United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
L. Maloney United States District Judge
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court
is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under
federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se
complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations
as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly
incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim
against Defendants Nallbach and Majerczyk. The Court will
serve the complaint against Defendants Ball and Cromten.
presently is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Oaks Correctional Facility (ECF) in
Manistee, Manistee County, Michigan. The events about which
he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues the
following ECF officials: Food Service Director (unknown)
Nallbach, Warden T. Ball, Psychologist Brian Majerczyk, and
Doctor (unknown) Cromten.
alleges a series of one- or two-sentence allegations of
unrelated violations of the Eighth Amendment. First, he
contends that he was placed in a dirty cell with no running
hot water and no flushable toilet and was given no clean
clothes from January 1, 2018 to March 20, 2018, purportedly
on orders from Defendant Warden Ball. Second, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Majerczyk and others inaccurately
diagnosed him as being mentally ill. Third, Plaintiff asserts
that Defendant Nallbach fed him food loaf instead of finger
foods from January 1, 2018, to April 3, 2018, despite the
fact that the warden had never ordered food loaf. Fourth,
Plaintiff complains that Defendant Dr. Cromten discontinued
Plaintiff's blood-thinning medication used to treat a
blood clot, thereby placing Plaintiff's life in jeopardy.
Plaintiff argues that he has attempted to exhaust his claims,
but the mailroom has refused to send out his Step-III
relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, together with
injunctive relief, including reinstatement of his
blood-thinning medication, placement on indigent status,
discontinuation of interference with the mailing of his
grievances, and criminal investigation by the United States
Failure to state a claim
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged - but it has not ‘show[n]' - that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies
to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.
1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself,
the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the
power of the states to punish those convicted of crimes.
Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it
contravene society's “evolving standards of
decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
345-46 (1981). The Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by
prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson,
832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged
must result in the denial of the “minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities.” Rhodes,
452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148
F.3d 596, 600-01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is
only concerned with “deprivations of essential food,
medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions
intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes,
452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). “Routine discomfort
is ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society.'” Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). As a consequence,
“extreme deprivations are required to make out a
conditions-of-confinement claim.” Id.
“[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might
endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.”
Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954. In order for a prisoner to
prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that he
faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and
that the defendant official acted with
“‘deliberate indifference' to [his] health or
safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474,
479-80 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (applying deliberate indifference
standard to medical claims); see also Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying deliberate
indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims)).
Defendant Nallbach - Food Loaf
contends that Defendant Nallbach placed him on food loaf for
three months, apparently without authorization from the
warden and in violation of ...