United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 [#622], DENYING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST TO
WITHDRAW MOTION [#634], and DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE CIVIL
No. 19-10097
Denise
Page Hood, United States District Judge.
I.
Introduction
On May
1, 2017, pursuant to a Rule 11 Plea Agreement, Defendant
pleaded guilty to Counts 1 and 5 of the Superseding
Indictment. [Dkt. No. 413] The undersigned imposed a sentence
of 360 months. [Dkt. No. 554] Defendant filed a timely appeal
of an Order to Strike [Dkt. No. 540], which the Sixth Circuit
denied on January 3, 2019. [Dkt. No. 621]
On
January 10, 2019, Defendant filed a Motion to Vacate, Set
Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (the
“2255 Motion”). [Dkt. No. 622] The Government
filed a response on March 14, 2019. In a letter dated March
29, 2019 and filed on April 8, 2019, Defendant requested that
the 2255 Motion be withdrawn (the “Request to
Withdraw”). [Dkt. No. 634] The Government filed a
response to the Request to Withdraw.
II.
Legal Standard
A.
28 U.S.C. § 2255
28
U.S.C. § 2255 authorizes a federal prisoner to move the
district court to vacate a sentence. 28 U.S.C. §
2255(a). A defendant seeking relief under § 2255
“must allege as a basis for relief: (1) an error of
constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside
statutory limits; or (3) an error of fact or law that was so
fundamental as to render the entire proceeding
invalid.” Pough v. United States, 442 F.3d
959, 964 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Mallett v. United
States, 334 F.3d 491, 496-97 (6th Cir. 2003)). When
raising claims alleging errors of constitutional magnitude, a
defendant must show that the constitutional error had a
substantial and injurious effect or influence on the
proceedings. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,
637-38 (1993); Watson v. United States, 165 F.3d
486, 488 (6th Cir. 1999). Further, relief under § 2255
requires a showing of “a fundamental defect which
inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice.” Davis v. U.S., 417 U.S. 333, 346
(1974).
B.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Under
the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has a right to “have
the assistance of counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const.
Amend. VI. A defendant under the Sixth Amendment has a right
to “reasonably effective assistance of counsel.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court articulated
a two-prong test for ineffective counsel:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing
that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said
that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown of the
adversary process that renders the result unreliable.
Id.
“There
is a strong presumption that legal counsel is competent,
” United States v. Osterbrock, 891
F.2d 1216, 1220 (6th Cir. 1989), and “falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. A “reviewing
court must give a highly deferential scrutiny to
counsel's performance.” Ward v. United
States, 995 F.2d 1317, 1321 (6th Cir. 1993). Further,
“[t]he reasonableness of counsel's performance is
to be evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time of
the alleged error and in light of all the
circumstances.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477
U.S. 365, 384 (1986). “The defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
III.
Analysis
A.
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