United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
January 2, 2018, Plaintiff Raymond Martin Wilson filed his
pro se prisoner complaint alleging that Defendants violated
his constitutional rights and the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA"). ECF 1. Wilson identified the following
parties as Defendants: Michigan Department of Corrections
("MDOC"), Corizon Incorporated Collectively Corizon
Corporations ("Corizon"), Sonya Forbes,
Richard Dase, K. Hamblin, Connie J. Ives, Mick Roberts, and
C. Whitford. The Court referred all pretrial matters to
Magistrate Judge Stephanie Dawkins Davis. ECF 6.
September 12, 2018, Corizon filed a motion to dismiss. ECF
15. On October 24, 2018, MDOC, Dase, and Roberts filed a
motion for summary judgment. ECF 27. On January 7, 2019,
Hamblin, Ives, and Whitford filed a motion for summary
judgment. ECF 44.
6, 2019, Magistrate Judge Davis submitted her report and
recommendation ("Report") and recommended that the
Court grant Corizon's motion to dismiss and deny the MDOC
Defendants' motions for summary judgment. ECF 50. The
MDOC Defendants timely objected. ECF 52. For the reasons
below, the Court will adopt in part and reject in part the
Report, will grant Corizon's motion to dismiss, and will
grant the MDOC Defendants' motions for summary judgment.
Report adequately recounts the facts of the case. ECF 50,
PgID 317-19. The Court fully adopts the recitation here.
Rule 72(b) governs the review of a magistrate judge's
report. A district court's standard of review depends on
whether a party files objections. The Court need not review
portions of a Report to which no party objected. Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 153 (1985). The Civil Rules
require de novo review, however, if the parties "serve
and file specific written objections to the proposed findings
and recommendations." Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). In
conducting a de novo review, "[t]he district judge may
accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition;
receive further evidence; or return the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions." Fed.R.Civ.P.
Screening the Complaint
Court must review "a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). The Court "shall . . . dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint
. . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) (statute governing complaints filed by in
forma pauperis plaintiffs).
Report explains that MDOC Defendants did not offer "an
analysis under the dismissal standard" for Rule 12(b)(6)
motions and did not provide "notice to the opposing pro
se plaintiff that they may be seeking such relief." ECF
50, PgID 339-40. Thus, the Report "makes no
finding" on whether Plaintiff's complaint fails to
state a claim for relief. Id. at 340. But, as noted,
the Court has a statutory obligation to review each civil
complaint filed against a governmental employee-or by an in
forma pauperis prisoner-to determine whether it states a
claim. Based on the Report's language, it appears that
the magistrate judge did not screen the complaint. The Court
therefore will screen the complaint.
context of a prisoner's civil rights complaint, two broad
standards guide the Court's review of the complaint.
First, the standard for whether a complaint states a claim on
which relief can be granted, as articulated in the context of
Rule 12(b)(6). Second, the standards related to § 1983
Failure to state a claim.
deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim on which
relief can be granted, the Court views the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, presumes the truth of
all well-pleaded factual allegations, and draws every
reasonable inference in favor of the non-moving party.
Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,
528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). "[T]he complaint must
contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting
all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some
viable legal theory." Nat'l Hockey League
Players Ass'n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419
F.3d 462, 468 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Plaintiff
must allege facts "sufficient 'to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level,' and to 'state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"
Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609
(6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007)). If "a cause of action
fails as a matter of law, regardless of whether the
plaintiff's factual allegations are true," then it
fails to state a claim. Winnett v. Caterpillar,
Inc., 553 F.3d 1000, 1005 (6th Cir. 2009).
Liability under § 1983.
establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff
must provide factually-supported allegations that a
particular defendant "(1) deprived him of a right
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,
(2) while acting under color of state law." Doe v.
Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 738 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal
citations and marks omitted).
Wilson's Claims Against Forbes, Hamblin, Whitford, and
claims against Forbes, Hamblin, Whitford, and Ives fail to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court
addresses the insufficiency of Wilson's allegations.
Claims against Sonya Forbes.
alleges that Forbes served as his "medical
provider" and was responsible for "caring for the
prisoners, insuring that disabled prisoners were not
discriminated against, harassed, disrespected, degraded, or
humiliated." ECF 1, PgID 2. He claims that Forbes
violated Title II of the ADA and that she acted
discriminatorily, disrespected him, degraded him sexually,
and degraded him for his medical conditions. ECF 1, PgID 8.
Wilson fails to allege any facts that are "sufficient
'to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level,' and to 'state a claim to relief that is