United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
J. QUIST UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Joseph Bruneau, proceeding pro se, has sued the City
of Hillsdale and several individuals who were police officers
with the Hillsdale Police Department. Bruneau alleges that on
September 4, 2014, the individual Defendants repeatedly
tasered him while he was being treated at the Hillsdale
Community Health Center. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.2-3.) Bruneau
alleges that Defendants tasered him even though he was
restrained, with his wrists and ankles strapped securely to
the gurney. Bruneau makes the following claims: (1) under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the individual Defendants for
using excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment;
(2) against the City for liability under Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct.
2018 (1978); and (3) state-law claims against the individual
Defendants for gross negligence and assault and battery.
5, 2018, the magistrate judge issued an order granting
Bruneau leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No.
5.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is
required to dismiss any action brought under federal law if
the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2); see also Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d
1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that "§
1915(e)(2) applies only to in forma pauperis
proceedings"). The Court must read Bruneau's pro
se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596 (1972), and accept his
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or
wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25,
33, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992).
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint must
provide “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “a
plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds'
of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct.
1955, 1964-65 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103 (1957)). The court must accept
all of the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466
(6th Cir. 2009). The court must determine whether the
complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974.
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Although the
plausibility standard is not equivalent to a
“‘probability requirement, ' . . . it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). “[W]here the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct.
at 1950 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).
statutes of limitations and tolling principles apply to
determine the timeliness of claims asserted under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268-69,
105 S.Ct. 1938, 1942-43 (1985). For civil rights suits filed
in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is
three years. See M.C.L. § 600.5805(10);
Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir.
1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239,
1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). Accrual of the
claim for relief, however, is a question of federal law.
Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir.
1996); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir.
1984). The statute of limitations begins to run when the
aggrieved party knows or has reason to know of the injury
that is the basis of is action. Collyer, 98 F.3d at
complaint is untimely. Bruneau's § 1983 claims are
based solely on conduct that occurred on September 4,
2014-more than three years prior to the date Bruneau filed
his complaint. Bruneau knew or had reason to know of the harm
done to him (use of excessive force) at the time it occurred.
Moreover, it is well established that ignorance of the law
does not warrant equitable tolling. See Rose v.
Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1991).
plaintiff's allegations “show that relief is barred
by the applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is
subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim . . .
.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215, 127 S.Ct.
910, 920-21 (2007). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss
Bruneau's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure
to state a claim. ...