United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Northern Division
MAN LEWIS, JR. Plaintiff,
RICHARD SNYDER, and COLONEL KRISTE K. ETUE, Defendants.
Patricia T. Morris Magistrate Judge
ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS, ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION, AND GRANTING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
L. LUDINGTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Man Lewis, Jr. (“Plaintiff”)-who proceeds pro se
and in forma pauperis-filed this § 1983 lawsuit on March
13, 2017, against Defendants Richard Snyder and Colonel
Kriste K. Etue (“Defendants”). ECF No. 1.
Pretrial matters were referred to Magistrate Judge Patricia
T. Morris. ECF No. 4. Plaintiff has three prior criminal
convictions: (1) a 1978 conviction for procuring or inducing
a person to engage in prostitution, M.C.L. 750.455; (2) a
1983 conviction for attempted criminal sexual conduct in the
third degree, M.C.L. 750.520d; and (3) a 1983 conviction for
criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, M.C.L. 750.520b.
ECF No. 1 at 3. As a result of these convictions, he must
comply with Michigan's Sex Offender Registration Act
(“SORA”), M.C.L. § 28.723, et seq.
Plaintiff's view, because SORA emerged after his
convictions, it constitutes an ex post facto law and is
unconstitutional as applied to him. He seeks a declaration
that the Act- “specifically, the retroactive
application of the [2006 and 2011] amendments”-is
unconstitutional as applied to him, and asks this Court to
enjoin Defendants from enforcing it against him. ECF No. 1 at
1-2. See generally M.C.L. § 28.723, et seq.;
Mich. Pub. Acts 121, 127 (2005) (the 2006 amendments); Mich.
Pub. Acts. 17, 18 (2011) (the 2011 amendments). Plaintiff
moved for summary judgment on February 12, 2018. ECF No. 21.
Defendant filed a Response and Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment on March 25, 2018, ECF No. 25, to which Plaintiff
replied, ECF No. 26. On June 6, 2018, Judge Morris issued a
report, recommending that Plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment be granted in part, and that Defendants' motion
for summary judgment be granted in part. ECF No. 29.
to the holding of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016),
reh'g denied (Sept. 15, 2016), Judge Morris
found that retroactive application of SORA's 2006 and
2011 amendments to Plaintiff would amount to an
unconstitutional ex post facto law. Id. at 2-4. To the
extent Plaintiff challenged the retroactive application of
other SORA amendments prior to 2006 and 2011, Judge Morris
found that Plaintiff offered no legal authority for the
proposition that retroactive application of those amendments
would violate the Constitution or any other law. Id.
at 4-5 (quoting Hall v. Washington, No. 5
16-CV-11812, 2018 WL 1875598, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 19,
2018) (observing that Does #1-5 “only addressed whether
the retroactive application of certain SORA amendments
constituted an ex post facto punishment in contravention of
Morris also found that “the Mendoza-Martinez
factors militate against a finding that SORA's
registration requirements constitute punishment, ” and
that retroactive application of those requirements therefore
does not violate the Constitution's prohibition on ex
post facto laws. Rep. & Rec. at 6 (citing Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)).
Accordingly, Judge Morris recommended that the Court grant
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to the
retroactive application of SORA's 2006 and 2011
Amendments, and deny it in all other respects. Plaintiff
timely objected to Judge Morris's report and
recommendation. ECF No. 30.
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, a party may object to
and seek review of a Magistrate Judge's report and
recommendation. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Objections must be
stated with specificity. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140, 151 (1985) (citation omitted). If objections are made,
“[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part
of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been
properly objected to.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). De novo
review requires at least a review of the evidence before the
Magistrate Judge; the Court may not act solely on the basis
of a Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation.
See Hill v. Duriron Co., 656 F.2d 1208, 1215 (6th
Cir. 1981). After reviewing the evidence, the Court is free
to accept, reject, or modify the findings or recommendations
of the Magistrate Judge. See Lardie v. Birkett, 221
F.Supp.2d 806, 807 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
those objections that are specific are entitled to a de novo
review under the statute. Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d
636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). “The parties have the duty to
pinpoint those portions of the magistrate's report that
the district court must specially consider.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
A general objection, or one that merely restates the
arguments previously presented, does not sufficiently
identify alleged errors on the part of the magistrate judge.
See VanDiver v. Martin, 304 F.Supp.2d 934, 937 (E.D.
Mich. 2004). An “objection” that does nothing
more than disagree with a magistrate judge's
determination, “without explaining the source of the
error, ” is not considered a valid objection.
Howard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 932
F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). Without specific objections,
“[t]he functions of the district court are effectively
duplicated as both the magistrate and the district court
perform identical tasks. This duplication of time and effort
wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs
contrary to the purposes of the Magistrate's Act.”
takes issue with the fact that Judge Morris stated that he
only mentioned the 1999 and 2004 amendments in passing, but
focused on the unconstitutionality of retroactive application
of the 2006 and 2011 amendments. Obj. at 3-4. Plaintiff
underscores the fact that he is challenging the 1999 and 2004
amendments as well. Id. Judge Morris did not
disregard those challenges or deem them waived, but rather
observed that Plaintiff had offered no legal support for the
proposition that retroactive application of the 1999 and 2004
amendments would be unconstitutional. Notwithstanding the
lack of any cognizable legal argumentation in Plaintiff's
briefing, Judge Morris independently analyzed whether the
registration requirements imposed by those amendments
constitute punishment under the Mendoza-Martinez
factors, and concluded that they do not. See Rep.
and Rec. at 4-6 (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
at 168-69). Much like the initial briefing on his motion for
summary judgment, Plaintiff offers no legal authority to the
contrary. Accordingly, his objection will be overruled.
it is ORDERED that the report and
recommendation, ECF No. 29, is ADOPTED.
further ORDERED that Plaintiff's