United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS
DAVID
M. LAWSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Petitioner
Lawrence Dunn pleaded guilty to burglary and larceny charges
in state court and was sentenced to concurrent prison terms
under a youthful offender statute that would have resulted in
an expunged record, had he successfully completed his
sentence. The sentencing paperwork erroneously indicated that
Dunn had been placed on probation, so the jail released him.
Dunn promptly left the jurisdiction, bound for Nevada, when
he was apprehended in Missouri. When he came back before the
court, the sentencing judge concluded that Dunn was trying to
flee, taking advantage of the clerical mistake, and sentenced
him to a longer prison term after revoking his youthful
offender status. After unsuccessfully seeking relief in the
state appellate courts, Dunn filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. His argument -
that the sentencing judge abused her discretion - does not
raise a claim that he is presently “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Therefore,
the Court will deny his position.
I.
Dunn
was charged in two criminal informations filed in the Oakland
County, Michigan circuit court with first-degree home
invasion, second-degree home invasion, and larceny of a
firearm. On February 13, 2015, he pleaded guilty to all three
charges under a plea agreement with the state. One of the
provisions of that agreement was that Dunn would be sentenced
under the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act, Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 762.11, which allows certain youthful offenders to
plead guilty and subject themselves to a probationary or
prison sentence, but have their cases dismissed if they
successfully complete the program. See Mich. Comp.
Laws § 726.14. But the sentencing court retains the
authority “at its discretion [to] revoke that status
any time before the individual's final release.”
Mich. Comp. Laws § 726.12.
On
March 3, 2015, the trial court sentenced Dunn on each of the
three counts to concurrent terms of three years imprisonment
under the Youthful Trainee Act. After sentencing, when Dunn
reported to jail, he was told that the paperwork received by
the jail indicated that he had been sentenced to a term of
probation. The jail mistakenly released him. Dunn had left
the jurisdiction when the amended paperwork was filed the
next day. He was apprehended in Missouri, en route to Las
Vegas.
On
resentencing, the trial court determined that Dunn
intentionally left the State of Michigan with the intent to
flee the jurisdiction. She revoked Dunn's designation
under the Youthful Trainee Act and imposed concurrent
sentences totaling 5 years, 8 months to 20 years. Dunn filed
an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of
Appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion
when it revoked the petitioner's Youthful Trainee status
and imposed a substantially greater sentence. The Michigan
Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal, as did the state
supreme court. People v. Dunn, No. 328513 (Mich. Ct.
App. March 8, 2016), lv. denied 499 Mich. 870
(2016).
Dunn
then filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
raising the same claim he advanced on direct review in state
court.
II.
An
individual “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court” may petition a federal court for relief in
the form of a writ of habeas corpus “only on the ground
that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(a). But certain provisions of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996), which govern this
case, “circumscribe[d]” the standard of review
federal courts must apply when considering an application for
a writ of habeas corpus raising constitutional claims.
See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003). A
federal court may grant relief only if the state court's
adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States, ” or if the adjudication
“resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
“Clearly
established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1)
includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta,
of [the Supreme] Court's decisions.” White v.
Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). “As a condition for obtaining
habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must
show that the state court's ruling on the claim being
presented in federal court was so lacking in justification
that there was an error well understood and comprehended in
existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
86, 103, (2011). The distinction between mere error and an
objectively unreasonable application of Supreme Court
precedent creates a substantially higher threshold for
obtaining relief than de novo review. Mere error by
the state court will not justify issuance of the writ;
rather, the state court's application of federal law
“must have been objectively unreasonable.”
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (quoting Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000) (quotation marks
omitted)). The AEDPA imposes a highly deferential standard
for evaluating state-court rulings, and demands that
state-court decisions be “given the benefit of the
doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773
(2010).
In his
single claim for relief, Dunn argues that the state trial
court abused its discretion when it revoked his Youthful
Trainee status and increased his sentence after Dunn left the
state upon his release from jail. That argument, however,
will not afford him relief under section 2254.
First,
Dunn raised his claim in the state court of appeals, which
denied leave to appeal “for lack of merit in the
grounds presented.” People v. Dunn, No. 328513
(Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2015). This summary denial of
Dunn's claim, despite its brevity, is entitled to
deference under section 2254(d). Where a state court denies a
claim on the merits, but without explanation, “a habeas
court must determine what arguments or theories . . . could
have supported, the state court's decision; and then it
must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could
disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent
with [Supreme Court precedent].” Harrington,
562 U.S. at 102. Therefore, the relevant question is whether
any reasonable argument consistent with established Supreme
Court law could support the state court decision summarily
rejecting Dunn's claim.
Dunn
was 19 years old at the time of his plea and sentencing. His
initial sentence, adhering to the plea agreement, allowed him
the chance to avoid a record of three felony convictions if
he successfully completed the Youthful Trainee program. There
is no dispute that Dunn reported to the Oakland County Jail
on the day he was sentenced. And the parties agree that jail
officials mistakenly released Dunn from custody after being
told that he had been sentenced to probation. The parties
disagree about what Dunn should have done about that and what
impact his actions should have had on his sentence.
At the
resentencing hearing, Dunn and his attorney argued that Dunn
was not fleeing Michigan. Rather, they maintained he was
headed to Nevada because his uncle promised that he had a job
waiting for him. Defense counsel asked the trial court to
impose the same sentence previously imposed. But the trial
judge declined to do so, because she found that Dunn
intentionally left the State of Michigan with the intent to
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