United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub
ORDER ACCEPTING AND ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE
JUDGE'S APRIL 11, 2019 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
NANCY
G. EDMUNDS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff
David Haney filed this pro se civil rights matter
against Nicki Monroe, Addie Briske, Vicki Jensen, Deborah
Swickley, Bridget Ball, Jennifer Russel, and Jack Bellinger,
who are employees of the Michigan Department of Corrections
(“MDOC”), and Dr. Robert Crompton, who is
employed by Corizon Health, Inc. Plaintiff claims that
Defendants denied him adequate medical care in violation of
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Pending
before the Court is the Magistrate Judge's April 11, 2019
Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 110.) The Magistrate
Judge recommends that the Court deny Plaintiff's motion
for partial summary judgment, grant Defendant Robert
Crompton's motion for summary judgment, and grant in part
and deny in part the MDOC Defendants' motion for summary
judgment. Plaintiff raises two objections to the Magistrate
Judge's Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 111.)
Defendant Crompton opposes Plaintiff's objections. (ECF
No. 112.) Defendants do not otherwise object to the
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. The Court
has conducted a de novo review of Plaintiff's
objections. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
OVERRULES Plaintiff's objections,
ACCEPTS and ADOPTS the
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation,
GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary
judgment, DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment, and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN
PART the MDOC Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment.
I.
Standard of Review
This
Court performs a de novo review of those portions of
the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation to which
Plaintiff has objected. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. §
636(b). The Court need not and does not perform a de novo
review of the report's unobjected-to findings. Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). Moreover, an objection
that “does nothing more than state a disagreement with
a magistrate's suggested resolution, or simply summarizes
what has been presented before, is not an
‘objection' as that term is used in this
context.” Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F.Supp. 2d.
743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2004). Indeed, the purpose of an
objection to a report and recommendation is to provide the
Court “with the opportunity to consider the specific
contentions of the parties and to correct any errors
immediately.” Id. (quoting United States
v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949-50 (6th Cir. 1981)).
II.
Analysis
A.
Plaintiff's Objection Regarding Record
Inaccuracies
Plaintiff
alleges that on May 22, 2013 Defendant Crompton denied him
several medications and treatments that were prescribed by
the doctors who treated Plaintiff at McLaren Hospital from
May 9-17, 2013. Defendant Crompton testified that he examined
Plaintiff on May 20, 2013 and again on May 22, 2013. Based on
his observations during these examinations, Defendant
Crompton concluded that “[b]ecause [Plaintiff] was
doing well before his hospital stay and working in food
service without restriction, and because he did not find
Ultram helpful, I discontinued Ultram and gabapentin.”
(ECF No. 110, PG.ID. 1269.)
On the
record before the Court, the Magistrate Judge found that no
reasonable trier of fact could find Defendant Crompton
“disregarded an excessive risk to [Plaintiff's]
health or safety” by discontinuing the medications and
treatments recommended by the doctors who treated Plaintiff
at McLaren Hospital. Plaintiff's records suggest
Defendant Crompton gave due consideration to those
recommendations and simply reached a different conclusion
than the doctors at McLaren. (ECF No. 110, PG.ID. 1269-70.)
Plaintiff
challenges the accuracy of the description of Plaintiff's
May 20, 2013 visit with Defendant Crompton. Specifically,
Plaintiff contends Defendant Crompton misstated facts and
falsified evidence to mislead the Court “into believing
that [Crompton] followed a course of treatment, when in fact
he did not.” (ECF No. 111, PG.ID. 1278.) Plaintiff
points to alleged inconsistencies in his medical records to
support this allegation. (ECF No. 111, PG.ID. 1276-78.)
First, Plaintiff argues the records show incorrect start and
stop dates for Ultram and gabapentin. Id. Plaintiff
argues these records indicate that Ultram was ordered on May
18, 2013, which was a Saturday and not a day Defendant
Crompton worked at the facility. Id. Second,
Plaintiff claims that because the records show a prescribed
quantity of zero, the records demonstrate Defendant Crompton
never prescribed Ultram or gabapentin. Id. Plaintiff
contends he was never prescribed Ultram, either while in the
hospital or during his visits with Defendant Crompton, and
thus Defendant's statement that Plaintiff requested to be
removed from the medication was false. Plaintiff argues this
is a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary
judgment.
Plaintiff's
objection is overruled. As Defendant points out, the May 20,
2013 note reflects Defendant Crompton was under the
impression Plaintiff had been on Ultram at the hospital and
suggests this information came from Plaintiff himself. Even
assuming Plaintiff is correct and Defendant was mistaken
about Ultram, it would have no bearing on the analysis in the
Report and Recommendation regarding his visits on May 20 and
22, 2013. (ECF No. 112, PG.ID. 1307.) The Magistrate Judge
concluded “Plaintiff's medical records suggest that
Dr. Crompton gave due consideration those recommendations and
simply reached a different conclusion than the doctors at
McLaren.” (ECF No. 110, PG.ID. 1269-70.) Neither the
specific dates on which the medications were ordered or
stopped, nor any miscommunication between Plaintiff and
Defendant regarding those medications, have any bearing on
the conclusion that Defendant Crompton reached a different
medical conclusion than some of his colleagues may have.
“Where a prisoner alleges only that the medical care he
received was inadequate, “federal courts are generally
reluctant to second guess medical judgments.”
Weslake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n. 5 (6th Cir.
1976).
B.
Plaintiff's Objections Regarding Appointing an
Expert
Plaintiff's
objections 2 through 5 argue that the Court should have
appointed him a medical expert. Plaintiff contends an
appointed medical expert would have ...