United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION
ELLEN
S. CARMODY, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is
an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's
claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II
of the Social Security Act. The parties have agreed to
proceed in this Court for all further proceedings, including
an order of final judgment. Section 405(g) limits the Court
to a review of the administrative record and provides that if
the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial
evidence it shall be conclusive. The Commissioner has found
that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act.
For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the
Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial
evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is
vacated and the matter remanded for further factual findings
pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
The
Court's jurisdiction is confined to a review of the
Commissioner's decision and of the record made in the
administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v.
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 847 F.2d 301,
303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social
security case is limited to determining whether the
Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her
decision and whether there exists in the record substantial
evidence supporting that decision. See Brainard v.
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 889 F.2d 679,
681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de novo
review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide
questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745
F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). It is the Commissioner who is
charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for
disability benefits, and her findings are conclusive provided
they are supported by substantial evidence. See 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance. See Cohen v. Secretary of Department of
Health and Human Services, 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir.
1992). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971);
Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir.
1993). In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the
Court must consider the evidence on the record as a whole and
take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from
its weight. See Richardson v. Secretary of Health and
Human Services, 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984). As
has been widely recognized, the substantial evidence standard
presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision
maker can properly rule either way, without judicial
interference. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545
(6th Cir. 1986). This standard affords to the administrative
decision maker considerable latitude, and indicates that a
decision supported by substantial evidence will not be
reversed simply because the evidence would have supported a
contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347;
Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
PROCEDURAL
POSTURE
Plaintiff
was 56 years of age on his alleged disability onset date.
(PageID.296). He successfully completed college and worked
previously as a teacher aide and assistant principal.
(PageID.75, 89). Plaintiff applied for benefits on September
29, 2015, alleging that he had been disabled since July 22,
2015, due to demyelinating polyneuropathy, nervous system
disorder, radicular lumbar pain and trauma, prostate cancer,
chronic and major depression, suspected autoimmune disease,
degeneration of spinal discs, weakness, and loss of function
in extremities. (PageID.296-97, 331). Plaintiff's
application was denied, after which time he requested a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
(PageID.185-294).
On
October 18, 2017, ALJ Donna Grit conducted a hearing with
testimony being offered by Plaintiff and a vocational expert.
(PageID.82-119). In a written decision dated December 5,
2017, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled.
(PageID.48-76). The Appeals Council declined to review the
ALJ's determination, rendering it the Commissioner's
final decision in the matter. (PageID.31-36). Plaintiff
subsequently initiated this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ's
decision.
ANALYSIS
OF THE ALJ'S DECISION
The
social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential
process for evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R.
'' 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).[1] If the
Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in
the review, no further finding is required. See 20
C.F.R. '' 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations
also provide that if a claimant suffers from a nonexertional
impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are
considered in determining his residual functional capacity.
See 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1545, 416.945.
The
burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely
on Plaintiff's shoulders, and he can satisfy his burden
by demonstrating that his impairments are so severe that he
is unable to perform his previous work, and cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, perform
any other substantial gainful employment existing in
significant numbers in the national economy. See 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528.
While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step
five, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four
of the procedure, the point at which his residual functioning
capacity (RFC) is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert,
482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Commissioner of
Social Security, 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997).
The ALJ
determined that Plaintiff suffered from: (1) degenerative
changes of the lumbar, thoracic, and cervical spine; (2)
status post cervical fusion; (3) carpal tunnel syndrome; (4)
lower extremity neuropathy; (5) right shoulder degenerative
changes; (6) history of right shoulder rotator cuff tear
repair surgery/bilateral shoulder tendinitis; and (7) history
of prostate cancer, severe impairments that whether
considered alone or in combination with other impairments,
failed to satisfy the requirements of any impairment
identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20
C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.52-59).
With
respect to Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the capacity to
perform sedentary work subject to the following limitations:
(1) he cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (2) he
cannot crawl and can only occasionally stoop, crouch,
balance, kneel, and climb ramps/stairs; (3) he can frequently
perform handling and fingering activities; (4) he can
occasionally reach bilaterally; (5) he can occasionally be
exposed to extreme cold; and (6) he cannot use vibratory hand
tools. (PageID.59). Based on the testimony of a vocational
expert, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was still capable of
performing his past relevant work as a teacher aide.
Accordingly, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim for
benefits.
I.
The ALJ's Step II Findings are not Supported by
...