United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division
L. Maloney United States District Judge.
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court
is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under
federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se
complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations
as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly
incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint against Defendants for failure to
state a claim.
Kevin Kendell Boone is presently incarcerated with the
Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Ionia
Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Michigan. The events
about which he complains, however, occurred at the Marquette
Branch Prison (MBP) in Marquette, Michigan. Plaintiff sues
the following MDOC employees at MBP: Warden Erica Huss;
Assistant Deputy Warden (ADW) Unknown Denbeste; LPN Unknown
Grant; Registered Nurses Unknown Negrinelli and D. Carlson;
Housing Unit Manager (HUM) C. Scott; Prisoner Counselor (PC)
Unknown Cody; and Assistant Resident Unit Manager (ARUM)
alleges that in February 2019 he was confined in segregation
at MBP due to the fact that he assaulted a staff member at
the prison. On the morning of February 5, 2019, LPN Grant
gave him the wrong medication. She gave him 600 mg of
Tegretol and 112 mcg of Levothyroxine. About an hour
later, Nurse Negrinelli informed Plaintiff that he had
received the wrong medication. Soon after, Plaintiff began to
experience stomach pain, constipation, and vision problems.
He also began to spit up blood. Plaintiff sent kites
requesting medical care.
also filed a grievance, ostensibly about the fact that he had
received the wrong medication. On February 26, he received a
step I grievance response from Nurse Carlson, reviewed by HUM
Scott, stating that Plaintiff had received the wrong
medication due to an “accidental error.” (Compl.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)
February 27, at a segregation behavior review hearing,
Plaintiff told Warden Huss, ADW Denbeste, PC Cody, and ARUM
Laitinen about how he was “being treated.”
(Id.) They did nothing to correct the issue.
contends that he has sent several kites requesting treatment
for his symptoms, but the only thing medical staff have done
is draw his blood.
relief, Plaintiff apparently seeks monetary damages and a
finding that Defendants have violated his constitutional
Failure to state a claim
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies
to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.
1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself,
the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).