United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS [#4]
AND ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED
PAGE HOOD, U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
January 24, 2019, pro se Plaintiff Jesse Kennedy
(“Kennedy”) commenced this action in the small
claims division of the State of Michigan's
46thJudicial District Court in Southfield,
Michigan alleging that Defendant Arbor Professional
Solutions, Inc. (“Arbor”) violated the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §
1681, and Sections 806, 807, and 809 of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692. (Doc # 1) Arbor removed this action to
federal court on February 14, 2019. (Id.) On
February 25, 2019, Kennedy filed a letter in which he sought
to amend his Complaint. (Doc # 3) The Court considers
Kennedy's letter to be his request to amend his
Complaint. The Court now grants Kennedy's request
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), which
instructs the Court to “give leave [to amend] freely
when justice so requires.” Further, the Court finds
that Arbor will not be prejudiced in any way by granting
February 28, 2019, Arbor filed a Motion to Dismiss
Kennedy's Amended Complaint. (Doc # 4) On March 4, 2019,
Kennedy filed a letter in which he responded to Arbor's
Motion. (Doc # 6) On March 18, 2019, Arbor filed
its Reply. (Doc # 9) This Motion is currently before the
Court and a hearing was held on May 1, 2019.
Kennedy's Amended Complaint, he alleges the following.
His claims arose on these dates: October 14-15, 2016, April
25, 2017, December 13, 2018, and January 17-18, 2019. (Doc 3,
Pg ID 8) Kennedy alleges that Arbor violated his rights under
the FCRA and FDCPA in Southfield, Michigan. (Id.)
Due to these alleged violations, Kennedy requests that he be
awarded $6, 000. (Doc # 1, Pg ID 5)
Standards of Review
Motion to Dismiss
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). This type of
motion tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's
complaint. Davey v. Tomlinson, 627 F.Supp. 1458,
1463 (E.D. Mich. 1986). When reviewing a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must “construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Directv Inc.
v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). A court,
however, need not accept as true legal conclusions or
unwarranted factual inferences.” Id.
(quoting Gregory v. Shelby Cnty., 220 F.3d 443, 446
(6th Cir. 2000)). “[L]egal conclusions masquerading as
factual allegations will not suffice.” Edison v.
State of Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., 510
F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007).
Supreme Court has explained, “a plaintiff's
obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level… .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted);
see LULAC v. Bresdesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir.
2007). To survive dismissal, the plaintiff must offer
sufficient factual allegations to make the asserted claim
plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 663 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id.
Pro Se Litigants
drafted by pro se litigants are held to a less
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by counsel.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A court
will liberally construe a pro se complaint to
determine whether it fails to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991). However, the “duty to be less
stringent with pro se complaint[s] does not require
[a] court to conjure up unplead allegations.” Wells
v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.1989). Accordingly,
the Court liberally construes Kennedy's
allegations-without creating new ones for him. See
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
argues that Kennedy's FCRA and FDCPA claims should be
dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) because his Amended
Complaint does not contain a short and plain statement of his
claims showing that he is entitled to relief. Arbor asserts
that Kennedy has not described any actions that it has taken
that would allow the Court to find that it violated either
statute. Arbor additionally claims that Kennedy's ...