United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
CAMERON McCADDEN, a minor, by his next friend, CHRYSTAL McCADDEN, Plaintiff,
CITY OF FLINT, et al. Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART CITY
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 15]
Page Hood, Chief Judge.
31, 2018, Plaintiff Cameron McCadden, a minor by his next
friend, Chrystal McCadden, filed this action for alleged
violations of Plaintiff's civil rights and his rights
under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”). On October 9, 2018, Defendants City of
Flint (the “City”) and City Police Chief Timothy
Johnson (“Johnson”) (collectively, “City
Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss the claims
against the City Defendants. Dkt. No. 15. The Motion has been
fully briefed. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is
granted as to the claim against Johnson and granted in part
and denied in part with respect to the claims against the
STATEMENT OF FACTS
October 12, 2015, Plaintiff, a seven-year-old with attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”),
experienced a disability-induced behavior episode. Dkt. No. 1
at ¶ 34. The after-school program administered by
Defendant Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce
(“FGCC”) contacted Defendant Terrance Walker, a
City police officer who served as a school resource officer
(“Walker”). Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 2, 35.
Walker did not inquire whether Plaintiff had a disability or
an individualized education plan (“IEP”), and
Walker immediately placed Plaintiff in handcuffs. Plaintiff
remained in those restraints for almost one hour. Dkt. No. 1
at ¶¶ 36-46.
City Police Department has an official policy on police
interactions with children. Section III(C)(2) of this policy
Juveniles taken into custody for status offenses should
normally be frisked for weapons prior to being transported
and may be handcuffed or otherwise restrained at
any time if, in the judgment of the officer,
the juvenile poses a physical risk to the officer or others.
Complaint includes five claims in which Johnson or the City
are sued: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Defendant
Police Chief Timothy Johnson (“Johnson”) for
unreasonable search and seizure and excessive force in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution (Count I); (2) a Monell liability claim
against the City (Count II); (3) a claim against the City for
disability-based discrimination in violation of Title II of
the ADA (Count III); (4) a claim for disability-based
discrimination by the City for violating Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act (Count IV); and (5) disability-based
discrimination by the City in violation of Michigan's
Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act
(“PWDCRA”) (Count V).
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the
plaintiff's complaint. Accepting all factual allegations
as true, the court will review the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Eidson v. Tennessee
Dep't of Children's Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634
(6th Cir. 2007). As a general rule, to survive a motion to
dismiss, the complaint must state sufficient “facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). The complaint must demonstrate more than a sheer
possibility that the defendant's conduct was unlawful.
Id. at 556. Claims comprised of “labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555.
Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Count I - Unreasonable Search and Seizure/Excessive Force
has sued Johnson only in his official capacity. [Dkt. No. 1
at ¶ 23; see also Complaint's Case
Caption] The Complaint only references Johnson in the
(1) In the caption (“TIMOTHY JOHNSON, Chief of Police,
City of Flint, in his official capacity”);
(2) At Paragraph 23 (“Defendant TIMOTHY JOHNSON is the
Chief of Police for the City of Flint, and the official
responsible for actions and inactions complained of herein,
including policies, practices, customs, and training. Chief
Johnson is a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and the PWDCRA. At all times relevant to this complaint,
Chief Johnson and his predecessors were acting under color of
state law. Chief Johnson is sued in his official
(3) In the heading of Count I (“COUNT I - UNREASONABLE
SEIZURE AND EXCESSIVE FORCE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (Against Chief Johnson and Officer
(4) In the “Demand for Relief, ” where
“Plaintiff requests that this Court: . . . award
Plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages from Defendants
City of Flint, Johnson, and Walker; . . .”
[Dkt. No. 1]
City Defendants argue that when “[a]n official-capacity
claim against a person is essentially a claim against the
municipality, ” Peatross v. City of Memphis,
818 F.3d 233, 241 (6th Cir. 2016), it is duplicative and
appropriate to dismiss. Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103
F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 1996). The City Defendants state
that, assuming Plaintiff intends to hold the City liable
pursuant to ...