United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART DEFENDANT ANCHOR STAFFING, INC.'S MOTION TO
V. PARKER, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
initiated this lawsuit on September 12, 2018, alleging that
Defendants engaged in unlawful discrimination, harassment,
and retaliation in violation of federal and Michigan law.
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on November 20, 2018.
(ECF No. 14.) In that pleading, Plaintiff asserts two counts
against Defendants Michigan Automotive Compressor, Inc.
(“MACI”) and Anchor Staffing, Inc.
(“Anchor”): (I) sex harassment and discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”) and Michigan's Elliott-Larsen
Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”); and (II) retaliation
in violation of Title VII and ELCRA. The matter is presently
before the Court on Anchor's motion to dismiss, filed
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6)
on November 28, 2018. (ECF No. 15.) The motion has been fully
briefed. (ECF Nos. 16, 17.) Finding the facts and legal
arguments sufficiently presented in the parties' briefs,
the Court is dispensing with oral argument with respect to
Anchor's motion pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan
Local Rule 7.1(f).
Anchor's Arguments & Subject Matter
first argues in its motion to dismiss that subject matter
jurisdiction is lacking over Plaintiff's action against
it because Plaintiff failed to file a charge of
discrimination against Anchor with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Alternatively,
Anchor argues that Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts
to assert her claims against it.
3, 2019, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision
addressing whether Title VII's charge-filing precondition
to filing suit is “jurisdictional.” Fort Bend
Cty., Texas v. Davis, -- S.Ct. --, 2019 WL 2331306 (June
3, 2019). The Court held that it is not. Id. at *2.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's failure to file an EEOC charge
against Anchor prior to initiating this lawsuit is not
determinative of whether there is federal subject matter
jurisdiction. The Court therefore will not evaluate
Anchor's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1)'s
Court will, however, consider Anchor's motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and decide whether Plaintiff fails
to state a viable Title VII claim against this defendant
because she filed her EEOC charge against it after she
initiated this lawsuit and more than three hundred days after
she was terminated. The Court also will consider whether
Plaintiff states any viable claim(s) against Anchor in her
Applicable Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must
contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]”
Under this notice pleading standard, a complaint need not
contain “detailed factual allegations, ” but it
must contain more than “labels and conclusions”
or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action . . ..” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint does not “suffice
if it tenders ‘naked assertions' devoid of
‘further factual enhancement.'” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Supreme Court provided in Iqbal and
Twombly, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard
“does not impose a probability requirement at the
pleading stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
illegal [conduct].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
deciding whether the plaintiff has set forth a
“plausible” claim, the court must accept the
factual allegations in the complaint as true. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). This presumption,
however, is not applicable to legal conclusions.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668. Therefore,
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555).
Applicable Law and Analysis
appears to be asserting Title VII harassment, discrimination,
and retaliation claims against Anchor. Plaintiff
attaches to her response brief the EEOC charge she filed
against Anchor on November 8, 2018, alleging sex
discrimination and retaliation. (Pl.'s Resp. Ex. A, ECF
No. 16-2 at Pg ID 134.) According to Plaintiff's EEOC
charge and Amended Complaint, she suffered discrimination
from November 21, 2017 to January 2, 2018, the latter being
the date she was terminated. (Id.; see also
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12-23, ECF No. 14 at Pg ID 80-81.)
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a condition
precedent to filing a Title VII action. Zipes v.
TWA, 455 U.S. 385, 392-98 (1982). To exhaust
administrative remedies, a plaintiff must file an EEOC charge
“within 180 days ‘after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occur[s].'” Fort Bend
Cty., 2019 WL 2331306, at *2 (brackets in original)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e)(1)). A plaintiff
initiating proceedings in a State or political subdivision
with a fair employment agency of its own has 300 days to file
an EEOC charge. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(e)). Once the EEOC dismisses the charge and issues a
right-to-sue letter, the plaintiff has 90 days to file a
civil action. Id. at *3 (citing 42 U.S.C. §
200e-5(f)(1)). The failure to adhere to Title VII's time
limits is an appropriate basis for dismissal of a
plaintiff's claims under the ...