United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT [1] AND DENYING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER [7]
LAURIE
J. MICHELSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Theodore
J. Visner is a Michigan prisoner, currently serving a
custodial sentence for convictions out of Bay County Circuit
Court. Visner sues a host of police officers, prosecutors,
and municipalities, all of whom, Visner says, in one way or
another violated his constitutional rights. To make him
whole, Visner seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief.
Specifically, Visner asks for a temporary restraining order
releasing him from custody, expunging his record, and barring
Bay County from pursuing any further criminal prosecutions
against him.
The
Court has granted Visner leave to proceed without prepayment
of the filing fee for this action. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1). Because Visner is proceeding without first
paying, the Court is required to screen his complaint before
initiating service on the Defendants. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). And if upon
screening the Court determines that the action is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief, the complaint must be dismissed.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A complaint is frivolous
if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In making this
determination, pro se filings are to be construed liberally.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
Visner's
chief complaint goes to the validity of his continued
confinement. He challenges the police raids on his property
and the ensuing state criminal proceedings. Because Visner
alleges his rights were violated at every stage, he thinks he
is entitled to an injunction securing his release.
However,
an action under § 1983 is not a valid way to challenge
confinement following a state criminal conviction. See
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Only by
petitioning a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus may a
state prisoner seek relief from a state criminal conviction.
Id. So Visner's present demand for his immediate
release from prison is unwarranted.
Moreover,
to the extent Visner seeks any other form of relief (monetary
or injunctive), his claims are barred. A prisoner's
§ 1983 case is barred if “success in that action
would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement
or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544
U.S. 74, 81- 82 (2005). The bar continues until Visner can
show that state criminal proceedings have terminated in his
favor. See Fox v. Michigan State Police Dep't.,
173 Fed.Appx. 372, 377-78 (6th Cir. 2006).
Visner
cannot overcome the Heck bar. Visner challenges
police raids on his property along with the ensuing state
criminal process that, taken together, led to his felony
firearm convictions. Success in this action would demonstrate
the invalidity of Visner's convictions and his continued
confinement. But because Visner cannot first establish that
his felony firearm convictions have been overturned or called
into question on habeas review, his civil rights claims are
barred by Heck. Harper v. Jackson, 293 Fed.Appx.
389, 392 (6th Cir. 2008). They must be dismissed.
Finally,
to the extent Heck does not bar the remainder of
Visner's claims, they are still subject to dismissal. It
appears Visner seeks monetary damages based on allegedly
unreasonable search and seizure. But to recover from an
allegedly unreasonable search and seizure “a §
1983 plaintiff must prove . . . that [the search and seizure]
caused him actual, compensable injury, which does not
encompass the injury of being convicted and imprisoned (until
his conviction has been overturned).” Heck at
487, n. 7; see also Hunt v. Michigan, 482 Fed.Appx.
20, 22 (6th Cir. 2012) (illegal search claim barred by
Heck because a conviction resulting from the seizure
of incriminating evidence is not a compensable injury). In
this case, Visner does not allege any facts showing a
personally compensable injury (other than loss of freedom) in
his complaint. At best, Visner makes conclusory claims of
assault, stemming from his arrest and placement in handcuffs.
But conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a civil
rights claim. Moldowan v. City of Warren,
578 F.3d 351, 390-91 (6th Cir. 2009); Crawford-El v.
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998). Thus, what remains of
Visner's complaint is subject to dismissal.
For the
reasons stated, the Court concludes that the plaintiff fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
and 1915A(b) and DENIES Visner's request for a temporary
restraining order. Lastly, the Court concludes that an appeal
from this decision cannot ...