United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION & ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING
IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (DKT. 19); AND (2)
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CERTIFY CLASS (DKT.
17)
Hon.
Mark A. Goldsmith, Judge
In this
action, Plaintiff Oron 2015, LLC challenges the Defendant
City of Southfield's (the “City”) inspection
requirements for residential real property in Southfield,
which it says permit warrantless searches and penalize any
property owner who refuses inspection.[1] The City has
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) (Dkt. 19), and Oron
2015 has filed a motion to certify a class (Dkt. 17). The
motions have been fully briefed. Because oral argument will
not aid the decisional process, the motions will be decided
based on the parties' briefing. See E.D. Mich.
L.R. 7.1(f)(2); Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b). For the reasons that
follow, the Court grants in part and denies in part the
City's motion to dismiss and denies Oron 2015's
motion to certify a class.
I.
BACKGROUND
According
to the complaint, the City of Southfield has adopted the
International Property Maintenance Code (“IPMC”),
which authorizes the City's code official to enter any
premises without a warrant, upon reasonable cause to perform
an inspection of the property. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7;
IPMC, Section 104.3. Further, Section 8.509 of the Code of
the City of Southfield (the “City Code”) provides
that city inspectors may enter property without a warrant:
The owner shall schedule with the department the date and
time of the inspection; and the department shall notify the
owner of the fees that must be paid before the inspection.
The owner shall be responsible for notifying each tenant or
occupant of the rental dwelling of the date and time of the
inspection. The owner or agent is required to provide the
code official with access to the rental dwelling and
accompany the code official during the performance of all
inspections and in the event that the tenant or occupant is
not present, the owner or agent must provide access to the
inspector by unlocking the door of the tenant or
occupant's dwelling unit, verifying that no occupant is
present and securing the dwelling unit after the inspection
is completed.
Id. ¶ 8.
Oron
2015 alleges that Section 8.509 of the City Code and Section
104.3 of the IPMC (together, the “Inspection
Ordinances”) make inspections of rental and commercial
property in Southfield mandatory and make refusing these
inspections a punishable offense. Id. ¶¶
8, 10, 12. An owner of real property who does not permit the
City to inspect the property is denied a certificate of
compliance and cannot lawfully rent or occupy their property.
Id. ¶ 14. Oron 2015 further alleges that the
owner may also face civil infractions or have liens placed
upon the property. Id. ¶¶ 15-16.
Oron
2015 owned property in Southfield and was forced to pay the
City $340 on August 11, 2016, pursuant to the Inspection
Ordinances. Id. ¶¶ 20-22. Had Oron 2015
refused to pay and allow the warrantless search, it claims
that it would have been denied the right to rent, use, or
occupy its property. Id. ¶¶ 23-24. Oron
2015 argues that the Inspection Ordinances are
unconstitutional and asserts the following claims against the
City: (i) violation of due process under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments; (ii) violation of the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches; and
(iii) a state-law claim for unjust
enrichment/assumpsit.[2] It seeks injunctive, declaratory, and
monetary relief on behalf of a class of persons who paid
registration or inspection fees to the City under the
Inspection Ordinances.
The
City seeks to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Oron 2015
lacks standing to bring this suit and has failed to state a
claim for unjust enrichment/assumpsit. Oron 2015 seeks to
certify a class.
II.
MOTION TO DISMISS
A.
Standard of Review
The
City moved under Federal Rule 12(c) for judgment on the
pleadings. Any party may move for the entry of a judgment
after the pleadings are closed, but early enough not to delay
trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Courts apply the same analysis to
motions for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) as
is applied to applications for dismissal under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Warrior Sports, Inc. v.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 623 F.3d 281,
284 (6th Cir. 2010). “For purposes of a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material
allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be
taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the
moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to
judgment.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v.
Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007). However, a
court need not accept as true legal conclusions or
unwarranted factual inferences. Id. at 581-582.
When
evaluating a motion for a judgment on the pleadings, a court
considers the complaint, the answer, and any written
instrument attached as exhibits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). A court
should also consider any undisputed facts. Stafford v.
Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., 554 Fed.Appx. 360, 369-370 (6th
Cir. 2014) (taking judicial notice of undisputed facts in
documents considered by district court on ruling on 12(c)
motion); see also Knutson v. City of Fargo, 600 F.3d
992, 999-1000 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding, on review of 12(c)
dismissal, that district court could take judicial notice of
a publicly available state-court argument, which involved a
concession by the appellant).
The
City also challenges Oron 2015's standing to bring the
case. “[A] Rule 12(b)(1) motion is the proper vehicle
for considering whether subject matter jurisdiction exists in
a particular case[.]” Ogle v. Church of God,
153 Fed.Appx. 371, 374-375 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that the
district court “erred by converting the motion to a
Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings because the
Rule 12(c) motion is a decision on the merits that cannot be
decided without first determining whether subject matter
jurisdiction is proper, regardless of whether the court used
the factual record to resolve that threshold inquiry”)
(citing Ohio v. Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United
States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990)). “When
a Rule 12(b)(1) motion attacks the factual basis for
jurisdiction . . . the district court has broad discretion
over what evidence to consider and may look outside the
pleadings to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction
exists.” Adkisson v. Jacobs Engineering Group,
Inc., 790 F.3d 641, 647 (6th Cir. 2015).
B.
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