United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT ROBERT H.
HEALY'S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF #34)
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
In
1976, Plaintiff Ledura Watkins was convicted of first-degree
murder in state court and sentenced to life in prison without
the possibility of parole. In 2017, the state trial court
vacated Watkins' conviction and released him from custody
based on a finding that certain expert testimony admitted
against Watkins at trial - asserting that Watkins' hair
matched a hair found on the victim - was unreliable. Watkins
has now filed this civil-rights action against the City of
Detroit and certain individuals involved in his arrest and
prosecution, including Defendant Robert H. Healy, a former
state-court prosecutor. Watkins alleges that Healy fabricated
evidence against him and maliciously prosecuted him. Healy
filed a motion to dismiss Watkins' claims on January 25,
2019. (See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF #34.) For the
reasons that follow, Healy's motion is
DENIED.
I
On
September 6, 1975, “a Detroit school teacher and
reputed drug dealer” named Yvette Ingram “was
found shot to death in her home” in Detroit. (Am.
Compl. at ¶12, ECF #30 at Pg. ID 7490.) Roughly one
month later, the City of Highland Park Police took a man
named Travis Herndon into custody on an unrelated offense.
(See Id. at ¶15, Pg. ID 7491.) While Herndon
was in custody, he “told a Highland Park police officer
… that he [Herndon] had information regarding the
Ingram murder.” (Id.) Herndon said that
Watkins “robbed and killed [] Ingram on the orders of
Highland Park police officer[] Gary Vazana.”
(Id. at ¶16, Pg. ID 7491.)
On
October 21, 1975, Healy and Neil Schwartz, then a sergeant
with the Detroit Police Department, “interrogated
[Herndon] at length about the [] Ingram murder.”
(Id. at ¶17, Pg. ID 7491.) During that
interrogation, Herndon initially provided a different version
of events than the version that he recounted to the Highland
Park police. Herndon told Healy and Schwartz that he
and Watkins, not Watkins alone, killed Ingram on instructions
from Vazana. (See Id. at ¶20, Pg. ID 7492.)
More specifically, Herndon said that “he and Watkins
drove Vazana's car” to Ingram's home and
“used Vazana's pistol to kill Ingram.”
(Id.)
At some
point during the interrogation, “Healy left the room
and [then] returned, passing a note to Schwartz.”
(Id. at ¶21, Pg. ID 7492.) Schwartz read the
note and then handed it to Herndon. (See id.)
“The note indicated that Vazana had been found shot to
death in his residence.”[1] (Id.) Healy thereafter
left the room a second time “while Schwartz attempted
to have Herndon make a tape-recorded statement” that
implicated Watkins in Ingram's murder. (Id. at
¶22, Pg. ID 7493.)
Herndon
then changed his story again and offered a third version of
events. Herndon “specifically told Schwartz that his
earlier statement about [] Watkins' involvement [in
Ingram's murder] was not true.” (Id. at
¶23, Pg. ID 7493.) Herndon then said that Vazana,
not Watkins, drove Herndon to Ingram's home and
that Vazana, not Watkins, shot and killed Ingram.
(See id.) Schwartz then left the room to consult
with Healy. (See Id. at ¶24, Pg. ID 7493.)
According
to Watkins, “while outside the interrogation room,
Healy and Schwartz conspired and agreed to frame [Watkins for
Ingram's murder] by fabricating evidence that Herndon and
Watkins killed [] Ingram.” (Id.) “When
they returned, Healy told Herndon that he and Schwartz wanted
[] Watkins for the Ingram murder because they believed he was
involved and that [Watkins] likely murdered [] Vazana.”
(Id. at ¶25, Pg. ID 7493.) “Herndon again
told Healy and Schwartz that Watkins had nothing to do with
the murder[] and that Herndon and Vazana [had] killed
Ingram.” (Id. at ¶26, Pg. ID 7493.)
Healy
and Schwartz then began to threaten Herndon. They told
Herndon “that they would charge [him] with the Ingram
murder unless he implicated Watkins.” (Id. at
¶27, Pg. ID 7493-94.) Healy and Schwartz also threatened
to charge Herndon with another, unrelated murder if he did
not implicate Watkins. (See Id. at ¶28, Pg. ID
7494.) “In the face of these threats ….
[Herndon] agreed to testify against Watkins.”
(Id. at ¶29, Pg. ID 7494.)
Schwartz
then “took the affirmative step of tape recording a
statement from [] Herndon that implicated Watkins in []
Ingram's murder.” (Id. at ¶30, Pg. ID
7494.) In that recording, Herndon said that he and Watkins
had killed Ingram “on orders from [] Vazana.”
(Id. at ¶30 n.1, Pg. ID 7494.) “Schwartz
deliberately chose not to record Herndon's statement that
[] Vazana[] murdered [] Ingram[] and that [] Watkins had
nothing to do with the murder.” (Id. at
¶33, Pg. ID 7495.)
“One
day after procuring Herndon's made-up statement, Schwartz
filed a Warrant Request [for Watkins] with the Wayne County
Prosecutor's Office.” (Id. at ¶39,
Pg. ID 7496.) Healy was not involved in the decision to seek
a warrant for Watkins' arrest. (See Id. at
¶40, Pg. ID 7496-97.) Instead, “Schwartz submitted
[the warrant request] to the Prosecutor's Office and
swore to facts in support of the warrant.”
(Id. at Pg. ID 7497.) Judge John Patrick O'Brien
issued the arrest warrant on October 22, 1975. (See
id.) Watkins was thereafter arrested for Ingram's
murder pursuant to that warrant. (See Id. at
¶44, Pg. ID 7497.) The content of Herndon's
incriminating statement was “the sole basis
for probable cause for Watkins' arrest.”
(Id. at ¶32, Pg. ID 7495; emphasis in
original.) At that time, “there was no other evidence
linking Watkins to the crime.” (Id.)
At
Watkins' preliminary examination, Healy elicited
testimony from Herndon that he and Watkins killed Ingram at
Vazana's request. (See Id. at ¶32, Pg. ID
7495.) The state district court then bound Watkins
“over for trial based on Herndon's []
testimony.” (Id.)
Watkins'
murder trial began in March of 1976. (See Id. at
¶51, Pg. ID 7498.) Healy again acted as the state-court
prosecutor. (See Id. at ¶52, Pg. ID 7499.) At
the trial, the prosecution relied on two primary pieces of
evidence: (1) Herndon's testimony that he and Watkins
killed Ingram (see Id. at ¶¶ 56-64, Pg. ID
7499-7501) and (2) expert testimony from evidence technician
Ronald Badaczewski that a hair found on Ingram's pants
was “microscopically similar [to]” and “was
a match to” Watkins' hair. (Id. at
¶¶ 66-67, Pg. ID 7501.) The hair evidence was
“[t]he only physical evidence linking [] Watkins to the
scene [of the crime].” (Id. at ¶65, Pg.
ID 7501.)
On
March 16, 1976, a jury convicted Watkins of first-degree
murder. (See Id. at ¶81, Pg. ID 7504.) The
state trial court then sentenced Watkins “to a term of
life in prison without the possibility of parole.”
(Id. at Pg. ID 7505.)
Numerous
appeals and post-conviction motions for relief from judgment
followed. In 1980, during an evidentiary hearing on one of
Watkins' motions, Herndon testified that both his
tape-recorded statement implicating Watkins and his trial
testimony to that effect were false, that Healy and Schwartz
had pressured him into implicating Watkins, and that Vazana,
not Watkins, murdered Ingram. (See Id. at ¶86,
Pg. ID 7505.) The state trial court concluded that
Herndon's recantation was not credible, and it denied
Watkins' motion. (See 5/21/1981 State-Court
Order, ECF #34-26.)
In
2016, Watkins filed a new motion for relief from judgment in
the state trial court. (See Am. Compl., ECF #12 at
¶100, Pg. ID 7510.) In that motion, Watkins challenged
the reliability and admissibility of the hair evidence
introduced at his trial - the only physical evidence linking
him to the Ingram murder. (See id.) The Wayne County
Prosecutor's Office then stipulated to the following
facts in state court:
• New Federal Bureau of Investigation standards of hair
comparison “undermined” the hair analysis offered
at Watkins' criminal trial;
• The prosecutor's office could not re-test the hair
evidence because “[a]ll evidence pertinent to this case
ha[d] been destroyed;”
• The new standards for hair-comparison evidence, and
the inability to re-test the hair evidence, “ma[de] a
different result probable on retrial;” and
• “Insufficient evidence exist[ed] to retry
[Watkins].”
(Id. at ¶101, Pg. ID 7511; see also
6/15/2017, “Stipulated Order Granting [Watkins']
Successive Motion for Relief from Judgment and Dismissing
Case without Prejudice, ” ECF #34-49.) After
stipulating to these facts, the prosecutor's office
“move[d] the [state c]ourt to dismiss the case without
prejudice.” (6/15/2017 State-Court Order, ECF #34-49 at
Pg. ID 9238.) Based on the parties' stipulated facts and
the motion by the prosecutor's office to dismiss the
case, the state trial court granted Watkins' motion for
relief from judgment, dismissed the murder charge against him
without prejudice, and released him from custody. (See
id.)
II
On
December 6, 2017, Watkins filed this civil-rights action
against Healy, Schwartz' estate, [2] Badaczewski, and the City of
Detroit. (See Compl, ECF #1.) Healy moved to dismiss
the claims Watkins brought against him (See Mot.,
ECF #21), and the Court held a hearing on that motion on
October 17, 2018. The Court thereafter entered an order (1)
directing Watkins to file an Amended Complaint and (2)
terminating Healy's motion to dismiss without prejudice.
(See Order, ECF #29.)
Watkins
filed his Amended Complaint on December 12, 2018.
(See Am. Compl., ECF #30.) Relevant to the pending
motion, Watkins brings the following claims against Healy:
• Fabrication of evidence in violation of the Fourth
Amendment (Count I);
• Fabrication of Evidence in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Count II);
.
• Malicious Prosecution in violation of the Fourth
Amendment (Count III);
• Civil Conspiracy in violation of the Fourth Amendment
(Count VIII);
• Civil Conspiracy in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment (Count IX); and
• Common law Malicious Prosecution (Count XV).
Healy
moved to dismiss Watkins' amended claims against him on
January 25, 2019. (See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF #34.)
The Court held a hearing on Healy's motion on July 22,
2019.
III
Healy
moves to dismiss the claims brought against him pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). “To survive a
motion to dismiss” under Rule 12(b)(6), “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A
claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads factual
content that permits a court to reasonably infer that the
defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. See
id. When assessing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's
claim, a district court must accept all of a complaint's
factual allegations as true. See Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt.,
Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 512 (6th Cir. 2001). “Mere
conclusions, ” however, “are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the
complaint's framework, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664. A
plaintiff must therefore provide “more than labels and
conclusions, ” or “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action” to survive a motion to
dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
IV
Healy
moves to dismiss Watkins' Fourth Amendment claims (Counts
I, III, and VIII) on several grounds. The Court will address
each in turn.
A
Healy
first argues that Watkins' Fourth Amendment claims are
barred by the applicable three-year statute of
limitations.[3] (See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF #34 at
Pg. ID 7758-63.) In the context of this argument, Healy
divides Watkins' Fourth Amendment claims into two
separate components: the first seeking damages for allegedly
wrongful detention from the date of arrest through the end of
Watkins' preliminary examination (the “Arrest
Claim”) and the second seeking damages for allegedly
wrongful detention from the end of the preliminary
examination through Watkins' conviction at trial (the
“Pre-Trial Claim”). Healy insists that both of
these Fourth Amendment claims accrued long before Watkins
filed this action and are therefore time-barred. The Court
disagrees.
1
Healy
contends that the three-year limitations period on
Watkins' Arrest Claim began to run in “October
1975” when Watkins was “arraign[ed]” on the
arrest “warrant.” (Id. at Pg. ID 7759.)
Healy rests this argument largely on the United ...