United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
EDDIE L. DILLARD, Plaintiff,
WAYNE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, et al., Defendant.
Honorable David M. Lawson
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION TO PROCEED
IN FORMA PAUPERIS  AND REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS, SUA SPONTE, PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT  UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915(E)
R. GRAND UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
case has been referred to the undersigned for management,
hearing, and determination of all pretrial matters pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A), and for any reports and
recommendations on dispositive matters that may be necessary
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B). (Doc. #5).
April 3, 2019, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause to
Plaintiff Eddie L. Dillard (“Dillard”) because he
had not paid the necessary filing fee to commence an action
in this Court, nor filed an application to proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Doc. #7). After
filing a Motion for settlement on May 7, 2019, (Doc. #11),
Dillard filed a response to the Order to Show Cause on May
10, 2019. (Doc. #12). On May 14, 2019, Dillard filed an
application to proceed IFP. (Doc. #13). The Court having
reviewed Dillard's contentions regarding his inability to
pay the filing fee in this case, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that his request to proceed without
prepayment of fees (Doc. #13) is
GRANTED. See 28 U.S.C.
§1915(a); Gibson v. R.G. Smith Co., 915 F.2d
260, 262 (6th Cir. 1990).
for the reasons discussed below, IT IS
RECOMMENDED that Dillard's complaint
(Doc. #1) be DISMISSED
sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e).
case presents Dillard's latest attempt to challenge state
criminal proceedings against him which took place in 1996 and
1997. On January 9, 2014, Dillard filed a civil complaint in
this court, No. 14-cv-10198, naming as defendants the Wayne
County District and Circuit Courts, as well as three Judges
of those courts: Irma J. Chenevert; Nancy Blount; and
Terrance K. Boyle. (No. 14-10198, Doc. #1). In short, Dillard
alleged that the judges who presided over his criminal case
were “un-registered judicial officers, ” and that
the entire criminal proceedings against him were therefore
conducted without “legal authority and
jurisdiction.” (Id.). Dillard's federal
court civil action was assigned to the Honorable Arthur J.
Tarnow, and on January 31, 2014, Judge Tarnow issued an
“Opinion and Order Summarily Dismissing [Dillard's]
Complaint” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
(Id., Doc. Doc. #6). Judge Tarnow found that Dillard
was improperly attempting to use a federal court lawsuit to
challenge his state court criminal proceedings (in violation
of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)),
and that the defendants were not persons who could be sued,
or who were otherwise immune from suit . (Id.).
February 25, 2019, Dillard commenced the instant civil action
in this court, purportedly pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
again naming as defendants the Wayne County District and
Circuit Courts, and Judges Irma J. Chenevert, Nancy Blount,
and Terrance K. Boyle. (Doc. #1). While Dillard's
allegations are largely nonsensical, the clear intent of his
instant complaint is to again challenge his state criminal
proceedings, though this time he also alleges that “the
City of Detroitis liable under Monell v Department of
Social Services [sic]” and for “violating [his]
Fourteenth Amendment rights by enforcing Heck v Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477, 486-87 [sic].” (Id. at 1).
Dillard's complaint is replete with legal jargon, but
lacks any actionable allegation of wrongdoing by any of the
five-named defendants. Instead, Dillard asserts generally,
without articulating any facts of the case, that the
“relationship between the City of Detroit” and
the three judges “is sufficiently intertwined to create
a triable issue of fact” and that “the specifics
of the encounter at issue also provide evidence of
substantial cooperation.” (Id. at 4). In
short, Dillard's instant complaint is a complete re-hash
of the case that Judge Tarnow dismissed some five years ago.
complaint is filed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C.
§1915(a), the court must test its sufficiency under
§1915(e). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B), a
court “shall dismiss” a case at any time if it:
“(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such
Court is required to construe Dillard's pro se
complaint liberally and hold his complaint to a less
stringent standard than one drafted by an attorney. See
Spotts v. United States, 429 F.3d 248, 250 (6th Cir.
2005). Even applying this liberal standard, however, the
Court concludes that Dillard's complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, and seeks monetary
relief against defendants who are immune, and, thus, should
be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B).