United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Cheryl D. McGee, Plaintiff,
Michael Andrews & Associates, Defendant.
Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
J. TARNOW SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Cheryl McGee, brings this case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692,
et seq. In 2017, Plaintiff financed the purchase of
her automobile through Tracer Financial Company. When she
fell behind on her payments, Ms. McGee began receiving phone
calls from Michael Andrews & Associates, a debt
collection company. Defendant defended the legality of those
phone calls in its January 3, 2019 Motion to Dismiss .
For the reasons below, that motion will be granted in part
and denied in part.
and Procedural Background
Defendant's motion is brought under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6), all of Plaintiff's plausible allegations will
be accepted as true.
began receiving phone calls from Defendant around the spring
of 2018, regarding the $8, 000 she continued to owe to
Tracer. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10-11). Though Defendant
primarily used one phone number for its calls, it
occasionally used others. (Id. at ¶ 13).
Plaintiff alleges that although Defendant was aware of
Plaintiff's insupportable financial condition, it
continued to place calls that were rude and demeaning in
tone. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-18). Defendant told
Plaintiff that it would repossess Plaintiff's vehicle if
payment was not made. (Id. at ¶ 19). Defendant
also berated Plaintiff for purchasing a vehicle that she
could not afford. (Id. at ¶ 20).
October 16, 2018, Plaintiff filed her original Complaint.
[Dkt. # 1]. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss , but
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint  on December 18,
2018. Defendant filed a second Motion to Dismiss  on
January 3, 2019. That motion is now fully briefed and
suitable for determination without a hearing in accord with
Local Rule 7.1(f)(2).
moves to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6). On such a motion to dismiss, the Court must
“construe the complaint in a light most
favorable” to Plaintiff and “accept all of [its]
factual allegations as true.” Lambert v.
Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2008).
“Although the factual allegations in a complaint need
not be detailed, they ‘must do more than create
speculation or suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of
action; they must show entitlement to relief.'”
Id. quoting LULAC v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d
523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007). To survive such a motion, Plaintiff
must plead factual content that allows the Court to draw a
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged- but it has not
‘show[n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to
relief.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting
has attached transcripts of a phone call between it and
Plaintiff. Such evidence is outside of the Court's
purview on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and will not be considered
in its determination.
enacted the FDCPA ‘to address the widespread and
serious national problem of debt collection abuse by
unscrupulous debt collectors.'” Scheuer v.
Jefferson Capital Sys., LLC, 43 F.Supp.3d 772 (E.D.
Mich. 2014) (quoting Currier v. First Resolution Inv.
Corp., 762 F.3d 529, 2014 WL 3882745 at *2 (6th Cir.
2014) (citing S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 2 (1977))).
alleges, in one count, violations of four separate provisions
of the FDCPA.