United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Anthony P. Patti U.S. Magistrate Judge
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS ;
DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
J. TARNOW SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Karla Brintley, a permanently blind woman, commenced this
action against Defendant Aeroquip Credit Union alleging
violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.§ 12181 et
seq., and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil
Rights Act (“PWDCRA”), M.C.L. § 37.110
alleges that Defendant's website contains access barriers
which prevent visually-impaired individuals, like herself,
from equal enjoyment of and access to Defendant's
the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss  filed on
February 5, 2018. For the reasons stated below,
Defendant's Motion is DENIED.
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
is a Michigan resident who is permanently blind and uses a
screen reader to access the internet. Screen-reading software
vocalizes visual information and is the only method by which
a blind person may independently use the internet. Defendant
is a Michigan credit union that operates a website,
aeroquipcu.com, which provides information about its
locations, services, and amenities. Plaintiff has tried
several times to access Defendant's website, but has
faced barriers which have hindered her from effectively
browsing for locations, amenities, and services and deterred
her from visiting Defendant's branches.
December 5, 2017, Plaintiff, through counsel, commenced four
separate actions in the Eastern District of Michigan against
different Michigan credit unions alleging violations of the
ADA and the PWDCRA. The cases were assigned to this Court as
February 5, 2018, Defendant filed this Motion to Dismiss 
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The Motion is
fully briefed. The Court held a hearing on the Motion on
May 21, 2018.
moves to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(1) for lack of standing. “Standing is thought of
as a ‘jurisdictional' matter, and a plaintiff's
lack of standing is said to deprive a court of
jurisdiction.” Ward v. Alternative Health Delivery
Sys., Inc., 261 F.3d 624, 626 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal
citation omitted). “[P]laintiff has the burden of
proving jurisdiction in order to survive the motion.”
Mich. S. R.R. Co. v. Branch & St. Joseph Cntys. Rail
Users Ass'n., Inc., 287 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir.
also moves to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, [plaintiff]
must allege ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.'” Traverse Bay
Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Mich. Dep't of
Educ., 615 F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must
“assume the veracity of [the plaintiff's]
well-pleaded factual allegations and determine whether the
plaintiff is entitled to legal relief as a matter of
law.” McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654,
658 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 679 (2009)).
Plaintiff has standing to pursue this action
courts may exercise jurisdiction only where an actual
‘case or controversy' exists.” Parsons v.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, 801 F.3d 701, 709-10 (6th
Cir. 2015) (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2).
“Courts have explained the case or controversy
requirement through a series of justiciability doctrines,
including, perhaps the most important, that a litigant must
have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.” Id. at 710 (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted).
establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must allege that:
she suffered an injury in fact; a causal connection exists
between the injury and conduct complained of; and it is
likely the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61
(internal citations omitted).
Supreme Court has instructed [courts] to take a broad view of
constitutional standing in civil rights cases, especially
where, as under the ADA, private enforcement suits ‘are
the primary method of obtaining compliance with the
Act.'” Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d
1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Trafficante v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972)).
injury-in-fact requirement requires a plaintiff to show that
he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected
interest' that is ‘concrete and particularized'
and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.'” Spokeo, ...