United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division
L. Maloney, United States District Judge.
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court
is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under
federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se
complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations
as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly
incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.
is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the St. Louis Correctional Facility
(SLF) in St. Louis, Gratiot County, Michigan. The events
about which he complains, however, occurred at the Chippewa
Correctional Facility (URF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County,
Michigan. Plaintiff sues Defendant Corrections Officer
states that he suffers from an enlarged prostate. Plaintiff
alleges that on July 11, 2017, he had to use the bathroom and
that his need was urgent because of his medical condition.
Plaintiff explained his medical condition to Defendant, told
him that he was about to urinate on himself, and asked to use
the bathroom. Plaintiff also showed Defendant his medication.
Defendant refused to allow Plaintiff to use the bathroom,
causing Plaintiff to urinate on himself. Plaintiff asserts
that corrections officers such as Defendant have discretion
to allow prisoner movement during count in order to use the
bathroom for medical reasons. Plaintiff filed a grievance on
31, 2017, Plaintiff was hired as a unit porter. When
Defendant gave Plaintiff his work detail, he commented that
Plaintiff would not be working long because of his bathroom
issues. On August 13, 2017, Defendant fired Plaintiff from
his job. The reason given for the job termination was that
Plaintiff had refused to clean the showers because they
smelled like “piss.” Plaintiff states that this
was untrue, and that Plaintiff had merely requested proper
cleaning materials to address the smell in the showers.
Plaintiff states that he had been given disinfectant for the
showers, but that procedure dictated that the showers first
be cleaned with MSI cream cleanser. Plaintiff was never given
the MSI [Michigan State Industries] cream cleanser. When
Plaintiff attempted to explain this to Defendant, he was told
to take off his gloves and was immediately fired. Plaintiff
was labeled as unemployable and was confined to his cell for
claims that Defendant's denial of bathroom usage on July
11, 2017, constituted deliberate indifferece to a serious
medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff
also states that Defendant's conduct in firing him was
motivated by a desire to retaliate against him for his use of
the grievance system in violation of the First Amendment.
seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as
Failure to state a claim
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies
to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.
1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself,
the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
claims that Defendant's denial of his request to use the
bathroom on July 11, 2017, constituted deliberate
indifference. The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional
limitation on the power of the states to punish those
convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be
“barbarous” nor may it contravene society's
“evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). The Amendment,
therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that
involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at
346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of
the “minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see
also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600-01 (6th Cir.
1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with
“deprivations of essential food, medical care, or
sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for
prison confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348
(citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant
experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning
of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at
order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim,
he must show that he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his
health or safety and that the defendant official acted with
“‘deliberate indifference' to [his] health or
safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474,
479-80 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (applying deliberate indifference
standard to medical claims)); see also ...