“strikes” under § 1915(g). Wilson v.
Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604 (6th Cir. 1998). This Court,
moreover, previously notified Plaintiff that he has
“three strikes” under § 1915(g). See Tucker
v. Shahee, No. 2:09-cv-12942 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2009, Nov.
nevertheless, asserts that he is under imminent danger of
serious physical harm as a result of the defendants'
failure to adequately treat his serious and chronic medical
conditions. “[T]o allege sufficiently imminent danger,
. . . ‘the threat or prison condition must be real and
proximate and the danger of serious physical injury must
exist at the time the complaint is filed.' ”
Vandiver v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 727 F.3d
580, 585 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Rittner v. Kinder,
290 Fed.Appx. 796, 797 (6th Cir. 2008)).
In addition to a temporal requirement, . . . the allegations
must be sufficient to allow a court to draw reasonable
inferences that the danger exists. To that end,
“district courts may deny a prisoner leave to proceed
pursuant to § 1915(g) when the prisoner's claims of
imminent danger are conclusory or ridiculous, or are clearly
baseless (i.e. are fantastic or delusional and rise to the
level of irrational or wholly incredible).”
Rittner, 290 Fed.Appx. at 798 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). . . .
a danger of serious physical injury as a result of being
presently denied adequate medical treatment for a chronic
illness satisfies the imminent-danger exception, ”
id. at 582-83, but exhibits to the complaint
indicate that Plaintiff is being treated for his diabetes and
monitored for his hepatitis. Although a medical provider
eliminated Plaintiff's noon dose of a diabetes
medication, the provider did not discontinue the medication.
Furthermore, Plaintiff's insulin order was renewed.
See Compl., Ex. 4, Pg ID 36-37, 56, 60.
Plaintiff's hepatitis, an infectious disease provider
determined in 2015 that Plaintiff did not have advanced liver
fibrosis and that Plaintiff was not considered a high
priority for treatment. In July of 2017, a physician saw
Plaintiff for his infectious disease and determined that
Plaintiff's liver enzymes were within normal limits.
Plaintiff continues to be monitored pursuant to a ...