United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
F. J. MILLER, Plaintiff,
INTERURBAN TRANSIT PARTNERSHIP, et al., Defendants.
Paul L. Maloney Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KENT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
pro se lawsuit is now before the Court on motions to
dismiss filed by defendants Grand Valley State University
(ECF No. 9) and Interurban Transit Partnership (ECF No. 12),
and an amended motion to dismiss filed by defendant City of
Grand Rapids (ECF No. 20). The motions are
complaint alleged, among other things, that defendants
Interurban Transit Partnership (“Partnership”),
the City of Grand Rapids (“Grand Rapids”), and
Grand Valley State University (“GVSU”) are
“longtime co conspirators and federal grant recipients,
” who have engaged in “elderabuse, elderlooting,
extravagance and brazen disenfrachisement” of
“Catholic city bus rate [sic] riders 7, 8, 10, 12, 14,
15, 16, 18 as well as black riders on black routes 1, 2, 3,
4, 5 and 14” in violation of “RICO Act of 1970
(as patterns of corrupt practices and policies), as well as
under the Older Americans Act of 1965, Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act and fundamental 14th Amendment equal
protections.” Compl. at PageID.1-3. The City's
amended brief summarized the myriad of claims brought by
Miller's complaint lists many grievances with respect to
what he alleges are recent changes to the Rapid's
operation: (1) an increase in fares resulting from capping
the number of transfers a rider may make on a single ticket;
(PageID.6); (2) the addition of a bus line running from
downtown Grand Rapids to Defendant GVSU's Allendale,
Michigan, campus (the Laker Line) (PageID.1); (3) replacement
of existing buses with buses with windows that do not open
(PageID.3.); (4) “disenfranchisement” of bus
riders of “Catholic” and “black
routes” (id.); (5)
“gerrymandering” of Defendant ITP's board
resulting in disproportionate representation among the
participating cities (PageID.5); (6) “offramping”
at Central Station that “cuts . . . access” to
downtown amenities (PageID.7); (7) the distance certain
riders must walk from the nearest stop to various
destinations (PageID.9) (8) the width and softness of bus
seats (id.); (9) problems with the air conditioning
at Central Station and the removal of tables and chairs from
the Central Station lobby (id.); and (10) the terms
of the employment contract of new ITP CEO (PageID.13, 14.)
Miller also alleges that (1) GVSU bribed two GR Mayors
(PageID.11); (2) GVSU created an unnecessary master's
degree program with the GR mayor as chairperson (PageID.12);
(3) the GR Mayor exploits Central Station for political
“cronies” (id.); (4) ITP board has cut
the number of meetings (id.); (5) the ITP held an
“ambush” meeting to elect a new chair and approve
a labor contract (PageID.13).
Amended Brief (ECF No. 21, PageID.85).
Defendants' motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 9, 12, and
three defendants seek dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction (plaintiff lacks standing
because he failed to allege a particularized injury) and
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (plaintiff failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted).
contend that plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action
and seek dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). “Whether a party has
Article III standing is properly an issue of a court's
subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).”
Crookston v. Johnson, 370 F.Supp.3d 804, 807 (W.D.
Mich. 2018). This Court addressed the issue of standing in
its order dismissing plaintiff's previous lawsuit against
“The doctrine [of standing to sue] limits t he c
ategory of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in
federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong.”
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016);
see, e.g., Allen v. Write, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
“[T]he ‘irreducible constitutional minimum'
of standing consists of three elements.”
Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1547 (quoting Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 556, 560 (1992)).
“The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in
fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct
of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a
favorable judicial decision.” Id. (citing
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61). “The ...