United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division
J. QUIST, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court
is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under
federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se
complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations
as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly
incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff's § 1983 claims for failure to state a
claim. The Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. Those
claims will be dismissed without prejudice.
is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Michigan Reformatory (RMI) in
Ionia, Michigan. The events about which he complains,
however, occurred at the Alger Correctional Facility (LMF) in
Munising, Michigan. Plaintiff sues LMF Physician Assistant
Unknown Westcomb, LMF Corrections Officer Unknown Barber, and
LMF Lieutenant Unknown Rondeau.
suffers from diabetes. Plaintiff alleges that on January 19,
2016, he went to LMF healthcare to get his morning insulin
dose. The nurse informed him that Defendant Westcomb had
reduced his morning, noon, and evening insulin doses.
Plaintiff does not elaborate with regard to the extent of the
three changes, but he does explain that the morning dose
changed from 48 units to 40 units. Plaintiff asked to speak
with or see Defendant Westcomb, to no avail. Plaintiff
immediately filed a grievance against Westcomb alleging that
she was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs. On January 25, 2016, perhaps in connection with the
grievance, the LMF healthcare supervisor spoke with Westcomb
about her actions with respect to Plaintiff's insulin
next day, Westcomb allegedly retaliated against Plaintiff by
joining Defendant Barber in ambushing Plaintiff. Westcomb
verbally attacked Plaintiff and Barber “became
physical” in an attempt to provoke Plaintiff. They did
sought assistance from Defendant Rondeau, but Rondeau told
Plaintiff he was “going to the hole.” Plaintiff
was taken to segregation. Plaintiff claims that Barber filed
a false misconduct report against Plaintiff for Threatening
Behavior. He claims that Rondeau filed a false witness
statement in support of the misconduct ticket.
days later, on January 29, 2016, a hearing officer found
Plaintiff not guilty of Threatening Behavior, but guilty of a
lesser offense. Plaintiff sought a rehearing, without
success, and then judicial review of the decision, but he
claims it was wrongfully denied. Plaintiff alleges that he
did not pursue administrative grievances for Rondeau's
and Barber's false reports because the MDOC does not
permit such grievances.
was released from segregation, but lost privileges for 30
claims that he suffered the medical consequences of Defendant
Westcomb's deliberate indifference until mid-March of
2016, when a doctor increased Plaintiff's insulin dose.
seeks declaratory relief and more than $300, 000.00 in
compensatory and punitive damages.
Failure to state a claim
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies
to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.
1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself,
the first step in an action ...