United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
L. Maloney United States District Judge
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court
is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under
federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se
complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations
as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly
incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim
against Defendants Simmons, Miller, and Skipper. The Court
will serve the complaint against Defendants Brown and Wilson.
is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Michigan Reformatory (RMI) in Ionia
County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the following MDOC employees
at RMI: Inspectors (unknown) Miller and (unknown) Simmons;
Deputy Warden (unknown) Skipper; and Correctional Officers
(unknown) Brown and (unknown) Wilson.
alleges when he arrived at RMI, he noticed that staff members
would allow inmates to assault each other, and would
sometimes pay inmates to assault another inmate. Plaintiff
filed a grievance against Officer Brown for denying Plaintiff
showers and other “proper necessities.” (Compl.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Brown allegedly became angry and
spoke with Defendants Simmons, Miller, and Skipper regarding
these “threats, ” five months before “the
incident.” (Id.) Inmates told Plaintiff that
Officers Brown and Wilson were trying to pay them to
“fuck [Plaintiff] up.” (Id.) However,
“[e]veryone” ignored Plaintiff and refused to put
him in protective custody. (Id.)
11, 2015, Officer Brown allegedly allowed several inmates to
assault Plaintiff in the shower area. Plaintiff's
sustained a broken jaw and was sent to the hospital. Three
months later, he returned to RMI and was
“threatened” by Officers Brown and Wilson.
(Id.) On August 21, 2015, Plaintiff was stabbed by
prisoners who allegedly told him that it was a
“message” from Officers Brown and Wilson.
(Id.) Finally, Plaintiff was transferred to another
5, 2018, Plaintiff was transferred back to RMI. He claims
that he is receiving “threats” from Inspector
Miller and Officer Wilson. (Id.) He is in
segregation for refusing to “lock” because he is
being denied protective custody. (Id.) He believes
that he will be assaulted again under “staff
instructions” if he returns to the general prison
population. (Id.) As relief, he seeks compensatory
and punitive damages.
Failure to state a claim
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged - but it has not ‘show[n]' - that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies
to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.
1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself,
the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Defendants Simmons, Miller, Skipper
alleges that he told Defendants Simmons, Miller and Skipper
about unspecified “threats” from Officer Brown,