Gardner v. Chapman

          OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 7), DISMISSING THE HABEAS PETITION (ECF NO. 1), AND DECLINING TO GRANT A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY OR LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

          LINDA V. PARKER U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

         This matter has come before the Court on Petitioner Randy Steven Gardner's pro se habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent Willis Chapman has moved to dismiss the petition due to Petitioner's failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitations. The Court agrees that the petition is time-barred. Accordingly, the Court is granting Respondent's motion to dismiss and dismissing the petition with prejudice.

         I. Background

         Petitioner was charged in Wayne County, Michigan with first-degree, premeditated murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316(1)(a), first-degree felony murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316(1)(b), torture, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.85, and first-degree child abuse, Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.136b(2). On February 27, 2012, he pleaded guilty in Wayne County Circuit Court to second-degree murder, torture, and first-degree child abuse. In return, the prosecutor dismissed the two first-degree murder charges. The plea agreement, as amended, also called for a sentence of thirty to sixty years in prison for the murder and ten to fifteen years in prison for the torture and child-abuse. On April 4, 2012, the trial court sentenced Petitioner pursuant to the plea and sentencing agreement and ordered all the sentences to run concurrently.

         Petitioner appealed the scoring of the sentencing guidelines, but the Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal for lack of merit in the grounds presented to it. See People v. Gardner, No. 311351 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2013). Petitioner did not appeal the Court of Appeals decision to the Michigan Supreme Court. See Affidavit of Larry Royster, Clerk for the Michigan Supreme Court, ECF No. 8-7.^[1]

         On March 30, 2015, Petitioner raised several issues in a motion for relief from judgment. The trial court found no merit in Petitioner's arguments and denied his motion. See People v. Gardner, No. 11-005770-01 FC (Wayne Cty. Cir. Ct. Nov. 12, 2015). Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision without success. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal because Petitioner had failed to establish that the trial court erred in denying his motion for relief from judgment. See People v. Gardner, No. 332986 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2016). On July 25, 2017, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal because Petitioner had failed to establish entitlement to relief under Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D). See People v. Gardner, 500 Mich. 1057; 898 N.W.2d 596 (2017).

         The Clerk of this Court received and filed Petitioner's habeas corpus petition on May 30, 2018. The petition is unsigned and undated, but it was postmarked on May 29, 2018. The Court understands Petitioner to be alleging as grounds for relief that: his trial attorney's ineffectiveness rendered his plea invalid; the prosecutor concealed exculpatory evidence and relied on perjured testimony; he is actually innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted; his right of confrontation was violated at the preliminary examination; the police department lacked probable cause to arrest him; and his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated by the lead investigator's omission of exculpatory evidence from the request for a warrant. As noted above, Respondent asserts that these claims are barred from substantive review by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to habeas petitions filed by state prisoners.

         II. Applicable Law and Analysis

         Petitioner's application for the writ of habeas corpus is subject to the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) because Petitioner filed his petition after AEDPA became effective in 1996. Davis v. Bradshaw, 900 F.3d 315, 323 (6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-7188 (U.S. Dec. 20, 2018). AEDPA established a one-year period of limitations for state prisoners to file their federal habeas corpus petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see also Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 550 (2011); Davis, 900 F.3d at 323; Holbrook v. Curtin, 833 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom Woods v. Holbrook, 137 S.Ct. 1436 (2017). The limitations period runs from the latest of the following four dates:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

         28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). “AEDPA also contains a tolling provision, which specifies that ‘[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under ...