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Goldman v. Michigan Department of Corrections

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

June 28, 2019

LANCE ADAM GOLDMAN, Petitioner,
v.
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

          OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS [DKT. NO. 1], DENYING THE MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION AND STAYING EXTRADITION [DKT. NO. 3], AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

          Denise Page Hood, Chief Judge

         I. INTRODUCTION

         Petitioner Lance Adam Goldman, currently in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections, has filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his extradition to Florida, pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. After reviewing the petition, it appears that Goldman has not exhausted his state court remedies, which a prisoner must do before applying to the federal courts for habeas corpus relief. Therefore, under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, the Court will dismiss the petition without prejudice and deny his motion for a stay. The Court also denies a certificate of appealability.

         II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

         Petitioner Goldman asserts that the Michigan Department of Corrections issued him a “Notice of Detainer” regarding charges pending in the state of Florida. Petitioner did not provide the Court a copy of the notice. The petition does include copies of an Affidavit dated February 3, 2017, from the Polk County, Florida, Sheriff's Office; and a charging document from the same county dated September 25, 2017. (Pet. at 6-9, 10-12, Docket No. 1, PageID 6-9, 10-12.) Petitioner was charged on three counts each of “executing a scheme to defraud on a financial institution” and “grand theft.” (Id. at 10.)

         No probable cause determination has been made by Florida, nor have the governors of the respective states granted extradition. (Id. at 2.) Yet Petitioner asserts that Michigan has “okayed” Florida to extradite him in violation of his rights under the IAD. (Id. at 3.)

         Petitioner disputes that he is the person named in the affidavit. (Id. at 2-3.) He acknowledges that the date of birth on the affidavit matches his own but that other identifying details are incorrect. Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus and an order staying his extradition to Florida. (Id. at 4.) It appears that Goldman's first challenge to the pending extradition is this federal habeas petition. Petitioner provides no indication that he attempted to obtain relief from the authorities of Michigan or Florida.

         III. ANALYSIS

         A. Legal standard

         Upon receipt of a habeas corpus petition, a federal court must “promptly examine [the] petition to determine ‘if it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.'” Crump v. Lafler, 657 F.3d 393, 396 n. 2 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts). “Federal courts are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face, ” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994); or if it does not set forth facts that give rise to a cause of action under federal law. See Perez v. Hemingway, 157 F.Supp.2d 790, 796 (E.D. Mich. 2001). No. response to a habeas petition “is necessary when the petition is frivolous, or obviously lack[s] merit, or where . . . the necessary facts can be determined from the petition itself without need for consideration of a return.” Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 140 (6th Cir.1970); see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2243.

         Section 2241, Title 28 United States Code confers upon federal courts jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus petitions filed by pretrial detainees, which applies to Goldman because of the pending charges in the State of Florida. Norton v. Parke, 892 F.2d 476, 478 n.5 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Atkins v. People of the State of Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 546 (6th Cir.1981)). Section 2241 jurisdiction is also proper here because Petitioner seeks to prevent his extradition by Michigan to Florida; he disputes the untried charges and challenges potential future custody by the latter state. See Gilmore v. Ebbert, 895 F.3d 834, 837 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1973)). The preliminary review and summary dismissal requirements described above apply to petitions brought under section 2241. See Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (Rule 4 review may be applied to habeas corpus petitions other than those brought pursuant to § 2254); 28 U.S.C. § 2243.

         Federal “courts should abstain from the exercise of [section 2241] jurisdiction if the issues raised in the petition may be resolved either by trial on the merits in the state courts or by other state procedures available to the petitioner.” Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546. Under the doctrine of comity, allowing state courts the opportunity to correct a constitutional violation in the first instance (before the federal court intrudes) reduces friction between state and federal court systems. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). The requirement that a habeas petitioner exhaust state court remedies before seeking relief in federal court “protect[s] the state courts' opportunity to confront initially and resolve constitutional issues arising within their jurisdictions and to limit federal judicial interference in state adjudicatory processes.” Id.

         B. Interstate Agreement on Detainers

         The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD), a compact among forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Government, “enables a participating State to gain custody of a prisoner incarcerated in another jurisdiction, in order to try him on criminal charges.” Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 341 (1994) (citing 18 U.S.C. App. § 2). Under the IAD, “a prisoner held in custody by one State may ‘request . . . a final disposition' of the charges underlying a detainer lodged against him by a different State.” Gilmore, 895 F.3d at 836 (citing 18 U.S.C. app. 2, § 2, art. III(a)). Alternatively, prisoners who do not invoke the “final disposition” provision and are being ...


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