United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
MICHALE JULIAN JEWEL, et al. Plaintiffs,
COUNTY OF MACOMB, et al., Defendants.
OPINION & ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART DEFENDANT RENE ANTONIAN'S AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (DKT. 37)
A. GOLDSMITH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Rene Antonian, a Detective Sergeant for the Michigan State
Police, seeks summary judgment on claims brought by
Plaintiffs Michale and Dorrinus Jewel. Because oral
argument will not aid the decisional process, the motion will
be decided based on the parties' briefing. See
E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2); Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b). For the reasons
that follow, the Court finds that Antonian is entitled to
summary judgment on Plaintiffs' federal claims and,
therefore, dismisses those claims with prejudice. Because the
dismissal of these federal claims means that this case no
longer retains a federal character, the Court dismisses
Plaintiffs' state-law claim without prejudice and denies
those portions of Antonian's motion challenging the
state-law claim without prejudice.
Michale Jewel was pulled over by Warren police on September
16, 2015. Def. Statement of Material Facts
(“SMF”), ¶ 3 (Dkt. 37); Am. Compl. ¶ 11
(Dkt. 9). According to the allegations in the amended
complaint, the police were surveilling an individual known as
“Smoke, ” but lost Smoke and pulled over Jewel
instead. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-14. Several months later,
Jewel received a notice in the mail that he had a criminal
warrant outstanding. Id. ¶ 16. Jewel was
charged in the 39th and 40th District Courts with delivery
and manufacture of cocaine, heroin or another narcotic less
than fifty grams, though it is undisputed that he did not
commit those crimes. SMF ¶ 3; Am. Compl. ¶¶
was arraigned on January 5, 2016, and released on bond. Am.
Compl. ¶ 17. Following a hearing on March 11, 2016,
charges against Jewel in both courts were dismissed.
Id. ¶ 23. Detective Dubois, who was dismissed
as a Defendant in this case, was the lead officer in the case
who sought the arrest warrant and charges for Jewel. SMF
¶ 6; Antonian Aff., Ex. A to Def. Mot., ¶ 3 (Dkt.
did not have any contact with Jewel until the court hearing.
Antonian Aff. ¶ 4; Jewel Dep., Ex. B to Def. Mot., at 41
(Dkt. 37-3). However, Antonian is listed as the complaining
witness on Jewel's felony complaint. Felony Compl., Ex. 1
to Pls. Resp. (Dkt. 40). According to Antonian, this is
because she was a supervisor with the County of Macomb
Enforcement Team (“COMET”) in September 2015, and
it was routine practice for COMET to list the supervisor as
the complaining witness. Antonian Aff. ¶¶ 2, 6.
After Jewel's court hearing, Antonian requested that the
charges against him be dismissed. Id. ¶ 5.
filed the instant action on September 18, 2017, alleging
violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Defendant Antonian is the only
remaining Defendant in this case and now moves for summary
STANDARD OF REVIEW
motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 shall be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists
when there are “disputes over facts that might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). “[F]acts must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a
‘genuine' dispute as to those facts.”
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there
is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
the movant satisfies its initial burden of demonstrating the
absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the burden
shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts
showing a triable issue of material fact. Scott, 550
U.S. at 380; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986). The nonmoving party “must do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts, ” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380
(quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586), as the
“mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment, ”
id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-248)
(emphasis in original); see also Babcock & Wilcox Co.
v. Cormetech, Inc., 848 F.3d 754, 758 (6th Cir. 2017)
(“A mere scintilla of evidence or some metaphysical
doubt as to a material fact is insufficient to forestall
Court will first address Jewel's federal claims, brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail on a claim pursuant to
§ 1983, a plaintiff must prove that “(1) the
defendant was a person acting under the color of state law,
and (2) the defendant deprived the plaintiff of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States.” Fridley v. Horrighs,
291 F.3d 867, 871-872 (6th Cir. 2002). Here, there is no
dispute that Antonian, as a police officer, was acting under
the color of state law. The Court must, therefore, address
whether Antonian deprived Jewel of a constitutional right,
and, if so, whether Antonian has a valid defense.
raises the defense of qualified immunity, which protects
“government officials performing discretionary
functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Barker v. Goodrich, 649 F.3d 428,
433 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity
‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by
protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.'” Johnson v.
Mosely, 790 F.3d 649, 653 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)). ...