United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Janet T. Neff, Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
S. CARMODY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 51), Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 63), and
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF
No. 71). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the
undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's motion be
denied, Defendants' motions be
granted, and this matter
initiated the present action on July 2, 2018, against: (1)
Cass County; (2) Advanced Correctional Helathcare; (3)
Sheriff Richard Behnke; (4) Undersheriff Clinton Roach; (5)
Captain Kevin Garrelts; (6) Medical Provider Joseph Mashni;
and (7) Nurse Susanne Salisbury. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants “acted with deliberate indifference to [his]
medical needs” between March 28, 2017, and June 26,
2018. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed
to provide appropriate treatment for his pancreatitis and
foot infection. The parties have now all moved for summary
judgment “shall" be granted Aif the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party moving for summary judgment can
satisfy its burden by demonstrating “that the
respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for discovery,
has no evidence to support an essential element of his or her
case." Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398 F.3d 751, 761
(6th Cir. 2005). Once the moving party demonstrates that
“there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party's case," the non-moving party
“must identify specific facts that can be established
by admissible evidence, which demonstrate a genuine issue for
trial." Amini v. Oberlin College, 440 F.3d 350,
357 (6th Cir. 2006).
the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, the party opposing the summary
judgment motion “must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts." Amini, 440 F.3d at 357. The existence
of a mere “scintilla of evidence" in support of
the non-moving party's position is insufficient.
Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730, 734-35 (6th Cir.
2005). The non-moving party Amay not rest upon [his] mere
allegations," but must instead present
“significant probative evidence" establishing that
“there is a genuine issue for trial." Pack v.
Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 813-14 (6th Cir. 2006).
the non-moving party cannot defeat a properly supported
motion for summary judgment by “simply arguing that it
relies solely or in part upon credibility
determinations." Fogerty v. MGM Group Holdings
Corp., Inc., 379 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2004). Rather,
the non- moving party “must be able to point to some
facts which may or will entitle him to judgment, or refute
the proof of the moving party in some material portion, and.
. .may not merely recite the incantation,
'Credibility,' and have a trial on the hope that a
jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof."
Id. at 353-54. In sum, summary judgment is
appropriate “against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial."
Daniels, 396 F.3d at 735.
moving party without the burden of proof need only show that
the opponent cannot sustain his burden at trial, a moving
party with the burden of proof faces a “substantially
higher hurdle." Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552,
561 (6th Cir. 2002). Where the moving party has the burden,
“his showing must be sufficient for the court to hold
that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for
the moving party." Calderone v. United States,
799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986). The Sixth Circuit has
emphasized that the party with the burden of proof
“must show the record contains evidence satisfying the
burden of persuasion and that the evidence is so powerful
that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it."
Arnett, 281 F.3d at 561. Accordingly, summary
judgment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion
“is inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible of
different interpretations or inferences by the trier of
fact." Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553
Denial of Medical Treatment
alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights
by failing to properly treat his pancreatitis and foot
infection. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment applies not only to punishment
imposed by the state, but also to deprivations which occur
during imprisonment and are not part of the sentence imposed.
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1976).
Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment protects against the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, the existence of
which is evidenced by the “deliberate
indifference” to an inmate's “serious medical
needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-06;
Napier v. Madison County, Kentucky, 238 F.3d 739,
742 (6th Cir. 2001).
analysis by which a defendant's conduct is evaluated
consists of two-steps. First, the Court must determine,
objectively, whether the alleged deprivation was sufficiently
serious. A “serious medical need, ” sufficient to
implicate the Eighth Amendment, is “one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that
is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize
the necessity for a doctor's attention.”
Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2008).
Thus, the objective component is satisfied where a prisoner
receives no treatment for a serious medical need. See
Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 737 (6th Cir. 2018).
However, if the prisoner “has received on-going
treatment for his condition and claims that this ...