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People v. Hammerlund

Supreme Court of Michigan

July 23, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JENNIFER MARIE HAMMERLUND, Defendant-Appellant.

          Argued on application for leave to appeal April 24, 2019.

         Syllabus

         Jennifer M. Hammerlund was charged in the Kent Circuit Court with operating while intoxicated, third offense, MCL 257.625; and failing to report an accident resulting in damage to fixtures, MCL 257.621, for her involvement in a single-vehicle accident that she did not report to the police. Her abandoned vehicle was discovered by Officer Erich Staman of the Wyoming Police Department, who searched the vehicle, found that it was registered to defendant, and went to her home. According to Staman, he stood on her porch while she remained inside, approximately 15 to 20 feet away from the front door, and they had a short conversation during which defendant admitted to driving the car that caused the damage. When Staman asked defendant to produce her identification, she passed a card to him through a third party in the home. After verifying her information, Staman offered the identification card back to defendant. According to Staman, when defendant came to the door and reached out to take the card, he grabbed her by the arm and attempted to take her into custody for having failed to report her accident. Staman stated that when defendant pulled away, the momentum took him inside the home, where he handcuffed defendant and completed the arrest before taking her to jail. Breath tests administered at the jail indicated that defendant had a blood alcohol content over the legal limit. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the charges, arguing that Officer Staman had violated her Fourth Amendment rights by arresting her inside her home without a warrant and that the evidence gathered following the arrest was subject to the exclusionary rule. The trial court, Paul J. Sullivan, J., denied the motion, ruling that the arrest was constitutionally valid because defendant had voluntarily reached out of her open doorway, which was a public place for Fourth Amendment purposes under United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976). After a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged, and she was sentenced to five years' probation and four months in jail for having violated MCL 257.625 and to a concurrent term of 60 days in jail for having violated MCL 257.621. Defendant appealed, challenging the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence. The Court of Appeals, Murray, P.J., and Sawyer and Markey, JJ., affirmed, holding that the arrest was constitutional under Santana and that the trial court had not erred by denying defendant's motion. People v. Hammerlund, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 17, 2017 (Docket No. 333827). Defendant sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. 501 Mich. 1086 (2018).

         In an opinion by Justice Cavanagh, joined by Chief Justice McCormack and Justices Viviano, Bernstein, and Clement, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held:

         Defendant was not subject to public arrest because she remained inside her home, where she maintained her reasonable expectation of privacy. Defendant's act of reaching out to retrieve her identification card did not expose her to the public as if she had been standing completely outside her house under Santana, and the circumstances were insufficient to justify the hot-pursuit exception to the warrant requirement. Because the arrest was completed across the Fourth Amendment's firm line at the entrance of the home, it was presumptively unreasonable, and the prosecution failed to overcome this presumption. The Court of Appeals judgment was reversed and the case was remanded to the trial court to consider whether evidence should be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.

         1. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. In order to be reasonable, an arrest must be justified by probable cause to believe that an offense has been or is being committed. Even when based on probable cause, however, a warrantless search or seizure inside a suspect's home is presumptively unreasonable, absent exigent circumstances. Warrantless arrests that take place in public upon probable cause do not violate the Fourth Amendment.

         2. The officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for failing to report an accident that caused damage to fixtures under MCL 257.621(a), which is a misdemeanor. While probable cause alone may justify a warrantless public arrest, the same is not true when it comes to arresting a suspect in the suspect's home. Under Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), an officer must obtain a warrant or identify exigent circumstances that excuse the warrant requirement before entering a home to make an arrest. In this case, there was no dispute that defendant's arrest was completed inside her home. The lower courts erred by relying on Santana to conclude that defendant's Fourth Amendment rights remained intact because-unlike the defendant in Santana, who was standing in her open doorway when officers arrived-defendant was not "exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch, as if she had been standing completely outside her house." Defendant was never in a public place, and she possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy inside her home that she maintained throughout the encounter. It was unnecessary to determine how far defendant extended her arm or hand over the threshold because a Fourth Amendment analysis does not focus on such arbitrary calculations; the focus remains on determining whether a person sought to preserve his or her reasonable expectation of privacy. Defendant did not surrender her reasonable expectation of privacy when some portion of her hand or arm crossed the threshold to retrieve her property. Instead, her actions manifested an intent to stay inside, and Staman was aware of that intent. Defendant's expectation of privacy within her home was reasonable, and her action of reaching out over the threshold and retrieving her identification did not relinquish that reasonable expectation.

         3. When officers have probable cause and exigent circumstances exist, it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for officers to enter a home without a warrant. Exigent circumstances exist when an emergency leaves law enforcement with insufficient time to obtain a warrant. While hot pursuit of a fleeing felon is one recognized example of exigent circumstances, there was a not a legitimate hot pursuit in this case. It is unclear whether an officer with probable cause to arrest a suspect for a misdemeanor may rely on the hot-pursuit exception to make a warrantless home entry, and there was no suggestion of any emergency that would have entitled the police to enter defendant's home throughout the conversation up to the point when defendant reached out to retrieve her identification. Accordingly, the seizure in this case, which occurred beyond the "firm line at the entrance of the house," was prohibited under Payton because it was accomplished without a warrant, without consent, and without any exigent circumstances.

         Court of Appeals judgment reversed; case remanded for further proceedings.

          Justice Zahra, joined by Justice Markman, dissenting, would have held that Santana was on point, applicable, and not meaningfully distinguishable from the facts presented in this case, given its holding that the doorway of one's residence is considered a public space for purposes of Fourth Amendment analyses. He stated that under Santana, when the arrest was initiated after some part of defendant's person had extended beyond the constitutionally protected bounds of her home, defendant was "as exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if she had been standing completely outside her house." He also stated that because the arrest was supported by probable cause, initiated in a public place in accordance with Santana, and properly completed inside defendant's home under the hot-pursuit exception to the warrant requirement, he would have affirmed defendant's convictions. He further reasoned that if the warrantless entry into defendant's home and subsequent arrest were improper, the established facts were sufficient to hold that exclusion of the evidence obtained after the arrest would not be appropriate under the United States Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990). Thus, he would have decided this issue in the name of judicial efficiency.

          Chief Justice: Bridget M. McCormack Chief Justice Pro Tem: David F. Viviano Justices: Stephen J. Markman Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth T. Clement Megan K. Cavanagh

         BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

          OPINION

          CAVANAGH, J.

         In this case we must decide whether defendant's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures was violated when a police officer entered her home to complete her arrest for a misdemeanor offense. The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant exposed herself to public arrest when she reached out her doorway to retrieve her identification and that when she pulled her arm back into her home the officer's entry was lawful as a "hot pursuit." We disagree. Defendant did not surrender her Fourth Amendment rights when she interacted with law enforcement at her doorway because she consistently maintained her reasonable expectation of privacy throughout the encounter, and further, the entry was not justified under the "hot pursuit" exception to the warrant requirement. The warrantless arrest was unreasonable under Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573; 100 S.Ct. 1371; 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). We reverse the Court of Appeals judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

         I. BACKGROUND

         Defendant, Jennifer Marie Hammerlund, was involved in a single-vehicle accident in the early morning hours of September 30, 2015, on a highway exit ramp in Wyoming, Michigan. According to defendant, another driver cut her off, causing her to overcorrect and lose control of her car. Her vehicle scraped a cement barrier and left a dent on a metal guardrail. Defendant suffered only minor injuries; however, the car was no longer drivable. She attempted to call her insurance company and then used a rideshare service to get home. She did not report the accident to police.

         Soon after, Officer Erich Staman of the Wyoming Police Department was dispatched to the scene of a reported abandoned vehicle on the shoulder of the highway off-ramp. After observing the damage to the vehicle, as well as the guardrail and cement barrier, Officer Staman requested a tow truck and conducted an inventory search. He discovered that the vehicle was registered to defendant and that it contained paperwork bearing defendant's name, so he requested that officers from the Kentwood Police Department go to defendant's home to perform a welfare check.

         In the meantime, according to defendant, she returned home, found that she was "really shaken up," and drank some alcohol. She then went into her room and went to bed. Only a few minutes later, the Kentwood officers arrived and told her roommate that they wished to speak with defendant. Defendant initially declined to leave her room; however, after her roommate spoke to the officers and reported back to defendant that the police would take her into custody and arrest the roommate for harboring a fugitive if she did not appear, defendant came to the door. After that, Officer Staman arrived at the home to "make contact" with defendant.

         Officer Staman testified that when he arrived at defendant's home, he stood on her porch while she remained inside, approximately 15 to 20 feet away from the front door. He acknowledged that it "didn't appear that [defendant] wanted to come to the door . . . ." And, when asked whether defendant "made it pretty clear that she wasn't coming out of the home," he agreed, stating, "It seemed that she wasn't going to come out." During their short conversation, defendant admitted to driving the car that caused the damage. When he asked defendant to produce her identification she was "reluctant" to give it to him so she passed it to him through a third party in the home. Officer Staman testified that defendant told him that she "thought [Officer Staman] might be trying to coax her out of the house."

         After verifying her information, Officer Staman offered the identification card back to defendant. He explained:

And then I had to give the I.D. back to her, so I made sure I gave it back to Ms. Hammerlund. In doing that she came to the door where I was standing and reached out to get the I.D. as I gave it back to her, at which point I grabbed her by the arm and attempted to take her into custody . . . [f]or the hit and run that she just admitted to.

         He said that when defendant pulled away he grabbed her again and "the momentum" took him inside the home two to three steps where he handcuffed defendant and completed the arrest.

         Following the arrest, Officer Staman placed defendant into the back of his patrol car. After she was advised of and waived her Miranda[1] rights, defendant provided further details about the crash, which she described to the officer as possibly a "road rage situation." Officer Staman detected a smell of intoxicants that was "moderate at best" and asked defendant if alcohol played a role in the crash. She opined that it had not, but did acknowledge drinking alcohol earlier in the night after finishing her shift as a bartender and later indicated that she thought her blood alcohol level may have been over the legal limit. When asked if she had any alcohol to drink after the accident, defendant replied, "Absolutely not." Once transported to the county jail, defendant was given two successive breath tests, which indicated a blood alcohol content over the legal limit at .22 and .21, respectively. Consequently, defendant was charged with operating while intoxicated (OWI), third offense, MCL 257.625, and failing to report an accident resulting in damage to fixtures, MCL 257.621.

         Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the charges. In the motion, she argued that Officer Staman had violated her Fourth Amendment rights by arresting her inside her home without a warrant and that all the evidence gathered following that arrest was subject to the exclusionary rule. The trial court denied the suppression motion, concluding that the arrest was constitutionally valid pursuant to United States v.. Santana, 427 U.S. 38; 96 S.Ct. 2406; 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976). Specifically, it found that defendant was "in the middle of a consensual discussion with Officer Staman" when she "voluntarily approached him" and "voluntarily reached out of her door." Therefore, the court concluded that Officer Staman "was legitimately in that area and it did not violate the constitution for him to effectuate an arrest by grabbing her arm when she reached out of her doorway." The fact that the officer stepped inside defendant's home to complete the arrest did not change the result, according to the trial court, because the officer was "clearly in pursuit for the arrest at that point . . . ."

         The case proceeded to trial. Defendant's theory of the case was that she became intoxicated only after the accident. However, she acknowledged that she did not tell any of the officers that she drank when she got home. Defendant's statements made to Officer Staman in his patrol car, as well as her blood-alcohol-content test results, were admitted at trial. After a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged, and she was sentenced to five years' probation and four months in jail for violating MCL 257.625 and to a concurrent term of 60 days in jail for violating MCL 257.621.

         Defendant appealed, continuing to challenge the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals, like the trial court, concluded that the arrest was constitutional under Santana, 427 U.S. at 42, and that the trial court had not erred by denying defendant's motion. People v.. Hammerlund, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 17, 2017 (Docket No. 333827). Defendant sought leave to appeal in this Court, and we ordered oral argument on the application.[2]

         II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         We review a trial court's findings of fact at a suppression hearing for clear error. People v. Williams, 472 Mich. 308, 313; 696 N.W.2d 636 (2005). We examine the facts as they were presented to the trial court at the time of the suppression hearing, not as supplemented by evidence presented at trial. People v. Kaigler, 368 Mich. 281, 288; 118 N.W.2d 406 (1962). Our review of the trial court's application of Fourth Amendment principles, however, is de novo. People v. Slaughter, 489 Mich. 302, 310; 803 N.W.2d 171 (2011).

         III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. [US Const, Am IV.][3]

         The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403; 126 S.Ct. 1943; 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006); see also People v. Mead, 503 Mich ___; ___ N.W.2d (2019) (Docket No. 156376); slip op at 5 ("The Fourth Amendment demands nothing more or less than reasonableness."). In order to be reasonable, an arrest must be justified by probable cause. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208; 99 S.Ct. 2248; 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). "Probable cause to arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed." People v. Champion, 452 Mich. 92, 115; 549 N.W.2d 849');">549 N.W.2d 849 (1996).

         Even when based on probable cause, however, a warrantless search or seizure inside a suspect's home is presumptively unreasonable. Payton, 445 U.S. at 586. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." Id. at 585 (quotation marks and citations omitted). To protect against unreasonable intrusions into the home, a warrant is required to "interpose the magistrate's determination of probable cause between the zealous officer and the citizen." Id. at 602. In other words, "the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house," which "[a]bsent exigent circumstances . . . may not be reasonably crossed without a warrant." Id. at 590; see also Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638; 122 S.Ct. 2458; 153 L.Ed.2d 599 (2002) ("As Payton makes plain, police officers need either a warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry into a home."). The burden of overcoming the presumption of unreasonableness attached to a warrantless entry rests on the prosecution. People v. Oliver, 417 Mich. 366, 380; 338 N.W.2d 167 (1983).

         Warrantless arrests that take place in public upon probable cause do not violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-424; 96 S.Ct. 820; 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). In Michigan, this standard applies when probable cause exists for a misdemeanor. See People v. Hamilton, 465 Mich. 526, 533; 638 N.W.2d 92 (2002) ("[P]robable cause to arrest for a felony is not required; rather, probable cause that a crime (felony or misdemeanor) has been committed is the constitutional requirement for an arrest."), overruled in part on other grounds by Bright v. Ailshie, 465 Mich. 770 (2002).

         IV. ANALYSIS

         As noted, the Fourth Amendment permits an arrest without a warrant in a public place as long as the police officer making the arrest possesses sufficient probable cause. Watson, 423 U.S. at 423. The officer in this case had probable cause to arrest defendant for failing to report an accident that caused damage to fixtures. MCL 257.621(a). He personally observed damage to the guardrail and cement barrier near defendant's abandoned vehicle. Further, defendant admitted to him that she was driving the car that caused the damage and that she did not report the accident to law enforcement. This information was more than adequate to provide the officer with probable cause to believe that the misdemeanor offense had been committed.[4] Defendant does not argue otherwise.[5]

         While probable cause alone may justify a warrantless public arrest, the same is not true when it comes to arresting a suspect in her home. Under Payton, law enforcement must obtain a warrant or identify exigent circumstances that excuse the warrant requirement before entering a home to make an arrest. Payton, 445 U.S. at 590. In this case, there is no dispute that Officer Staman completed defendant's arrest inside her home. Instead of viewing this as a straightforward Payton violation, the lower courts relied on Santana to find that defendant's Fourth Amendment rights remained intact because of her own actions before the arrest.

         In Santana, undercover officers who had probable cause to believe the defendant had just been involved in an illegal purchase of heroin drove to the defendant's house and saw her standing in the doorway holding a brown paper bag. Santana, 427 U.S. at 40. According to one officer, the defendant was "standing directly in the doorway-one step forward would have put her outside, one step backward would have put her in the vestibule of her residence." Id. at n 1. The officers pulled up within 15 feet of the defendant and got out of the vehicle while shouting "police" and displaying their identification. Id. at 40. The defendant retreated into her home, and the officers followed her inside and arrested her, discovering drugs in the bag and marked money on her person. Id. at 40-41. Before trial, the defendant successfully moved to suppress the evidence after the trial court ruled that a warrant was necessary to enter her home. Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding that (1) the arrest began in a public place, and (2) the police were in lawful hot pursuit when they entered the defendant's home because there was a realistic expectation that she would destroy the evidence. Id. at 43. Therefore, the arrest was constitutional because "a suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place . . . by the expedient of escaping to a private place." Id.

         A. PUBLIC ARREST

         In our view, Santana is distinguishable from the instant case. Unlike the defendant in Santana, in this case defendant was not "exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch, as if she had been standing completely outside her house." Id. at 42. Defendant was never in a public place and possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy inside her home that she maintained throughout the encounter. The lower courts erred by holding otherwise.

         Initially, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that defendant "went further" than the Santana defendant to expose herself to the public by approaching the doorway and "extending her arm beyond the threshold" to retrieve her identification. Hammerlund, unpub op at 5. The Santana defendant stood squarely in the middle of her doorway. Here, the circuit court found only that defendant "reached out of her door" to retrieve her property. According to the record, all that breached the threshold was some portion of defendant's arm or hand.[6]

         But the fact that some portion of defendant's arm or hand crossed the threshold does not tell us the constitutional significance of this fact. Should we consider her to be in public if her whole arm was outside the threshold? What if it was only her wrist or a couple of her fingers? Fortunately, an attempt to determine how far defendant extended her arm or hand over the threshold and what that might mean is an unnecessary exercise.[7] Our Fourth Amendment analysis does not focus on such arbitrary calculations; our focus remains on determining whether a person sought to preserve her constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351; 88 S.Ct. 507; 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).

         It is beyond clear that defendant had a reasonable constitutional expectation of privacy within her home. Payton, 445 U.S. at 587 ("Freedom from intrusion into the home or dwelling is the archetype of the privacy protection secured by the Fourth Amendment.") (quotation marks and citation omitted). Answering a knock at the door or speaking with officers does not destroy an occupant's right to maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy from unreasonable intrusion. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 470; 131 S.Ct. 1849; 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) ("[E]ven if an occupant chooses to open the door and speak with the officers, the occupant need not allow the officers to enter the premises and may refuse to answer any questions at any time.").[8] The only question is whether defendant's expectation of privacy remained intact when some portion of her hand or arm crossed the threshold to retrieve her property or if, by doing so, she somehow surrendered that expectation.

         The lower courts compared this case to Santana to conclude that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because she exposed herself to public arrest. See Hammerlund, unpub op at 5. Santana is distinguishable. In that case, the defendant was voluntarily standing in the middle of her open doorway before the police encounter even began; by doing so, she exposed herself to the public "as if she had been standing completely outside" and she did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy from the very beginning of the encounter. Santana, 427 U.S. at 42. In contrast, defendant began this encounter inside her home-inside her bedroom-emerging only when she and her roommate were threatened with arrest, and then remaining 15 to 20 feet away from the doorway. When asked to provide her driver's license, she had her roommate pass it to Officer Staman while she remained away from the door. Defendant manifested an intent to stay inside, and Officer Staman was aware of that intention. Given her actions, she did not voluntarily and knowingly expose herself to the public as if she had been standing outside her house. Defendant's actions made clear that she was carefully preserving her expectation of privacy.

         Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's application of Santana to this case because it reasoned that defendant exposed herself to public arrest by approaching the door and reaching out to retrieve her identification. Hammerlund, unpub op at 5. But there is a fundamental difference between the reasonable expectation of privacy of a person who voluntarily stands in an open doorway and the reasonable expectation of privacy of a person who remains inside the confines of her home, approaching the doorway only briefly and momentarily breaking the plane of the doorway with some portion of her arm or hand.[9] In other words, defendant did not surrender her expectation of privacy because she did not expose herself to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if she had been standing completely outside. Santana, 427 U.S. at 42.

         Defendant manifested an intent to remain fully within her home by carefully standing several feet away from the door. She continued to manifest this intent when she approached the doorway briefly and only broke the plane of the doorway with some portion of her arm or hand. We think that society would recognize defendant's behavior as preserving a reasonable expectation of privacy. In fact, we would venture that what society would not view as reasonable is exactly what occurred in this case-that a person suspected of a minor misdemeanor could be subjected to a warrantless arrest inside her home in the middle of the night.

         To recap, defendant's expectation of privacy within her home was reasonable, and her action of reaching out over the threshold and retrieving her identification did not relinquish that reasonable expectation. Defendant was not exposed to public arrest, and accordingly, Santana is inapplicable to the facts of this case.

         B. EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES

         Beyond the fact that Santana does not apply because defendant did not leave the confines of her home or otherwise subject herself to public arrest, Santana is still inapplicable because there was no hot pursuit or need for immediate police action. When officers have probable cause and exigent circumstances exist, it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for officers to enter a home without a warrant. Payton, 445 U.S. at 590. Exigent circumstances exist when an emergency leaves law enforcement with insufficient time to obtain a warrant. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509; 98 S.Ct. 1942; 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978). "Hot pursuit" of a fleeing felon is one recognized example of exigent circumstances. Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43. Unlike the lower courts, we do not believe that there was a legitimate hot pursuit in this case.

         To begin, application of the hot-pursuit doctrine under the instant circumstances is suspect. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750; 104 S.Ct. 2091; 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) ("Our hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially when warrantless arrests in the home are at issue, is particularly appropriate when the underlying offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor."). In fact, it is far from well settled that an officer with probable cause to arrest a suspect for a misdemeanor may rely on the hot-pursuit exception to make a warrantless home entry. Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6, 10; 134 S.Ct. 3; 187 L.Ed.2d 341 (2013) (recognizing that the federal circuits are sharply divided on whether a necessary component of the hot-pursuit doctrine is the pursuit of a fleeing felon and that its own precedent was "equivocal" on the matter).[10]

         However, even were we to characterize what occurred as a "pursuit," that pursuit would be far from a "hot" one. "What makes the pursuit 'hot' is 'the emergency nature of the situation,' requiring 'immediate police action.'" Smith v. Stoneburner, 716 F.3d 926, 931 (CA 6, 2013) (citation omitted). In Santana, immediate action was necessary both because police were pursuing a fleeing felon and because there was a reasonable fear that the defendant would destroy evidence if they did not act quickly. Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43. Here, defendant was suspected of a 90-day misdemeanor and there was no evidence of that crime that she could destroy. Indeed, all the elements of the crime were already known to the police. There is no suggestion that any emergency existed that would have entitled the police to enter defendant's home throughout the conversation up to the point when defendant reached out to retrieve her identification. We fail to see how defendant's interaction at the doorway created any kind of emergency, let alone one that would outweigh her expectation of privacy in her home.

         The Court of Appeals held that, under Santana, the officer's pursuit of defendant was legitimate because he acted lawfully by attempting to grab her arm when she extended it beyond the threshold of her home. Hammerlund, unpub op at 6. As we have explained, critical to Santana's holding was the fact that the defendant in that case was voluntarily in full public view when she first interacted with the police and before she retreated into her home. But, as previously discussed, defendant was not voluntarily exposed to public arrest at any point in the encounter. Therefore, unlike in Santana, when defendant pulled her arm away from the officer she did not thwart an "otherwise proper arrest" that had been "set in motion in a public place." Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43.

         C. PAYTON

         Because Santana is inapplicable, we return to Payton, which prohibits entry into a suspect's home without a warrant in the absence of an emergency situation. Payton, 445 U.S. at 590. Defendant did not expose herself to public arrest or relinquish her reasonable expectation of privacy throughout the encounter and there was no hot pursuit, but Officer Staman conceded that defendant's arrest was completed inside her home. Since the seizure occurred beyond the "firm line at the entrance of the house," it was ...


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