United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
SILAS T. MCADOO, Petitioner,
LES PARISH, Respondent.
T. NEFF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
purports to be a habeas corpus action brought by a state
prisoner. Promptly after the filing of a petition
for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary
review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly
appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits
annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief
in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing §
2254 Cases; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the
petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen
v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district
court has the duty to “screen out” petitions that
lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes
those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well
as those containing factual allegations that are palpably
incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434,
436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the review required
by Rule 4, the Court concludes that the petition must be
dismissed because the claims raised are not reviewable in a
habeas corpus proceeding.
Silas T. McAdoo is incarcerated with the Michigan Department
of Corrections at the Oaks Correctional Facility (ECF) in
Manistee, Manistee County, Michigan. Petitioner pleaded
guilty in the Wayne County Circuit Court to two counts of
assault with intent to commit murder, Mich. Comp. Laws §
750.83, and one count of second-degree murder, Mich. Comp.
Laws § 750.317. On March 24, 1995, the court sentenced
Petitioner to three terms of life imprisonment with the
possibility of parole.
purported habeas corpus petition, however, Petitioner does
not challenge his incarceration. Instead, he complains about
actions taken by the City of Ludington and the Michigan Tax
Tribunal in denying Petitioner's wife's request to
receive a disabled-veteran tax exemption on their home
address after Petitioner was incarcerated. Petitioner alleges
that the City of Ludington Board of Review denied the
application on December 14, 2016, on the grounds that it did
not believe that the residence was the homestead of a
qualified veteran and did not believe that the qualified
veteran had ever established residency at the address. (ECF
No. 1-4, PageID.26-29.) The board based its determination on
Taxpayer is a veteran and meets the qualifications for a
veteran and has a homestead. The issue is that the spouse got
the house . . . in 1999 and the taxpayer was sentenced for
life in prison in 1995 and he has never lived in the house.
The assessor is advising the Board of Review to deny the
appeal and then recommend the spouse to appeal this to the
State Tax Tribunal. There is really no evidence to deny this
appeal; however, with the evidence that has come to light and
the fact that there has been no situation like this in the
past, the assessor does not think this should be approved. It
the State Tax Tribunal rules on this on the appeal
this will then set precedence for future appeals.
Review Tax Appeal Minutes, ECF No. 1-4, PageID.27.)
alleges that he sent letters to the Michigan Tax Tribunal,
together with copies of the deeds and marriage license.
According to Petitioner's statement in support of the
case, the tax tribunal sent a notice of no action to
Petitioner and his wife on March 27, 2017, and the tribunal
entered an order dismissing the matter on March 27, 2017.
(Statement in Supp. of Case, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.14.)
filed an appeal from the tax tribunal's dismissal in the
Michigan Court of Appeals. The court of appeals dismissed the
appeal on June 8, 2017, for lack of jurisdiction, as the
appeal was filed more than 21 days after the March 27, 2017
order, but notified Petitioner of his ability to file a
delayed application for leave to appeal. (6/8/2017 Mich. Ct.
App. Order, ECF No. 1-4, PageID.35.) Petitioner then filed a
delayed application for leave to appeal, which the court of
appeals denied for lack of merit on September 27, 2017.
(9/27/2017 Mich. Ct. App. Order, ECF No. 1-4, PageID.44.)
Petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme
Court, which denied leave to appeal on May 1, 2018. (5/1/2018
Mich. Order, ECF No. 1-4, PageID.53.)
now brings a habeas corpus action, asserting that he has been
denied due process and his rights under Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 211.7b. He also asserts that city and state officials
have conspired to deny him his civil rights, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 241. Finally, he contends that he was denied
his rights under the First Amendment because, following his
transfer to the Muskegon Correctional Facility on April 26,
2018, he was not provided his legal property until May 7,
2018, and he was not given adequate access to the law
instant petition is subject to summary dismissal because
Petitioner is challenging his entitlement to state property
tax relief, not his confinement. Where a prisoner is
challenging the very fact or duration of his physical
imprisonment and the relief that he seeks is a determination
that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier
release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a
petition for writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). However, habeas
corpus is not available to prisoners who are complaining of
the conditions of their confinement, mistreatment during
their legal incarceration or any other matter. See Martin
v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004); Lutz
v. Hemingway, 476 F.Supp.2d 715, 718 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
Complaints like the ones raised by Petitioner, “do not
relate to the legality of the petitioner's confinement,
nor do they relate to the legal sufficiency of the criminal
court proceedings which resulted in the incarceration of the
petitioner.” Id. (quoting Maddux v.
Rose, 483 F.Supp. 661, 672 (E.D. Tenn. 1980)). An inmate
like Petitioner arguably may bring constitutional challenges
concerning his property taxes in a complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, but such claims “fall outside of the
cognizable core of habeas corpus relief.” See
Hodges v. Bell, 170 Fed.Appx. 389, 393 (6th Cir. 2006).
has filed a motion to clarify his petition, in which he
acknowledges that he does not seek traditional habeas relief
in the form of release from custody. Instead, he argues that
he is seeking relief from an order of a state agency that
allegedly violated his rights under the First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments and 18 U.S.C. §§ ...