United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division
T. Neff, United States District Judge.
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court
is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under
federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se
complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations
as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly
incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.
is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Chippewa Correctional Facility
(URF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan. The events
about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff
sues Ressie Stranley, R.N., Case Manager Mellindy Chapin,
Alexsandra Wilonawski, M.D., Sandra Wilson, N.P., Robbin
Waybrant, R.N., Warden Connie Horton, and URF Special Health
complaint consists of a jumble of largely unintelligible
assertions regarding his treatment by health care. Plaintiff
has three years left on his sentence. Plaintiff alleges that
he is a “type A diabetic” who is subject to low
blood sugar. Plaintiff weighs 233 pounds, is six feet two
inches, has bad knees and ankles, and fallen arches.
Plaintiff has bipolar disorder and the medication that he has
been taking caused him to lose 19 pounds. Consequently, the
doctor prescribed a snack bag for Plaintiff in addition to
his meals. Plaintiff states that he was given Senna, which
caused him to suffer from the low blood sugar. Plaintiff
states that he takes Cymbalta and “Hydrocr” water
pill, and believes that the two medications interact to cause
serious side effects. Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding
March 1, 2019, Defendant Chapin saw Plaintiff for symptoms of
influenza, such as a fever, difficulty breathing, and a
stuffy nose which made it difficult for Plaintiff to eat or
drink. Defendant Chapin was wearing a mask to protect her
from becoming ill. Plaintiff was seen on March 6, 2019, by
Defendant Stranley for an influenza check. Plaintiff claims
that his fever was down from 108 to 100.4. Plaintiff was
placed on bed rest from his job on the yard crew, but
Defendant Stranley could see that he was breathing normally.
Defendant Stranley released Plaintiff from health care and he
had to wait by himself in the cold. Plaintiff states that on
March 8, 2019, he was seen by Defendant Wilonawski, who
unkindly told Plaintiff that he would not be ready for
release by his ERD (earliest release date) and would be kept
in level IV. Defendant Wilonawski also told Plaintiff that he
did not need a food bag.
March 9, 2019, Plaintiff was seen by Defendant Wilonawski,
who told him that his cataracts might be due to high blood
pressure. In addition, Defendant Wilonawski also said that it
could be caused by ultraviolet rays. Defendant Wilonawski
told Plaintiff that his liver enzymes were elevated because
of his age and Hepatitis C diagnosis and that he needed to be
moved to a prison closer to home for treatment near his
states that the Defendants' conduct toward him was
unprofessional and constituted malpractice. Plaintiff seeks
equitable relief, specifically an inhaler, a walking cane,
orthopedic shoes, salt or mouthwash, and different
medications which will not cause side effects.
Failure to state a claim
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies
to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.
1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself,
the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
asserts that the medical treatment he received from
Defendants violated his rights. Plaintiff does not
specifically state that Defendants' conduct violated the
Eighth Amendment, but merely claims that it constituted
medical malpractice. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment against those
convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. The Eighth
Amendment obligates prison authorities to provide medical
care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide
such care would be inconsistent with contemporary standards
of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 102, 103-04
(1976). The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison
official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical
needs of a prisoner. Id. at 104-05; Comstock v.
McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001).
for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective
and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, the
plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is
sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the inmate
must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm. Id. The objective
component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied
“[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner's need[ ]
for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.”
Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th
Cir. 2004). If the plaintiff's claim, however, is based
on “the prison's failure to treat a condition
adequately, or where the prisoner's affliction is
seemingly minor or non-obvious, ” Blackmore,
390 F.3d at 898, the plaintiff ...