United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE
PLAINTIFFS STATE LAW CLAIM
H. CLELAND UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Kimberly Clark filed a complaint alleging the following
. Count I: a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for
excessive force in violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments against City of Center Line, Public
Safety Director Paul Myszenski, Officer Andrew Percha, and
Detective Michael Gerald;
. Count II: a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
for Monell  Liability against Defendants City of
Center Line and Public Safety Director Paul Myszenski, and
Defendants Officer Andrew Percha and Detective Michael
Gerald, in their official capacities;
. Count III: state law claims of gross
negligence and/or wanton and willful misconduct in violation
of Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407. (Dkt. #1.)
I and II allege federal claims over which the court has
original federal question jurisdiction. See 28
U.S.C. § 1331. Count III is a state law claim. Since
Plaintiff's federal and state law claims arise out of the
same incident and share common operative facts, the court is
permitted to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However,
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over this state law
claim would not promote judicial economy, the convenience of
the parties, fairness, or comity. Therefore, the court will
dismiss the state law claim without prejudice.
alleges that on April 25, 2018, she was at her son's
residence and Defendants “Officer Andrew Percha and/or
Detective Michael Gerald took custody of her, threw her into
a wall and handcuffed her.” (Dkt. # 1, Pg.ID 4.).
Plaintiff alleges she was not resisting Defendants and that
the police report for the incident confirms her account.
Plaintiff allegedly sustained numerous injuries. (Dkt. # 1,
Pg. ID 6-7.).
federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
each claim in an action that shares a common nucleus of
operative facts with a claim that invokes the court's
original jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). However, the federal court
need not exercise its authority to invoke supplemental
jurisdiction in every case in which it is possible to do so.
Id. at 726. Supplemental jurisdiction “is a
doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right.”
Id. Justification for this doctrine “lies in
considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness
to litigants.” Id. Therefore, “[i]n
deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
… a judge must take into account concerns of comity,
judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and the like.”
Senra v. Smithfield, 715 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir.
2013). However, if these considerations are not present,
“a federal court should hesitate to exercise
jurisdiction over state claims….” United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
Additionally, supplemental jurisdiction may be denied
“if the federal claims are dismissed before trial,
” if “it appears that the state issues
subsequently predominate, ” or “if the likelihood
of jury confusion” would be strong without separation
of the claims. Id. at 726-27.
U.S.C. § 1367 authorizes the federal court to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction. A court has discretion to decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or
claims over which the district court has ...