United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
ORDER GRANTING NISSAN'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
12(C) AND 56 [DKT. NO. 51]
Page Hood Chief Judge, U.S. District Court.
filed this action in Wayne County Circuit Court on February
12, 2018. Plaintiffs alleged that a number of former
Defendants violated the Fair Debt Consumer Protection Act
(“FDCPA”) and the Michigan Occupational Code, and
that Defendant Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation
(“Nissan”) violated the Michigan Uniform
Commercial Code (“Michigan UCC”), Article 9. On
March 9, 2018, the case was removed to this Court, and on
April 13, 2018, Nissan filed an Answer to the Second Amended
Complaint and a Counterclaim for breach of contract. Dkt.
Nos. 16, 17. Pursuant to the Court's Scheduling Order,
Dkt. No. 30, the discovery period closed on November 30,
2018. Nissan is the only remaining Defendant, as the Court
has entered stipulated orders dismissing the other
February 18, 2019, Nissan timely filed a Motion to Dismiss
and for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rules of
Procedure 12(c) and 56. Dkt. No. 51. The Motion has been
fully briefed, and a hearing on the Motion was held on April
10, 2019. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants
to February 13, 2017, Nissan hired Primeritus Financial
Services, Inc. to effectuate the repossession of a 2015
Nissan Altima (“Altima”). Plaintiffs purchased
the Altima on December 11, 2014, pursuant to a Michigan
Simple Interest Retail Installment Contract (the
“Contract”). Under the Contract, Plaintiffs
agreed to pay Nissan $38, 408.40 for the Altima. Plaintiffs
defaulted on the Contract when they made no payments after
the May 2016 payment. Nissan repossessed the Altima after
February 13, 2017, pursuant to the Contract and its security
interest. Nissan ultimately sold the Altima in December 2017
for $9, 500.00. After applying the $9, 500.00 sale proceeds
against the balance due and owing under Contract, Nissan
calculated that Plaintiffs had a balance remaining due and
owing in the amount of $20, 078.96.
Motion, Nissan asks the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint with prejudice, find in favor of
Nissan on its Counterclaim, and enter judgment in favor of
Nissan and against Plaintiffs in the amount of $20, 078.96.
APPLICABLE LAW & ANALYSIS
deciding a motion brought pursuant to Rule 12(c), the
standard is the same as that used in evaluating a motion
brought under Fed.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Stein v
U.S. Bancorp, et. al, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18357, at *9
(E.D. Mich. February 24, 2011). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's
complaint. The Court must accept all well-pleaded factual
allegations as true and review the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Eidson v. Tennessee
Dep't of Children's Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634
(6th Cir. 2007); Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 688
(6th Cir. 2006).
general rule, to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint
must state sufficient “facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The complaint must
demonstrate more than a sheer possibility that the
defendant's conduct was unlawful. Id. at 556.
Claims comprised of “labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Id. at 555. Rather, “[a]
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
56(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedures provides that the
court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The presence of factual disputes will
preclude granting of summary judgment only if the disputes
are genuine and concern material facts. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute
about a material fact is “genuine” only if
“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
Although the Court must view the motion in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, where “the moving
party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent
must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 586 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment must be entered against
a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial. In such a situation, there can be “no genuine
issue as to any material fact, ” since a complete
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.
A court must look to the substantive law to identify which
facts are material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.