United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Matthew A. Smith, Plaintiff,
Dominos Pizza, Defendant.
Anthony P. Patti Mag. Judge
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION TO PROCEED
WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS , DENYING MOTION TO STAY
, AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
E. LEVY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Matthew Smith brings claims under the Americans with
Disability Act (“ADA”) and Title VII based on
defendant Dominos Pizza's failure to accommodate his
disability and for harassment in the workplace. Smith also
alludes to additional state law claims in his complaint and a
subsequent affidavit he filed with the Court.
requests permission to proceed without prepaying fees or
costs (in forma pauperis). (Dkt. 2.) The in
forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)
states: “any court of the United States may authorize
the commencement . . . of any suit, action or proceeding . .
. without prepayment of fees . . . by a person who submits an
affidavit that includes a statement . . . that the person is
unable to pay such fees.” Smith's application to
proceed without prepaying fees indicates he currently has no
earnings and few assets. The Court therefore grants his
application to proceed in forma pauperis.
in forma pauperis statute continues. It mandates
dismissal of a case brought in forma pauperis
“at any time if the court determines that . . . the
action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Smith's complaint fails to state a claim at this time and
is therefore dismissed.
employee may not file a suit under the ADA if he or she does
not possess a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC because he or
she has not exhausted his or her remedies.” Parry
v. Mohawk Motors of Mich., Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 309 (6th
Cir. 2000) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12117(a) (procedures from § 2000e-5 apply to ADA
claims)). The same is true for a claim under Title VII.
Mayers v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., 101 Fed.
App'x 591, 593 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Before filing a
Title VII claim, a plaintiff must receive a right-to-sue
letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and then file suit within ninety days after receiving
the right-to-sue letter.” (citing 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(e) and (f)). Smith represents to the Court that he
filed a timely charge with the EEOC. But he indicates he has
not yet received his right-to-sue letter. (Dkt. 1 at 5.) He
must wait until he has received the right-to-sue letter
before bringing his case in federal court. The ADA and Title
VII claims are premature and are therefore dismissed.
extent Smith alludes to various state law claims, they are
insufficiently pleaded. First, he checks the box for
“Other federal law” and indicates negligence. He
alleges “[t]here was Negligent Hiring and Retention . .
. [and] Negligent Training.” (Dkt. 1 at 7.) In a
separate affidavit, he also indicates he may be intending to
bring a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, plaintiff
must plausibly plead the elements of the claims asserted.
Negligence and negligent hiring are state law claims. In
addition to pleading the elements of negligence, a claim of
negligent hiring, retention, or supervision requires a
showing that “the employer . . . [brought] an employee
into contact with a member of the public despite knowledge
that doing so was likely to end poorly.” Mueller v.
Brannigan Bros. Rests. & Taverns LLC, 323 Mich.App.
566, 574 (2018) (citing Hersh v. Kentfield Builders,
Inc., 385 Mich. 410, 417 (1971)). This requires the
employers “actual or constructive knowledge” of
previous wrongs of the employee. Id. at
And IIED, also a state law claim, requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2)
intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) severe
emotional distress.” Graham v. Ford, 237
Mich.App. 670, 674 (1999).
Smith has not provided sufficient factual allegations
regarding defendant's knowledge and the alleged negligent
hiring, retention, or training to state a claim under this
theory. Moreover, if he wishes to bring a claim of IIED he
must do so in his complaint-rather than a separate affidavit
as he has done here-and must provide enough factual
allegations to plausibly set forth the elements cited above.
His current complaint does not state a claim under either
theory and so must be dismissed.
Smith filed a motion to stay his case for 120 days so that he
could “get [his] finances clear, attain counsel, and
put [his] case together.” (Dkt. 3.) Because the Court
must dismiss the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), this
motion becomes moot and the Court need not address it.
However, this dismissal is without prejudice, which
means Smith is permitted to bring the case again. For his ADA
and Title VII claims, however, he must wait for a
right-to-sue letter before filing a federal case.
the Court GRANTS Smith's motion to
proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. 2), DENIES
his motion to stay (Dkt. 3) as moot, and
DISMISSES the case without prejudice.