United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Aaron Lopez-Lopez, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated Plaintiff,
County of Allegan, & Frank Baker, in his individual capacity, Defendants.
L. MALONEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Aaron Lopez-Lopez has raised claims against Defendants
Allegan County and Sheriff Frank Baker for alleged violations
of the Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and state tort law.
The matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion to
dismiss. Because Aaron has not pleaded a plausible claim for
which relief can be granted, the Court will grant
Defendants' motion to dismiss and enter judgment.
Lopez-Lopez was arrested on August 14, 2017 in Allegan County
on an outstanding warrant for a probation violation. He was
booked into the Allegan County Jail shortly thereafter-around
8:00 P.M.-and his family posted a $1000 cash bond around
9:30. The bond processing company faxed a time-stamped
confirmation to the jail, which recorded the time as 10:24.
simultaneous to Aaron posting bond, and before receiving
confirmation, Allegan County received an I-247 detainer and
I-200 administrative warrant from Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). The I-247 detainer requested that Allegan
County hold Aaron until an ICE agent could take custody of
him but indicated that if ICE was unable to pick him up
within 48 hours, Allegan County should release him. It also
set forth ICE's probable cause for believing Aaron was a
deportable alien. The next morning, an ICE agent personally
served Aaron with the I-200 administrative warrant, and ICE
took custody of him around 3:00 P.M. that afternoon.
on these facts, Aaron filed suit alleging that Allegan County
and Sheriff Frank Baker violated his Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, his Fifth
Amendment right to due process, and state tort law for false
imprisonment. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of
The Federal Immigration System
understanding of the federal immigration system is necessary
to resolve the motion. The federal government has
“broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration
and the status of aliens.” Arizona v. United
States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012); see also Trump v.
Hawaii, 585 U.S. --, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2408 (2018)
(explaining that the President has “broad discretion to
suspend the entry of aliens into the United States”).
Congress, by virtue of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), has authorized the Department of Homeland Security,
through Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to carry out
federal immigration law. This includes authority to
interview, arrest, and detain removable aliens. 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1226(a)-(c) (authorizing the Attorney General to
issue warrants, arrest aliens, and take them into custody
while a decision to remove them is pending).
also authorizes the Department of Homeland Security to enter
into formal cooperative agreements with state and local law
enforcement, essentially deputizing them to carry out federal
immigration law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). Under
these agreements, state and local authorities are subject to
the supervision of the Secretary and perform specific
immigration enforcement functions like investigating,
apprehending, and detaining aliens. § 1357(g)(1)-(9).
However, where no formal cooperative agreement exists, local
authorities may still “communicate with [ICE] regarding
the immigration status of any individual . . . or otherwise
cooperate with [ICE] in the identification, apprehension,
detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the
United States.” § 1357(g)(10)(A)-(B).
additional requirement exists when state and local
authorities seek to aid federal agents without a formal
agreement in place: Their cooperation must be pursuant to a
“request, approval, or other instruction from the
Federal Government.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 410.
When requested, state and local law enforcement may
“participate in a joint task force with federal
officers, provide operational support in executing a warrant,
or allow federal immigration officials to gain access to
detainees held in state facilities.” Id. But
state and local officers cannot make unilateral decisions
relating to immigration enforcement. Id.
method in which the federal government requests the
cooperation of state authorities is by issuing I-247
detainers. An immigration detainer notifies a state or
locality that ICE intends to take custody of a removable
alien when the alien is released from that jurisdiction's
custody. ICE issues the detainer to request that the state or
locality to cooperate by notifying ICE of the alien's
release date and by holding the alien for up to 48 hours-
which is based on ICE's determination that the it has
probable cause that the alien is removable. See 8
C.F.R. § 287.7(a), (d).
April of 2017, ICE changed its policy so that ICE officers
provided signed administrative warrants along with ICE
detainers when they sought cooperation from local law
enforcement to hold an individual for detention. Prior to
this change in policy, officers issued only I-247 detainers
to local law enforcement when it sought local cooperation to
hold a suspected alien.
complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the
claim showing how the pleader is entitled to relief.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The complaint need not contain detailed
factual allegations, but it must include more than labels,
conclusions, and formulaic recitations of the elements of a
cause of action. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A defendant bringing a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
tests whether a cognizable claim has been pled in the
complaint. Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc.,
859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988).
survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
plaintiff must provide sufficient factual allegations that,
if accepted as true, are sufficient to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level, Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555, and the “claim to relief must be plausible
on its face” Id. at 570. “A claim is
plausible on its face if the ‘plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.'” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v.
Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Ashcroft v. ...